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Conor Paul O’Kane 
Digital privacy and new media: An empirical study assessing the impact of Privacy Seals on 
personal information disclosure.  
Abstract  
 
Advances in technology have facilitated the rapid growth of a global new media industry. Many 
new media firms rely heavily on networked technologies to enable a primary income driver 
based on advertising revenues. This has attracted criticisms from privacy campaigners who 
argue that elements of the way some of these firms operate constitute an invasion of user’s 
privacy.  
 
Early economic approaches to privacy are primarily informed by the rational choice theory and 
viewed individuals as utility maximizers when making decisions involving personal information 
disclosure. Theoretical approaches have since developed to account for factors explored by 
bounded rationality and behavioural economics where individuals engage in complex trade-offs 
when making privacy disclosure decisions.  
 
Both EU and US regulators believe rapid technological advances have rendered existing 
regulatory provisions inadequate. In the EU, the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) set out to improve ‘information transparency’ and give individuals to exercise greater 
‘control’ over their personal data. The regulation set out provisions for the establishment of a 
privacy seal accreditation scheme.  
 
There is little empirical evidence to demonstrate that the use of privacy seals is privacy 
enhancing. Existing research reveals inconsistent and at times counter-intuitive findings. This 
research conducted online experimental research to establish if a causal link exists between the 
presence of a privacy seals and personal information disclose. Experiment results show that 
contrary to previous research in this area, the presence of privacy seals does not result in lower 
personal information disclosure. Survey findings also show that the GDPR has failed to expand 
‘sensitive’ categories of data in line with both EU and US data subjects expectations. 
 
This research makes a number of original contributions to knowledge. Information disclosure is 
examined in relation to sensitive data categories as defined in the GDPR. Using commercially 
available privacy seals, it adds to the existing body of literature on the impact of iconography on 
user behaviour. The findings suggest there is an opportunity for new media firms to use 
independently accredited privacy seals as a differentiator in this industry sector. 
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1 Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
This introduction chapter sets out how advances in technology have facilitated 
the emergence of a global new media industry. Technological innovation has 
facilitated the delivery of highly personalized digital services media services to 
consumers of new media (Küng, Picard and Towse 2008). While many of these 
digital products have proved to be very popular with users, they also pose 
potential risks for service users. Globally, data protection regulators struggle to 
keep up with the sheer pace of technological advances in this area. We have 
even seen the CEO of Apple calling for more regulation to provide 
reassurances to new media consumers and protect the future of this industry.  
 
In 2018, the EU introduced a comprehensive revision of its data protection 
provisions in the form of the General Data Protection Directive (GDPR). This 
thesis conducts experimental research related to a ‘new’ provision in the GDPR; 
the establishment of the privacy seal accreditation system.  
 
Leading media economics academic Robert Picard defines media economics 
as a discipline that addresses,  
 
“how media operators meet the informational and entertainment needs of 
audiences, advertisers and society” (Picard 1989, p.7).  
 
New media firms technology platforms enable advertisers to efficiently target 
specific audiences and this has seen firms like Facebook and Google dominate 
online advertising revenues. Doyle (2013) considers economics as an ideal 
discipline to view the media sector as,  
 
“most decisions taken by those who run media organizations are, to a greater 
or lesser extent, influenced by resource and financial issues” (Doyle 2013, 
p.1),  
 
New media scholars Napoli and Roepnack (2018) state that,  
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“Concerns about data privacy have been a defining characteristic of the digital 
media age” (Napoli and Roepnack 2018, p.410).  
 
This thesis examines these and related issues through the lens of media 
economics.  
 
1.1 New Media Privacy Issues in Context 
 
Apple’s chief executive Tim Cook declared privacy to be one of the most 
important issues of the 21st century. In a 2018 interview Mr Cook said,  
 
“I’m not a pro-regulation kind of person, I believe in the free market deeply [but] 
when the free market doesn’t produce a result that’s great for society, you have 
to ask yourself: What do we need to do? And I think some level of government 
regulation is important.” (Thornhill 2018). 
 
During his keynote address at the 40th International Conference of Data 
Protection and Privacy Commissioners (ICDPPC) in November 2018, Cook 
gives us some insight into why he believes additional regulation of the new 
media industry is needed. The Apple CEO describes how the trade in digital 
data has exploded into what he calls a ‘data industrial complex’. He somewhat 
startlingly sets out how,  
 
“Our own information — from the everyday to the deeply personal — is being 
weaponized against us with military efficiency…..These scraps of data, each 
one harmless enough on its own, are carefully assembled, synthesized, traded 
and sold. Taken to the extreme this process creates an enduring digital profile 
and lets companies know you better than you may know yourself. Your profile is 
a bunch of algorithms that serve up increasingly extreme content, pounding our 
harmless preferences into harm.”  He goes on to what that, “We shouldn’t 
sugarcoat the consequences. This is surveillance,” (Lomas 2018).  
 
It is not entirely surprising that new media firms go to such lengths to collect and 
synthesize data. In 2017, the Economist editorial declared data as the new oil. 
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“A new commodity spawns a lucrative, fast-growing industry, prompting 
antitrust regulators to step in to restrain those who control its flow. A century 
ago, the resource in question was oil. Now similar concerns are being raised by 
the giants that deal in data, the oil of the digital era. These titans—Alphabet 
(Google’s parent company), Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Microsoft—look 
unstoppable.” (Economist 2017).  
 
The editorial also calls for greater transparency by forcing these new media 
service providers into disclosing what information they hold on their customers.  
 
Edward Snowden is the former US National Security Agency (NSA) contractor 
and latter whistleblower, who leaked top-secret NSA documents detailing phone 
and Internet surveillance practices by US security agencies. In a 2016 interview, 
Snowden stated,   
 
“[In the past,] your beliefs, your future, your hopes, your dreams belonged to 
you,”……“Increasingly, these things belong to companies, and these 
companies can share them however they want, without a lot of oversight” (Ha 
2016).  
 
While Snowden was not advocating that companies should completely stop 
collecting user data, he was stating his belief that a central problem for the 
future was that individuals themselves needed to be in control of their own data.  
The World Economic Forum (WEF) believes the collection and storing of large 
amounts of individuals personal information poses significant macroeconomic 
challenges for the world. In its ‘Global Risks Report 2017’, the WEF identifies a 
number of ‘global risks’ to the world economy. It lists them in 5 categories 
covering economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological risks. 
The report defines ’global risks’ as,  
“an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, can cause significant negative 
impact for several countries or industries within the next 10 years” (WEF 2017, 
p.62).   
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The report further identifies the ‘Top 5 Global Risks in Terms of Likelihood’ (i.e. 
most likely to occur in the next 10 years) and identifies a, ‘Massive incident of 
data fraud/theft’ as a top 5 ‘likelihood’ risks (WEF 2017 pg4). It is worth noting 
this was the first time the WEF listed a ‘massive incident of data theft/fraud’ as a 
top 5 likely events. As a technological risk, it is also worth noting a ‘massive 
incident of data fraud/theft’ is considered more likely event than ‘large scale 
cyber-attacks’. So on a macro level, data theft/fraud is considered to have the 
potential to have a significant negative impact on the global economy and is 
listed alongside risks including, ‘extreme weather events’, ‘large-scale 
involuntary migration’, ‘major national disasters’ and ‘large scale terrorist 
attacks’. While network security is not the focus of the research being described 
here, the WEF report does highlight the need for individuals to be more vigilant 
in terms of when and who they share their personal information with.  
No internationally agreed consensus exists on common standards for how 
media corporations or governments protect personal information. Academic 
scholars in new media warn that that global nature of how new media firms 
operate means that,  
 
“collected data also might easily be transported across national borders to be 
archived and processed in a location where the individual’s expectations of 
privacy and data security, based on his or her home country laws, may not be 
fulfilled” (Alabarran, Mierzejewsha and Jung 2018, p.192).  
 
While one obvious solution to this problem is would be for counties to prohibit 
(in law) the transfer of citizens’ data, this has the potential to limit economic 
growth in countries that introduce such rules. In the EU, the Privacy Shield 
principle (examined in more detail in later chapters) puts in place the legal 
requirement that firms who transfer personal information of EU citizens to 
another jurisdiction (for processing or storage purposes etc) must adhere to EU 
data protection provisions.  
The 2016 Brexit referendum in the UK and the 2016 presidential elections in the 
US saw election campaigns successfully target potential voter groups highly 
personalized messages,  
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“We have no way of knowing how our personal data is being mined and used to 
influence us. We don’t realise that the Facebook page we are looking at, the 
Google page, the ads that we are seeing, the search results we are using, are 
all being personalised to us. We don’t see it because we have nothing to 
compare it to. And it is not being monitored or recorded. It is not being 
regulated. We are inside a machine and we simply have no way of seeing the 
controls. Most of the time, we don’t even realise that there are controls.” 
(Cadwalladr 2016). 
In the UK, the Information Commissioners Office (ICO) fined Facebook the 
maximum permitted £500,000 for,  
“allowing third party developers to access user information without sufficient 
consent” (Hern and Waterson 2018).  
Facebook were found to have failed to keep personal information about their 
users safe and although in total 87 millions users data was ‘harvested’ the ICO 
fine relates only to the 1 million UK users affected.  
“The fine is for two breaches of the Data Protection Act. The Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) concluded that Facebook failed to safeguard its 
users’ information and that it failed to be transparent about how that data was 
harvested by others.” (Hern and Pegg 2018).  
So how did we get here? 
 
 
1.2 The Rapid Emergence of ‘New Media Industry’  
 
The Oxford English dictionary defines the term ‘new media’ as,  
 
“means of mass communication using digital technologies such as the Internet” 
(Oxford Dictionaries 2018).  
 
Traditionally, media firms were defined as enterprises, “involved in the production 
and distribution of content intended for a mass audience” (Mierzejewska and Shaver 
2014, p48). However, media scholars suggest that research should focus on 
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firms that produce content as well as firms who operate platforms that distribute 
content, including user based content. This means that,  
 
“companies such as YouTube, Netflix, Facebook, Google and Apple become as 
important to media management research as traditional mass-media firms” 
(Rohn 2018, p.430).  
 
Technological growth is the key driver of a rapid expansion in the global ‘new 
media’ industry in recent years (Horst and Murschetz 2019; Küng 2017, Oliver 
2018b; Oliver and Picard 2020). As such,  
 
“Economic success in the media industry is naturally dependent on the ability to 
adjust and capitalize on technological advances” (Doyle 2013, p.26).  
 
New media firms including Alphabet Inc. (Google parent company), Facebook, 
Microsoft and Apple (as well as a host of others) have grown to become global 
brands in relatively short periods of time. The real and virtual products and 
services they offer have been popular with both users and investors alike.  
 
Alphabet was founded in 1994 and figures for 2017 show annual revenues in 
excess of $110 billion (Alphabet Investor Relations 2018). Their ‘search’ product 
dominates its rivals where it accounts for approx. 92% of online searches 
worldwide (StatCounter 2019). This creates the platform for its AdWords 
product, allowing advertisers to target users based on their online activities and 
generates a staggering 90% of its total annual revenue.  
 
Facebook founded 2004, in Dec 2018 Facebook had 1.52 daily active users 
and 2.32 billion active monthly users (Facebook 2019). At its Initial Public 
Offering (IPO) in 2012 it was valued at $104 billion (WSJ 2012). Despite losing 
£123 billion in value as a result of a major data breach, July 2018 saw the 
company still valued at a staggering $630 billion. Facebook does not charge a 
membership fee and its primary income driver is advertising revenues. Figures 
for year ending Dec 2017 saw its revenues earned from advertising hit $39.9bn, 
a rise of 48% from the previous year and with 98% of its revenue coming from 
advertising (Statista 2018).  
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“The ascent of the so-called Web 2.0 (blogs, social media, online social 
networks) has rendered individuals no longer mere consumers of information, 
but public producers of often highly personal data.” (Acquisti, Taylor and 
Wagman 2016, p.444). 
Instead of users’ data being stored locally on devices, digital information 
(emails, documents, music, chats, photos etc) is stored in a digital ‘cloud’ in the 
form of vast data centers. The data is then accessible through the range of 
networked devices including PCs, mobile phones, iPods etc. Some 
commentators suggest, 
  
“the potential power of these cloud providers raises all sorts of fears, not least for 
privacy, security and reliability” (Leadbeater 2010).   
 
New media firms have also attracted criticism from privacy campaigners who 
claim that elements of the way some products and services operate constitutes 
an invasion of privacy; and that the advertising incomes they attract are as a 
result of disclosure of users’ personal information.  
 
Leading privacy-economics academic Alesandro Acquisti describes the impact 
new media services and the challenges this brings as follows:  
 
“New search engines, social networks, ecommerce websites, web browsers, 
and individualized controls for privacy-conscious consumers have emerged. 
Concurrently, social media services have facilitated a culture of disclosure: a 
disclosure of one’s activities, location, emotions, work history, and political 
opinions. While, overall, these technologies seemingly leave privacy choices in 
the hands of consumers, many (if not most) consumers, in practice, lack the 
awareness and technical sophistication required to protect and regulate the 
multiple dimensions of their personal information. Privacy-invasive technological 
services have become integral to every-day communications, job searches, and 
general consumption. At the same time, privacy-protecting services require 
additional levels of user effort and know-how, which limits their efficacy, 
especially within some of the most vulnerable segments of the population” 
(Acquisti et al. 2016, p.484). 
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What evidence is there to support the argument that social media services 
facilitate a ‘culture of disclosure’ or that consumers ‘lack the awareness and 
technical sophistication’ to regulate their personal information when using these 
new media services? 
 
 
1.3 New Media: A Culture of Disclosure? 
 
Indeed, there is evidence that new media firms promote a so-called culture of 
disclosure. Facebook is no stranger to such controversy in relation to privacy. 
As far back as 2007, its ad serving Beacon service hit the headlines when it 
was found to have failed to inform users on how it shared their details with other 
services. The controversy resulted in a class action lawsuit and a $19m fine. In 
2017 Facebook was fined €110m for, “misleading the European Commission during 
its 2014 takeover of WhatsApp” (Murgia 2017). Facebook had explicitly told EU 
regulators that it could not automatically link Whatsapp customer accounts with 
its own platform and yet did this shortly after the acquisition and was therefore 
found to be in breach of EU merger rules. Facebook was further separately 
fined by French and Italian regulators over the way it tracked users web 
browsing, making this information available to advertisers, in breach of EU data 
protection laws.  
 
Academic research looking specifically at how Facebook operates has 
suggested that although the company has refrained from explicitly selling users’ 
information directly to advertisers,  
 
“they have created systems that enable advertisers to run highly targeted social 
advertising campaigns” (Korolova 2010, p.474).  
 
The rapid growth in revenue earnings would suggest that this indeed is the 
case. Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg challenges privacy campaigners 
arguing that privacy is no longer a ‘social norm’ and that,  
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“People have really gotten comfortable not only sharing more information and 
different kinds, but more openly and with more people” (Barnett 2010).  
 
However, Mr Zuckerberg’s comments may be more grounded in commercial 
imperatives rather than representing a fundamental paradigm shift in how 
millions of people around the world view their personal privacy.  
The following provides a useful example of how Facebook does not directly sell 
users personal details although it can perhaps been seen as facilitating a 
‘culture of disclosure’. Voncom is just one of a multitude of firms that provide 
interactive content on the social network including quizzes, top 10 lists etc. In 
2015, Voncom launched an interactive service that allowed Facebook users to 
create a ‘info-graphic’ or ‘world cloud’ based on the words you had used most 
often on the social network. When a user clicked on the link to use the service, 
they were shown a message to say that the app would need to access their 
Facebook data in order to create the ‘word cloud’ image. It was a popular app 
used by and estimated 17+ million users (Wakefield 2015).  
 
As it transpired, the personal data the ‘info-graph’ application accessed 
included the users,  
“name, profile picture, age, sex, birthday, entire friend list, everything you have 
posted on your timeline, all of your photos, home town, education history and 
everything you have ever liked” (IBID).  
 
There is no evidence or accusation that Facebook or Voncom breached data 
protections rules as the terms and conditions of the app included accessing 
their Facebook data. Voncom says it only accesses users personal data to 
‘improve the quality of its services’ and that it does not sell users personal 
information to third parties, even though this is permitted in its terms and 
conditions. However, this example highlights a potential lack of awareness 
individuals have when using ‘privacy invasive’ applications. Would 17m people 
have used the app had they known how much personal information about 
themselves they were disclosing? 
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More recently, a case taken by Austrian student Max Schrems resulted in the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling that the ‘Safe Harbour’ principle, a legal 
agreement that allowed companies collecting individuals personal information 
(including the likes of Facebook, Alphabet and Microsoft etc) to transfer EU 
citizens’ data to the US for processing, was no longer valid. It ordered that the 
transfer of data to the US relating to Facebook’s European subscribers be,  
 
“suspended on the ground that that country does not afford an adequate level 
of protection of personal data” (Court of Justice of European Union 2015, 
p.3).  
 
While this ruling from the ECJ was specific to Facebook, it has wider 
implications for all media firms reliant on the Safe Harbour principle. The US 
Federal Trade Commission commissioner Julie Brill described the impact of the 
ECJ ruling as, “measuring 7.8 on the Richter scale” (O’Kane 2015). The Safe 
Harbor Principle has since been replaced with a similar arrangement known as 
Privacy Shield, which is subject to ongoing legal challenges.  
 
Googles parent company Alphabet Inc. has also attracted controversy in 
relation to privacy. While collecting data for their ‘Street View’ service, it 
emerged they had been scanning and collecting information from Wi-Fi 
networks within range of their vehicles. Commentators claimed that Alpahbet’s 
actions amounted to a, “violation of customers trust” (Metz and Goodin, 2010). 
They attracted further criticism from privacy campaigners in relation to default 
settings on its Buzz social media service. Alphabets then CEO Eric Schmidt 
was questioned on these issues and the interviewer asked if users should be 
prepared to share information with them as, “a trusted friend”. Schmidt replied 
saying,  
 
“If you have something that that you don’t want anyone to know, maybe you 
shouldn’t be doing it in the first place” (Gelles et al 2009, p.11). 
 
Issues have also emerged in relation to relatively complex arrangements 
between new media companies over ownership of the information they hold on 
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users. In May 2013, UK media telecoms operator EE attracted the attention of 
privacy campaigners when it emerged that a separate company, Ipsos Mori, 
had an exclusive deal to sell on EE customers data. The London Metropolitan 
Police confirmed they had met with Ipsos Mori to discuss how data could 
potentially be used in crime prevention. Information on approximately 27m 
customers was available, although EE confirmed that they were fully in 
compliance with the UK data protection regulations. EE stated the data 
available was anonymised and could not be used to identify individuals. 
Personal data that was available on customers included gender, age, 
postcodes, websites visited and locations of customers when making calls (Lee, 
2013).   
 
Indeed, a recent investigation by the UK consumer group Which? found that, 
 
“sensitive personal and financial data is being traded on a huge scale, with 
some companies apparently willing to sell to anyone who comes calling” 
(McLaughlan 2017).  
 
Which?’s undercover investigators were offered 500,000 items of personal 
information, including phone numbers and addresses on households with an 
income above £40,000 for just four pence each. Perhaps most interesting was 
that none of the companies contacted performed any due diligence on the fake 
pensions company Which? was using to make the data requests through. The 
UK Information Commissioners Office is investigating to see if data protection 
rules were broken.  
 
The privacy issues discussed above are all examples where new media firms 
have found themselves embroiled in controversy in relation to their data 
protection practices. So what regulatory provisions exist to protect media 
consumers against threats to their privacy? The following section will give a 
brief overview of the key relevant privacy regulations in the EU and US.  
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1.4 Regulating Privacy 
 
Both the European Union (EU) and United States of America (US) have 
adopted contrasting approaches in terms of how they regulate data protection in 
their respective jurisdictions. They are also the largest and wealthiest 
economies in the world collectively accounting for almost 50% of global GDP. 
 
In recent years, the relevant EU and US data protection authorities have 
outlined how rapid technological advances pose challenges to existing data 
protection regulations. In 2012, the European Commission published a 
communication to the European Parliament declaring,  
 
“rapid technological developments and globalisation have profoundly changed 
the world around us, and brought new challenges for the protection of personal 
data” (European Commission 2012, p.2).  
 
The challenge for data protection regulators is to strike a balance between 
protecting individuals right to personal privacy and providing a 
business/commercial environment that promotes economic growth.  
 
A number of international agreements include privacy as a fundamental right 
that all humans are entitled to. These include Article 12 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (United Nations, 1948) and Article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Council of Europe, 1950). 
Both treaties state that all individuals have a right to privacy protected in law. 
Informed by these treaties, European Union and individual members’ data 
protection regulations have developed to protection individuals’ privacy rights. 
In the European Union (EU), a group called the Working Party 29 (WP29) 
provide expert opinion to the European Commission (EC) on questions/issues 
that arise in relation to data protection.   
 
“An examination of past, present and future data protection legislation reveals 
that the protection of personal data evolved from the right to private life as 
provided for in Art. 8 of the ECHR of 1950” (Working Party 29 2014, p.3).  
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WP29 believes that rapid advances in technology has created the requirement 
for further protection of individuals right to control their personal data, and have 
stated,  
 
“With the increase of new technologies and surveillance possibilities, both in 
the public and in the private sector, became apparent that there needed to be 
further protection for individuals from third parties (particularly the State) in 
addition to ‘defensive’ rights recognised under Art. 8 of the ECHR by ensuring 
that he individual had the right to control his/her own personal data.” (Working 
Party 29 2014, p.3).  
 
There are similar data protection concerns in the US where the two bodies 
responsible for data protection, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the 
Department of Commerce (USDoC) published major reports in 2010 pointing to 
serious failings existing data protection provisions.  
 
“As the ability of corporations and government to collect, archive and process 
individual data has expanded exponentially, no consensus has emerged on 
common standards of protection for personal information” (Jayakar 2018 
p.191-192).  
 
This is not entirely surprising as regulators face a complex task when 
developing data protection regulations, not least because,  
 
“privacy sensitivities and attitudes are subjective and idiosyncratic, because 
what constitutes sensitive information differs across individuals” (Acquisti et al. 
2016, p.446).  
 
Data protection regulators have for a number of years expressed concerns in 
relation to the protection of personal information. The EU describes how 
advances in technology have created the requirement for further protection of 
individuals’ right to control their personal data.  
 
24 
 
“With the increase of new technologies and surveillance possibilities, both in the 
public and in the private sector, became apparent that there needed to be 
further protection for individuals from third parties……by ensuring that the 
individual had the right to control his/her own personal data.” (Working Party 
29, 2014 p.3).  
 
In response to the 2012 Europeans Commission calls for a comprehensive data 
protection package, the Council of Europe on the 15th December 2015 
published a, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection 
Regulation)’ (Council of European Union, 2015). This General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) replaces the EU Data Protection Direction 94/46/EC (Data 
Protection Directive). The GDPR was adopted in April 2016 and became 
effective (and directly applicable) in all EU states from May 2018. The GDPR 
updates existing provisions as well as introducing new concepts that did not 
exist under the Data Protection Directive.  
 
1.5 Research Gap 
 
Issues around data protection and privacy have received limited attention 
among academics researching in the media economics and media 
management discipline. This is evidenced by the fact that a leading text 
Handbook of Media Economics and Management 2018 text, a publication that,  
 
“effectively constitutes a kind of “best of” media management and economics 
that very well summarizes the main issues and trends of the field” (Jung et al, 
2018, p.xiv)  
 
devotes just over half a page of text (out of 450 pages) to the topic of privacy in 
the context of data.  
 
In the limited section that does address privacy, it is noted that,  
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“it is important to acknowledge the privacy implications of a media environment 
in which managerial decision-making is increasingly dependent on the 
gathering and analysis of large quantities of personal data” (Napoli and 
Roepnack 2018, p.417).  
 
However, somewhat surprisingly, the chapter also states that,  
 
“The days of widespread consumer unease with the ever-increasing forms of 
data gathering that the media sector engages in seems to have passed” (IBID).  
 
The idea that media consumers are no longer uneasy with how media firms 
collect and manage their personal data is certainly out of step with how EU and 
US regulators view this issue. It also suggests that a research gap exists within 
the media economics and media management fields and this thesis will address 
some key elements that new media operators need to address in relation to 
relevant regulatory provisions.  
 
The GDPR sets out all of the provisions for,  
 
“the protection of natural persons with regards to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data” (GDPR 2016, p.1).  
 
Recital 100 proposes,  
 
“In order to enhance transparency and compliance with this Regulation, the 
establishment of certification mechanisms, data protection seals and marks 
should be encouraged, allowing data subjects to quickly assess the level of 
data protection of relevant products and services”, (GDPR 2016, p.19).  
 
It is this proposed use of privacy seals as a privacy enhancer that is the focus of 
the research conducted in this thesis. There is relatively little empirical evidence 
that examines how privacy seals (and/or related iconography) impacts on 
personal information disclosure. Our current understanding of privacy seals in 
academic literature (Tsai, Egelman, Cranor, and Acquisti, 2011; Brandimarte, 
Acquisti, and Loewenstein, 2012; Carolan and Castillo-Mayen 2014) suggests 
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that privacy seals/icons do not necessarily operate in a way that regulators 
might assume. Findings show inconsistent and at time somewhat counter-
intuitive behavior from data subjects when these ‘transparency enhancing’ 
features are displayed. Greater clarity in relation to the role privacy seals can 
play in promoting information transparency has implications for data subjects 
(as service users) and data controllers (as service providers) and policy makers 
(as industry regulators). With many new media firms so dependent on 
advertising revenues, a third party-verified accreditation scheme that confirms 
compliance the GDPR has the potential to gain the confidence of data subjects 
and in turn may lead to increased revenues. Alternatively, if privacy seals have 
a negative effect on personal information disclosure, then new media firms may 
choose not to participate in privacy seal accreditation schemes resulting in the 
improved transparency desired by regulators not being achieved.  
 
The EE data ownership example touches at the core of one of the key areas of 
concern i.e. a need to make it clear to individuals how and to whom their 
personal information is being shared. Regulators generally refer to this as clarity 
around what personal information is being collect and how it is used share as 
‘information transparency’. The following chapters will examine literature from a 
range of disciplines including media economics, economics and privacy theory 
exploring the key characteristics and complexities in relation to personal 
information disclosure. After examining key areas where data protection 
regulators say existing regulatory provisions need enhancing, a number of 
online experiments will be set out to examine the effects these privacy 
enhancing features may have on users’ information disclosure.  
 
1.6 Aims and Objectives 
 
It is clear from the growth rates, valuations and revenue streams of many new 
media firms that the collection and harvesting of users personal data including 
their click-through, photos, location data, networks of friends etc have 
substantial economic value. In an attempt to keep up with technological 
developments the EU has introduced a comprehensive new regulation in the 
form of the GDPR. However, this is a new regulation and as such the 
27 
 
enforcement mechanism (for breaches of the regulation) remain untested to 
date.  For data subjects, there is a risk to their privacy through the collection 
and sharing practices of new media firms. For data controllers, apart from 
potential regulatory fines, breaches of data subjects privacy may result in a loss 
of confidence in these firms resulting in a negative impact on their business 
models/revenues. The WEF even consider a large theft of personal data both a 
likely and substantial risk to the global economy.  
 
The GDPR represents an attempt by regulators to bring data protection 
provisions up to date with technological innovations. Improving transparency 
and increasing the control individuals have over their personal data are key 
objectives of this new regulation. The GDPR explicitly calls for the 
establishment of a privacy seal accreditation system where the display of an 
accredited seal may be used to demonstrate compliance with the new 
regulation. However, there is little empirical evidence in relation to whether 
privacy seals improve transparency in the way regulators desire. The research 
undertaken here uses online behavioral experiments in an attempt to help fill 
this research gap.  
 
The overarching research question this thesis addresses is the following: 
 
What impact(s) do Privacy Seals have on sensitive personal information 
disclosure in online environments? 
 
In order to answer this research question, the following research objectives are 
addressed: 
 
RO1 – To examine if respondents can identify the types of data 
categorised as ‘sensitive data’ status under current EU data protection 
regulations. 
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RO2 – To examine what categories of personal data respondents consider 
‘sensitive personal data’.  
 
 
RO3 – Conduct experiments to test if use of ‘privacy seals’ effect data 
subjects personal information disclosure.  
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2 Chapter 2: Literature Review  
 
For many new media firms, a very significant percentage of total revenues 
come from advertising income. Technology has revolutionised the new media-
advertising sector and behavioural advertising is a key driver of this. Online 
advertisers use personal data available on new media platforms to deliver 
personalised content and products to consumers (Küng, Picard and Towse, 
2008). We also know that,  
 
“Advertisers are critical to the success of commercial media because they 
provide the primary revenue stream that keeps most of them viable” (Picard, 
2002, p.122).  
 
The metrics that digital advertising offers makes it an attractive area to spend, 
especially when compared to the rather inexact science of traditional offline 
advertising methods.  
 
All media products/services must adhere to the regulatory requirements for the 
jurisdictions relevant to where it operates (Picard 2002). Therefore, any change 
to EU data protection regulations has the potential to impact the operations and 
revenues of any new media firms who operate within the EU jurisdiction.    
 
The GDPR represents a comprehensive overhaul of data protection regulations 
and as such impacts all new media firms that operate services with the lucrative 
markets that is the EU (Rossi 2017). Recital 100 of the GDPR is the primary 
concern of this thesis. To recap, it calls for the establishing of Privacy Seal 
accreditation scheme.  
 
“In order to enhance transparency and compliance with this Regulation, the 
establishment of certification mechanisms, data protection seals and marks 
should be encouraged, allowing data subjects to quickly assess the level of 
data protection of relevant products and services”, (GDPR 2016, p.19).  
 
This chapter examines relevant existing theoretical and empirical literature 
across a range of disciplines including media economics, economics, law, and 
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political science. It is organised as follows. While the findings of this research 
are of most relevance to the media economics discipline, the literature review 
does not begin with media economics. We begin by exploring academic 
definitions of privacy, establishing core themes among leading academics. We 
then examine the founding principles behind the origins of data protection 
regulations in the EU and US. While the regulatory approaches adopted are 
clearly different, the issues and challenges these services present in relation to 
online privacy share many common concerns for their respective regulators. We 
then examine literature from media economics, including the key role of 
regulation. We then trace the origins and development of economics literature 
as it pertains to privacy. Finally, key empirical literature across a range of 
disciplines that explores the impact privacy seals and similar related 
iconography has on personal information disclosure is discussed. A clear 
research gap is identified.   
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2.1 The Origins of Privacy 
 
While the Bible has numerous references to privacy, early Hebrew, classical 
Greek and ancient Chinese cultures saw more substantive protection of 
individual notions of privacy - mostly focused on the right to solitude (Hixson 
1987). The law of privacy can be traced back to 1361 when the English Justices 
of the Peace Act established ‘peeping toms’ and ‘eavesdropping’ as offences 
(Davies 2001). In 1765, a ruling by British Lord Camden struck down a warrant 
to enter a house to seize papers saying there was no law in the country to 
justify this. He added that if such a law did exist, “it would destroy all the comforts 
in society” (Entick v. Carrington, 1558-1774 All E.R. Rep. 45).   
 
The world’s first data protection act dates from Sweden in 1776. The ‘Access to 
Public Records Act’ restricted the use of government held information to 
‘legitimate’ purposes only. In 1792 the French ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and Citizen’ saw private property established as inviolable and sacred. Then in 
1858, France prohibited the publication of private facts on individuals and 
established fines for violators (Henderson and Snyder 1999).  
 
Research conducted by Irwin Altman in the 1970’s examined a range of 
cultures (including the cultures of apparently minimal privacy like the Mehinacu 
tribe in Brazil and the Pygmies of Zaire) and found privacy to be culturally 
universal phenomena. Altman argues that privacy is fundamental to both 
individual and wider cultural survival (Altman 1977). 
 
Privacy is a complex and multi-faceted term. Davies (2001) categorises it into 
four distinct facets: a) Information Privacy: Establishing rules of governing the 
collection of personal data and how this data is managed and handled. b) 
Privacy of Communications: Covers the security of telephones, emails and 
other forms of communication. c) Territorial Privacy: Setting the 
limits/boundaries on intrusion into domestic, workplace or other public 
environments. d) Bodily Privacy: Concerns the protection of the physical being 
against potential intrusions such as drug testing and cavity searches. This 
thesis focuses on Information Privacy, defined by Clarke as an,  
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“Individuals claim that data about themselves should not be automatically available 
to other individuals and organisations, and that, even where data is possessed by 
another party, the individual must be able to exercise a substantial degree of 
control over that data and its use.” (Clarke 2013).  
 
2.1.1 Defining Privacy 
 
To gain a better understanding of privacy, we must define it. However, there is 
no universally accepted definition of privacy. Therefore, we examine definitions 
from a range of disciplines including key contributions from political scientist 
Alan Westin, social scientist Irwin Altman and legal academic Charles Fried. 
These theorists are relevant because their contributions have stood the time, 
featuring prominently in major privacy academic publications over the last 40 
years (Margulis 2003).  
 
In what is widely regarded as a seminal article in relation to privacy, the 1890 
Harvard Law Journal published a paper entitled ‘The Right to Privacy’. It quoted 
Judge Thomas Cooley’s claim for an individual’s “right to be let alone”. 
Interestingly, despite writing over 125 years ago, authors Warren and Brandeis 
specifically make reference to the threat to privacy that technological 
development presents. They described how,  
 
“Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the 
sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical 
devices threaten to make good that prediction that ‘what is whispered in the 
closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops” (Warren and Brandeis 1890, 
p.195).  
 
They argue there is ‘no doubt’ that protection from such invasions of privacy is a 
‘necessity’. They also describe how the press and other branches of commerce, 
through the invasion of individuals’ privacy, act in a manner where it is in fact 
the supply of such information in itself creates the demand. Lawyer Charles 
Fried later provides a similarly concise definition of privacy, “control over 
knowledge about oneself” (Fried 1968, p.483). 
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Political scientist Alan Westin defines privacy as,  
 
“the ability of the individual to control the terms under which personal 
information is acquired and used” (Westin 1967, p.7).  
 
In 2003, Westin ‘expands’ his definition to reflect the new media or ‘internet era’, 
defining privacy as,  
 
“the claim of an individual to determine what information about himself or 
herself should be known to others…This, also, involves when such information 
will be obtained and what uses will be made of it by others” (Westin 2003, 
p.7).  
 
Social scientist Irwin Altman defines privacy simply as, “the selective control of 
access to the self.” (Altman 1975, p.18). Altman further argues,  
 
“the ability to regulate interaction is necessary for individual and cultural 
survival” (Altman 1977, p.82).  
 
The table below summarises the key definitions of privacy from authors 
discussed above. Control clearly emerges as a common theme across 
disciplines.  
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Figure 2-1 Academic Definitions of Privacy 
Year Definition Reference 
 
1890 
 
“right to be left alone”. 
 
 
(Warren and 
Brandeis, 1890, 
p.195) 
 
1967 
 
“the ability of the individual to control the 
terms under which personal information is 
acquired and used”  
 
 
(Westin 1967, p.7) 
 
1968 
 
“control over knowledge about oneself”. 
 
 
(Fried 1968, p.483) 
 
1975 
 
“the selective control of access to the self.”  
 
(Altman 1975, p.18) 
 
 
2003 
 
“…this, also, involves when such information 
will be obtained and what uses will be made 
of it by others”  
 
 
(Westin 2003, p.3) 
 
While on one hand these definitions of privacy are seemingly different, they are 
related, as they pertain to the boundaries between the individual self and the 
other, between private, and/or public (Altman 1975). We will examine these 
approaches to privacy in more detail. 
  
2.1.2 Alan Westin: Privacy as ‘States and Functions’ 
 
Westin (1967) describes privacy as a set of changing states and functions. The 
first state of individual privacy is solitude, where one is completely free from the 
observation of others. The second is intimacy, where small groups separate 
themselves from others in order to be alone, perhaps like a husband and wife 
might do. Anonymity occurs where a person is in a public place but expects not 
to be recognised. Going to the cinema or attending a concert alone might be an 
example of this. Finally, reserve is a state where we limit disclosure to others, 
35 
 
an example being where in the company of others we ‘tune out’ persons or 
communications at various times. These various states of privacy effectively act 
as the “hows” of privacy (Margulis 2003).  Within these states an individual’s 
needs are constantly changing. A person may want to be completely alone 
while soon afterwards want to be in the presence of a partner or close friend, or 
discussing personal issues with a complete stranger (Westin, 2003).  
 
He also describes four functions of privacy. Personal autonomy relates to the 
desire not to be manipulated or exposed by others. Emotional release is where 
people can relax and take ‘downtime’ from social restrictions or customs. Self-
evaluation deals with extracting meaning from personal experiences and 
planning future actions. Finally, limited and protected communication sets 
interpersonal boundaries and allows for sharing of selected personal 
information with others who we trust (Westin 1967). 
  
2.1.3 Irwin Altman: Privacy as ‘Processes and Goals’ 
 
Altman (1977) sees privacy as a set of processes and goals. Firstly, as a 
Dynamic Dialectic Process; he describes privacy as a boundary control process 
where we change how open or closed we are in response to internal and 
external conditions. These change over time and are depending on the specific  
circumstances an individual finds themselves in. Secondly, as An Optimisation 
Process; this describes privacy as not being monotonic i.e. that more privacy is 
not necessarily better. He proposes the idea of an optimal level of privacy 
where the desired level of privacy is equal to actual privacy achieved. He also 
acknowledges possibilities of too little privacy where desired level is greater 
than actual levels (i.e. social isolation) and perhaps too much privacy where 
desired levels are less than actual levels achieved (i.e. overcrowding). Thirdly, 
as a Multimechanism Process; here Altman describes,  
 
“a self-other boundary control process, privacy is viewed as involving a network 
of behavioural mechanisms that people use to achieve desired levels of social 
interaction” (Altman 1977, p.67).  
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The mechanisms here include verbal and non-verbal behaviours and he argues 
that privacy regulation encompasses much more than management of physical 
environment in relation to social interaction (IBID). 
 
Altman proposes that privacy is concerned with three important goals. The first 
of these involves managing the relationship with the social world. Secondly, 
managing the interface between oneself and the social world, and thirdly issues 
relating to self-definition and self-identity (Altman 1977). 
 
 
2.1.4 Charles Fried: Privacy as Control and Monitoring 
 
Surveillance and identity theft are common themes that arise when discussing 
privacy. Here Orwell’s seminal ‘1984’ novel depicting the potential for invasive 
and subversive monitoring of our personal information by Big Brother perhaps 
comes to mind (Palen & Dourish 2003). American law academic Charlies Fried, 
while writing in the Yale Law Journal in 1968 described the existence of 
electronic devices,  
 
“so small as to be entirely unobtrusive: other persons cannot tell that a subject 
is “wired” and even the subject himself – if he could forget the initial installation 
– need be no more aware of the device than of a small bandage” (Fried 1968, 
p.475). 
 
Fried argues that it is not just the amount of information privacy is concerned 
with, but it is also the quality of that data. He cites the example that we might be 
happy for a casual acquaintance to know that we are sick, but it may constitute 
a violation of ones privacy for them to know the exact nature of the illness.  
 
For Fried, love, friendship and trust are all identified as important concepts in 
privacy. Trust is regarded as more functional; that is, we can trust persons 
whom we neither love nor even like, whereas both friendship and love imply a 
certain level of trust. Privacy also has a key role to play in protecting our liberty,  
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“if we thought that our every word and deed were public, fear of disapproval or 
more tangible retaliation might keep us from doing or saying things which we 
would do or say if we could be sure of keeping them to ourselves or within a 
circle of those who we know approve or tolerate our tastes” (Fried 1968, 
p483). 
 
For Fried, electronic monitoring represents, “an intolerable violation of privacy”, as 
it dramatically reduces (or even eliminates) our ability to control information 
about ourselves (Fried 1968, p490). His words resonate with the type of harmful 
surveillance that Tim Cook warned about in his ICDPPC keynote address in 
November 2018.  
 
2.1.5 Summary  
 
As we have seen, privacy is a wide-ranging and complex topic. Both emotions 
and/or social setting impact our levels of desired privacy. In academic 
definitions of privacy, ‘control’ emerges as a core theme. Westin’s (2003) 
expanded privacy definition takes into account the impact technology has on 
how and when our personal information is accessed and shared. This definition 
reflects the challenges to personal privacy posed by the use of networked 
technologies, a key enabler of the new media industry. The actions of some 
global new media firms examined in the introduction can be viewed as 
breaches of these academic definitions of privacy, where individuals lose 
control over their personal data, thus impacting their privacy.  
 
The reach of ‘new media’ firms like Facebook, Apple and Google makes privacy 
a concern with respect to their operations across the globe. Revelations in 
relation to widespread surveillance carried out by US and UK based national 
security agencies led to comments from Tim Berners-Lee (the widely accredited 
‘inventor’ of the Internet) that echo Altman’s comments as Berners-Lee believes 
that increased surveillance poses a threat to the very future of democracy 
(Arthur 2013).  
 
Research published in the Harvard Law & Policy Review,  
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“empirically demonstrate that advertisers are making it impossible to avoid 
online tracking” (Hoofnagle, Soltani, Good and Wambach 2012, p.273). 
 
This research shows how tracking technologies have moved on from the 
standard text file ‘cookies’ (that can be deleted by users) to ‘flash cookies’ that 
can track individuals irrespective of whether they wish to be tracked or not. 
Flash cookies and similar tracking techniques take control away from individuals 
and clearly represent a serious challenge to the core components of the 
academic definitions of privacy. These technological developments led EU and 
US regulators to undertake major reviews of how existing data protection 
regulations in light of new media developments.  
 
The discussion in this thesis will address Information Privacy and how personal 
information disclosure impacts an individual’s privacy. Based on this approach, 
the most relevant definition of privacy comes from Alan Westin,  
 
“the claim of an individual to determine what information about himself or herself 
should be known to others…This, also, involves when such information will be 
obtained and what uses will be made of it by others” (Westin 2003, p3).  
 
This definition captures the two key objectives of the landmark EU 95/46/EC 
Data Protection Directive (later incorporated into the GDPR). Firstly, respecting 
the individuals right to privacy (i.e. the claim of an individual to determine what 
information about himself or herself should be known to others). Secondly, it 
addresses how this information is obtained and used by third-parties as well as 
how media businesses manage this ‘free flow’ of information i.e.  
 
‘when such information will be obtained and what uses will be made of it by 
others’. (Directive 95/46/EC, 1995) 
 
We will begin by examining the origins and key principles of EU data protection 
directives.    
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2.2 Privacy Regulations in the EU 
 
“The roles that governments play in economic affairs are necessary to create and 
perpetuate markets” (Picard 2002, p.69).   
 
Although notions of privacy have existed for many centuries, the experiences of 
WWII are the driving force behind European data protection laws (Loring 2002). 
Elaborate population registers in Holland, compiled primarily for public policy 
and state planning purposes were used by the invading Germans to identify 
individuals for deportation, many to concentration camps. Here, while the 
information itself was not harmful, it serves as an example of where personal 
information freely supplied today for one reason, may be looked upon and 
treated in a very different way in the future (Lloyd 2011).  
 
The immediate post-war period in Europe saw the creation by treaty in 1949 of 
the Council of Europe. This led to the establishing of the European Convention 
on Human Rights that came into force in 1953. Article 8 specifically related to 
privacy and states that: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to respect his private and family life, his home, and his 
correspondence. 
 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as in accordance with the law and it necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
(Council of Europe 1950) 
 
2.2.1 From Privacy Protection to Data Protection 
 
While the Human Rights convention established a right to personal privacy, the 
1960’s saw Europe progress from an industrial economy to an information 
economy. This heightened concerns about privacy in relation to personal 
information/data (Loring 2002).   
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In parallel to individual countries enacting domestic legislation, 1973 saw The 
Council Of Europe’s intergovernmental body (the Committee of Ministers) pass 
Resolution 22 covering the ‘ground rules’ for data protection in the private 
sector. A year later Resolution 29 was passed, focussing on the public sector 
(Reed 2011). Resolution 22 and 29 urged individual member nations to adopt 
data protection legislation.  
 
Indeed, the 1970’s saw the first data privacy legislation become law. The 
German state of Hesse enacted the first data protection law in 1970. Sweden 
introduced its own data protection legislation in 1973 and was followed by 
Germany in 1977 and France in 1978. However, divergent privacy standards 
began to appear between member states, raising concerns that differences in 
national legislation may pose significant barriers to the transmission of data 
between European nations (Murray 1998). Divergence was also seen as having 
a negative impact on the key strategic goal of creating a single market.  
 
In an attempt to create a unified data protection environment and promote 
greater economic ties among member states, two important sets of international 
guidelines emerged. These were: 
 
1. The Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regards to 
the Automatic Processing of Personal Data: This Council of Europe 
established convention came into force in 1985. It had five countries as 
signatories and established a number of basic provisions in relation to 
data protection. The aim was to provide a minimum degree of 
harmonisation between signatories in order to eliminate restrictions on 
data flows between countries for reasons related to data ‘privacy’ 
protection. The major weakness and criticism of the Convention is its 
lack of enforceability, as no enforcement agency was created leaving 
disputes to be resolved at a diplomatic level (Reed 2011). 
 
2. Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data (OECD): Established by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and development (OECD) in 1980, this broad set 
of principles are essentially a series of recommendations outlining good 
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practice in relation to data protection practices. Again, the primary aim 
here was to prevent restrictions on data flows between OECD member 
states. Similar to the Convention, the OECD has no formal authority. The 
OECD adopted a further declaration on Transborder Data Flows in 1985. 
The signatories indicated an intention to promote access to 
data/information and related services. They also sought transparency in 
regulations relating to information. Additionally, it set out to develop 
common approaches to managing trans-border data flows and to 
consider implications for other countries when dealing with data flows 
(Lloyd 2011). 
 
Despite the aspirations and intent of both the Council and the OECD, the 
regulatory protection for personal privacy that emerged was not uniform across 
signatories. This occurred for a number of reasons, not least the fact that not all 
Council of Europe members adopted the legislation. A lack of clear definition of 
key terms led to inconsistencies when individual countries adopted the key 
principles into national legislation.  
 
In an attempt to overcome these inconsistencies, the European Community in 
1990 published a draft Council Directive on the Protection of Individuals With 
Regards to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
Such Data. It is important to view this draft directive in its wider context. It 
represented one element of a shift to widening Europe into both an economic 
and political union, as embodied in the Treaty of European Union signed 1992 
(Cate 1999).  
 
The key piece of European data protection came in the form of the Directive 
95/46/EC. Enacted in 1995, it gave EU Member States 3 years to bring national 
data protection legislation into line with the directive. The GDPR came into 
effect among member states in May 2018 and represents a major 
revision/updating of the key 1995 directive. 
 
 
42 
 
2.2.2 EU Data Protection: Core Principles 
 
The EU Directive 95/46/EC became effective on 25th Oct 1998 and this data 
protection directive established information privacy as a basic human right.  
 
“The EU Directive represents a unification of divergent European privacy 
policies, as it seeks to balance the privacy needs of the individual with the 
information needs of society” (Cate 1999, p431).  
 
The underlying objective of the Directive was to advance the development and 
functionality of the single market (Murray 1998). Crucially, promoting the 
internal market required the Directive to balance two core principle objectives 
of; (1) Protecting the fundamental rights of an individuals right to privacy, and; 
(2) The prevention of obstacles to the free flow of information among Member 
States (Maxeiner 1995).  
 
Directive 95/46/EC set out eight broad principles, these are: 
 
1. Purpose Limitation Principle: Requires information only collected for 
specific and specified purpose and only used in ways compatible with 
those purposes. Information should be stored for no longer than is 
necessary for those purposes. Interestingly this principle also states that 
information not required for such specified purposes should not be 
collected.  
 
2. Data Quality Principle: Requires that information be accurate and up-
to-date.  
 
3. Data Security Principle: Requires measures appropriate to risks be 
taken to protect data from improper use and disclosure as well as the 
security of data processing and transmission.  
 
4. Special Protection for ‘Sensitive’ Data Principle: This imposes 
restrictions on the collection and processing of certain types of 
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information where data collected can identify a persons racial or ethnic 
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical belief or concerning 
health or sexual orientation.  
 
5. Transparency Principle: Requires data controllers to notify individuals 
when data is being collected about them; the purposed for which that 
data will be used; and the identity of the person who is collecting the 
information.  
 
6. Data Transfers Principle: Restricts authorised collectors of personal 
information from transferring that information to third parties without the 
consent of the data subject. In the case of transborder transfers, the 
directive prohibits transfers outright to countries lacking what they call ‘an 
adequate level of protection’.  
 
7. Independent Oversight Principle: Requires an effective and 
independent supervisory body with the authority to audit data processing 
systems. This includes the ability to investigate complaints brought by 
individuals and the ability to enforce sanctions against data processors 
that fail to comply. The requirement for all individuals who engage in data 
collection to register with the relevant national supervisory body.  
 
8. Individual redress Principle: Establishes that individuals have a right to 
access their personal information including the right to correct inaccurate 
information and the right to seek recourse against data controllers who 
do not comply with the directive.  
(Loring 2002) 
 
The EU Data Protection Directive established a high water mark in terms of 
regional and international legal protection in relation to information privacy 
(Cate 1999). 
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2.2.3 Interpreting the EU Directive: Working Party 29 
 
Each member state appoints a Supervisory Authority who is responsible for 
ensuring compliance with the relevant provisions. In the UK this is the 
Information Commissioners Office (ICO).  Article 29 of the Directive 95/46/EC 
created a ‘Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regards to the 
Processing of Personal Data’. Often referred to as the Working Party 29, this 
group is composed of representatives from each of the member states data 
protection authorities. Its main purpose was to interpret key portions of the 
directive. For example, although Article 25 of the directive used the term 
‘adequate’ in relation to data transfers yet no clear definition of this key term 
was included. The working party established a methodology to determine 
whether or not non-member states provided a sufficient level of data protection. 
This included setting out a number of procedural and substantive principles that 
must be met as a precondition to the finding of ‘adequacy’ (Loring 2002). There 
are also issues with regard to interpretation of the word ‘relevant’ in relation the 
Data Protection Directive.  
 
The EU Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive (2002/58/EC), also 
known as the e-Privacy directive, translates the principle of the ‘technologically 
neutral’ Data Protection Directive into specific rules applied to the electronic 
communications sector.  
 
The GDPR, published in 2015 and effective from 2018 supersedes the 
95/46/EU directive. The GDPR incorporates many of core principles of the 
earlier directive while also attempting to address specific areas of concern to 
regulations as a result of more recent technological advances. This thesis 
examines the ‘novel’ new provision for the establishment of privacy seal 
accreditation schemes.  
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2.2.4 Privacy Regulation in the US 
 
The US adopted a markedly different approach to the regulation of data 
protection compared to the EU. The EU Directive 95/46/EC can be categorised 
as a centralised, standard-setting approach that includes enforcement features. 
In contrast, the US regulatory environment is fragmented and narrowly targeted, 
addressing specific concerns/industries in reaction to perceived issues as they 
arise (Shaffer 2000). A core premise of the US approach that is that openness 
of information advances privacy interests as it allows citizens to access and 
correct information held about them in an affordable manner. Any requirement 
to increase privacy protection will add costs to information flows, creating 
inefficiencies in the form of reduced productivity and higher prices for products 
and services and a loss of competitiveness for the macroeconomy (Cate 1999). 
Overall the US is a self-regulatory approach that endorses the core principles 
as set out by the OECD guidelines in relation to data protection (to which it is a 
signatory) and trans boarder flows.  
 
The fragmented approach in the US means enforcement of data 
protection/information privacy is distributed and includes constitutional 
protections, common law privacy torts as well as state and federal legislation 
(Loring 2002).  
 
In terms of constitutional protection, the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the US Constitution all contain limited protection in relation to 
an individuals privacy rights. However, most of the constitutional protection that 
does exist relates specifically to unwarranted government invasions of privacy. 
A landmark U.S. Supreme Court case of Whalen v. Roe in 1977 examined a 
New York statute requiring physicians to provide details relating to prescriptions 
to a centralised database. The Court recognised an individuals right to have 
their personal information remain private but also added, 
 
“We are not aware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast 
amounts of personal information in vast data banks or other massive 
government files…” (US 1977).  
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Interestingly, the US Supreme court also ruled that no constitutional protections 
existed in the Fourth Amendment for personal information transmitted to their 
parties for commercial use.  
 
A number of Federal Statutes also offer privacy protections. Here the approach 
has been reactive with legislation introduced on a piecemeal basis in response 
to specific issues that arise in an industry sector. Examples of such legislation 
include the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) of 1970 with permits consumer 
credit agencies to release individuals credit information to businesses with a 
legitimate need for such information.  The Privacy Act 1974 regulates the 
collection, maintenance and dissemination of personal information by federal 
agencies. However, criticisms include the acts lack of an enforcement 
mechanism to ensure compliance. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA) of 1986 safeguards all electronic communications from unauthorised 
interception. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 
1996 regulated the use of private health records. The Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act (COPPA) of 1998 restricts the online collection of personal 
information for children under the age of thirteen.  
 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act (GLBA) 1999 represents 
the most comprehensive US approach to privacy regulation. Some 
commentators’ suggest US lawmakers were influenced by what the EU had 
done in relation to data protection in their directive. However, as with previous 
legislation, this act was limited in so far as it only applied to ‘financial 
institutions’.  
 
Some privacy regulation also exists in the form of State Statutes but these are 
limited by their application at a state only level. Despite this, some states have 
been active in creating industry-specific privacy legislation.  Finally, the 
Common Law Tort of Privacy offers protection from individuals and the 
government in relation to privacy intrusions. However, it provides minimal 
protection for information privacy (Loring 2002).  
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As you might expect with a fragmented regulatory approach, responsibility for 
the enforcement of this rules in relation to privacy there falls across a number of 
different agencies with the US Federal Trace Commission (FTC) and the US 
Department of Commerce as the primary enforcers. The FTC has issued a set 
of ‘Fair Information Practice Principles’ or (FIPs) in relation to Data Protection 
but these can be seen as good practice principles reliant on the industry self-
regulation and are not enforceable by law. However, other bodies do have 
powers in relation to specific acts. For example, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has enforcement powers in relation to the GLBA.  
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2.2.5 Managing Transnational Data/Information Flows 
 
As we have seen, the EU and US take very different approaches in terms of 
how they address issues related to protecting information privacy. Through its 
Directives, the EU sets out clear principles and requirements for member states 
in terms of creating both overseeing and enforcement agencies. In contrast, the 
US takes adopts the position that legislation is only required to deal with sector 
or industry specific issues as they arise.  
 
Perhaps the one clear area of commonality in terms of overriding principles in 
relation to privacy is the importance they both place on the role free-flow of 
information impacts commerce. However, the philosophical approach that 
underpins this principle differs greatly between jurisdictions. The EU enacted 
the Data Protection Directive as they feared differing national legislation would 
obstruct the free flow of data. This contrasts with the US, where the overriding 
principle sees data protection as state interference that introduces transactional 
costs making markets less efficient. The differing regulatory approaches both 
place significant importance of ensuring information-flows, in recognition of the 
key role this plays in promoting economic growth. It was this common view that 
led to the creation of the ‘Safe Harbor Principle’ (later revised to Privacy Shield). 
Furthermore, as economic globalization advanced and the growth of global new 
media firms accelerated, the free flow of data/information between different 
jurisdictions came into even sharper focus.  
 
2.2.6 ‘Safe Harbor’ Principle 
 
Article 25 of the 95/46/EC Directive extended the application of EC privacy laws 
beyond the jurisdiction of the EU Member States. It required all data from 
citizens of member states to be given the same protection as was afforded to it 
in the EU directive. Some commentators have interpreted this move by the EC 
as a deliberate attempt to establish the directive as a global standard for data 
protection (Cate 1999). Working Party 29 ruled that the US GLBA law was not 
stringent enough to comply with the EU ‘adequacy’ requirement. This led to the 
prospect of a transatlantic ‘data war’ and prompted the European Commission 
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and US Department of Commerce to meet and agree a set of conditions. These 
are generally referred to as ‘safe harbor’ principles/standards were established 
to avoid a potentially damaging trade conflict. US based companies who stated 
that adhered to the agreed standards would be considered as adhering to EU 
data protection requirements. Negotiations were not particularly problematic, as 
many of the core principles of the EC directive were compatible with the OECD 
Guidelines where the US had been a signatory.  
 
The US-EU Safe Harbor Framework came into effect in 2000 (Lloyd 2011). 
Under the Safe Harbour compromise, US firms who transferred data collected 
in the EU to the US would self-certify that they adhere to the core principles set 
out in Directive 95/46/EC. This arrangement, although not without its critics, 
operated successfully for many years.  
 
However, in 2015, the Safe Harbour arrangement was declared invalid by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). This ECJ decision came about as a result of a 
complaint taken against Facebook by Austrian law student Max Schrems. 
Based on leaked confidential documents from former US National Security 
Agency (NSA) employee Edward Snowdon, Schrems successfully 
demonstrated that Facebook was in breach of EU data protection principles 
when transferring and processing data collected in the EU, to the US. In 
October 2015, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that Facebook indeed 
insufficiently protected Schrems data and therefore was in breach of Safe 
Harbor.  
 
The ECJ decision forced the EU and US authorities to come up with a new legal 
framework to cover the transatlantic data flows. This new arrangement came 
into force in Feb 2016 under a framework known as the ‘EU-US Privacy Shield’. 
However, this did not completely settle the matter and a number of court cases 
are currently pending in relation to the validity of the Privacy Shield 
arrangement. In April 2016, the Working Party 29 highlighted there major points 
of concern relating to deletion and collection of personal information, as well as 
concerns in relation to the Ombudsperson mechanisms used to resolve 
disputes. The GDPR has effectively superseded the Privacy Shield as the 
regulation goes beyond it in terms of its scope.  
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2.2.7 Regulation v’s Free Market Approaches 
 
Academic critiques of the approaches taken by the EU and US to data 
protection are broad in scope and often technical/detailed. However, a number 
of key themes emerge and these are discussed below.  
 
Neoliberal/neoclassical economists generally dislike formal regulation and 
favour self-regulation of markets. We discuss this in more detail in later sections 
of this chapter. Their criticisms of the formal EU style regulatory driven 
approaches to data protection cite a number of problematic areas. Apart from 
the usual ‘transactional costs’ argument (i.e. compliance with regulation adds 
cost and this impacts on prices and competitiveness etc), they also argue that 
the length of time it takes governments formulate and enact legislation (for a 
particular technology) means the ‘new’ technology itself is often outdated or 
superseded in the meantime. There are also concerns that efforts to reign in 
technology through regulation will force firms to move to less privacy restrictive 
jurisdictions and this in turn will hurt jobs and economic growth. Furthermore, 
critics argue that any attempt to control technologies will force developers to 
design more complex systems that are more difficult to monitor (Beck 2001). 
Broadly speaking, critics of the EU style regulatory framework often favour a 
more free-market approach/solution.  
 
However, the free-market approach also attracts criticism from privacy 
campaigners. Those in favour of regulation that being applied to specific 
industries cite how regulation can be used,  
 
“to promote activities or results beneficial to the public good, to limit or halt 
activities or results harmful to the public good” (Picard 2002, p.70).   
 
The telemarketing industry in the US provides a simple yet relevant example of 
how pure marketplace approaches can limit user choice. Until regulations were 
introduced that created a National Do Not Call Registry, individuals had no way 
of preventing unwanted and intrusive phone calls. The new rule requiring 
telemarketers to include Caller ID when making such calls, preserved 
individuals basic privacy ‘right to be left alone’ while allowing user to opt in or 
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out of such telemarketing calls. There are parallels between the telemarketing 
direct marketing debate and the current Internet tracking debate (Hoofnagle et 
al 2012). The absence of an enforceable option for Internet users to choose not 
to be tracked is limiting their choice.  
 
Neither the US or EU approach to data regulation can be seen as efficient. 
Interestingly, despite their differing approaches data protection regulations, 
major ‘white paper’ reports by the EU, the FTC and the US Dept of Commerce 
all pointed to similar remarkably similar failings, acknowledging that their 
respective approaches are not effective, perhaps even obsolete. The failure to 
meet the challenges to privacy that come from new technologies may in fact 
damage commerce and economic growth going forward (Cate 2011). We will 
explore these reports in more detail in the following sections.  
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2.2.8 Regulatory Environment: Fit for Purpose? 
 
Rohn (2018) suggests that media firms can gain a better understanding of their 
audiences by examining the data they collect on them. In this context,  
 
“important concepts such as trust, authority and knowledge are very relevant” 
(Rohn 2018, p.434).  
 
This view is very much echoed by EU and US data protection enforcement 
authorities and gaining a more detailed understanding of the relationship 
between new media consumers and new media platform providers is a fertile 
ground for media management researchers.  
 
In 2010, the European Commission published a consultation entitled, ‘A 
comprehensive approach on personal Data Protection in the European 
Community’. It set out a number of areas where it believed the existing 
95/46/EC Data Directive was not providing adequate protection for individuals 
or business. In Jan 2012, following a period of consultation with a range of 
stakeholders, the Commission set out more detailed proposals for the reform of 
the EU’s 1995 data protection rules. The reforms had the dual goal of 
strengthening online privacy rights and boosting Europe’s digital economy. A 
new single law would address issues relating to how member states had 
interpreted the 95/46/EC rules differently as well as reducing what they describe 
as ‘costly administrative burdens’ and save business €2.3 billion a year 
(European Commission 2012).  
 
To address these and other issues, the Commission had undertaken a review of 
the existing legal framework through a range of public consultations and 
studies. Overall they found the core principles of the Directive to be valid but 
identified several problematic areas they described as “posing specific 
challenges”. The proposed changes represented a convergence of views across 
consumer organisations, business association and Data Protection Authorities. 
These recognised that technology developments including social networking 
and cloud computing had resulted in an increasing level of risk to individuals’ 
53 
 
personal data. The Commission states that it believes that existing data 
protection provisions are inadequate citing that,  
 
“ways of collecting personal data have become increasingly elaborated and less 
detectable” (European Commission 2012, p.2).  
 
The following sections set out some of the key challenges identified by 
regulators.  
 
2.3 Privacy Policies  
 
A privacy policy represents a binding legal agreement between the data subject 
and data controller. It operates on what is commonly referred to a ‘notice and 
choice’ principle. The wording of the policy gives ‘notice’ of what data the 
controller is collecting and how they can use/share the personal information 
gathered about the data subject. The service user or data subject then has the 
option to exercise their ‘choice’ by deciding whether to use the service or 
otherwise. Requirements from the US and EU data protection regulators means 
that almost all websites carry a privacy policy.  
 
A new media firm’s privacy policy is generally accessed via a link/hyperlink on 
the hosts (data controller) website/app. In most cases the link appears in either 
in the footer of the webpage or from a link displayed during the registration or 
purchase process. Engagement in said processes constitutes acceptance of the 
privacy policy and permits the data controller to collect and use the data 
subjects personal data in the ways described in the policy. Most countries have 
a designated Data Protection Authority (DPA) to ensure that data collectors 
comply with its own stated privacy policy. For example, in the UK, DPA 
responsibility lies with the ICO.  
 
Empirical research has long shown most privacy policies to be both time-
consuming and difficult to read/understand. As a result, individuals (data 
subjects) rarely engage with privacy policies, even when they express concerns 
about information collection processes (Jensen, Potts and Jensen 2008; 
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Reidenberg, Breaux, Cranor, French, Grannis, Graves, Liu, McDonald, Norton 
and Ramanath, 2015; Vila, Greenstadt and Molnar 2004). Research from 
McDonald and Cranor (2008) estimated the economic ‘costs’ associated with 
reading privacy policies. They looked at privacy policies from 75 popular 
websites and found the average policy was 2,500 worlds long. Based on a 
reading speed of 250 words per minute, they calculated that it would take 
approx. 10 mins to read an average privacy policy. Next they estimated the 
average number of websites visited by web users to be 1,462 different websites 
a year. This means the average person would need to spend 40 mins a day 
reading privacy policies alone! (McDonald and Cranor 2008). Clearly this is 
unrealistic expectation and regulators are therefore seeking alternative 
mechanisms to aid data subjects in this area. 
 
2.3.1 Machine Readable Privacy Policies 
 
An early attempt to address the complex area of privacy polices (for online 
users) was developed by the World Wide Web Consortium (P3P) during the 
‘dotcom’ boom in the early 2000’s. The initiative came about in response to 
specific concerns from the FTC who thought that data subjects privacy 
concerns might constrain the development of online commerce. It operated as 
follows. Website owners placed a privacy policy on their website in machine 
readable format. P3P provided tools embedded in a web browser that allowed 
the data subject to set customized privacy requirements/preferences. When a 
user visited a website, the privacy requirements set by the data subject were 
compared to the host website (data controller) with any differences between the 
two highlighted. The data subject could then decide whether they wanted to 
continue with in their interaction with the website. This process did not include 
the use of icons. While the P3P initiative retained the ‘notice and choice’ 
principle at its core, the now machine readable privacy policy was successful in 
terms of vastly reducing the ‘economic cost’ of reading the policy.  
 
Overall the P3P initiative enjoyed limited success. It failed to become more 
widely adopted due to criticisms of the interface design and the technical 
complexity in configuring it further limited its adoption (Hochheiser 2002). 
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Furthermore, the lack of clear incentives for data collectors to adopt the P3P 
initiative mean also contributed to the failure to achieve widespread adoption.   
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2.3.2 Regulatory Changes Proposed 
 
The Commission’s report set out a number of overall ‘key objectives’ in areas 
where data protection could be improved. These effectively reiterated the 
founding principles of EU data protection i.e. 1) strengthening individuals’ rights 
and 2) enhancing the internal market dimension. We will look at these in more 
detail. 
 
The 2012 report set out its desire to Ensuring appropriate protection for 
individuals in all circumstances. It identified how the definition of ‘personal data’ 
in the existing 95/46 Directive was not clear. It also noted how in data mining 
and data aggregation innovations meant that aggregating data across different 
systems/databases could identify data subjects. The report also made the case 
for the expansion of the current definition of what constitutes ‘sensitive data’ 
citing in particular areas like genetic data and location data is not covered under 
data protection.  
 
Transparency and control are other key areas addressed in the report. The 
Commission accepted that privacy notices are unclear and do not always 
comply with existing rules. As such, they actually reduce transparency and 
control for data subjects. In order to enhance control, the report sets out 
aspirations in terms of ‘right to be forgotten’ and ‘data portability’ (recognised as 
particularly challenging in the new media environment). 
 
The report formally acknowledged that there are differences in how individual 
Member States interpret how consent is attained (by data controllers with 
respect to processing of an individual’s personal data). The 
acceptance/interpretation of implied consent was viewed as particularly 
problematic area and the Commission called for clarity on the rules of consent. 
 
There was also a clear recognition that existing sanctions for serious data 
protection violations need strengthening and suggests that explicit criminal 
sanctions may also be needed. This is especially true for large new media firms 
where the maximum fine applicable represents only a tiny fraction of revenues.  
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The Commission set out areas where data protection regulations could help to 
promote the internal market dimension. It acknowledges that the 95/46 Directive 
has been incorrectly implemented in some member states. This has resulted in 
greater restrictions for some businesses in relation to the free flow of data. The 
new regulation would seek to provide greater legal certainty and a level playing 
field for data controllers. It would also aim to simplify the ‘administrative burden’ 
placed on data controllers under the current system. 
 
The Commission also proposed that any new regulation included a ‘Privacy by 
Design’ principle. This is where technology infrastructure (software and 
hardware) would include the principle of privacy in at the early design stage of 
their systems architecture.  
 
The report also called for the establishment of a EU privacy seal certification 
scheme that could be offered for products and services that meet the 
established privacy standards.  
 
The eventual outcome of this process was the publication in 2016 of the GDPR. 
Member states were given an approx. 2-year implementation period and the 
new regulation into effect in May 2018.  
 
The Commission highlighted other significant issues in relation to ‘Clarifying and 
simplifying the rules for international data transfers’ and ‘promoting universal 
principles’. However, perhaps the most significant aspect of what the 
Commission set out is the sheer number and range of areas in which the 
existing Data Protection legislation was seen to be failing. The report concludes 
with broad aspirations,  
 
“the challenge to legislators is to establish a legislative framework that will stand 
the test of time” (European Commission 2010, p.18).  
 
This reflects the core challenge that regulators face when attempting to 
assemble the new regulation - crafting a regulation that will be able to keep 
pace with the rate of technological development.  
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Identifying areas that need improving is one thing, but implementing 
rules/regulations that address these current concerns while may well prove to 
be extremely difficult to achieve. The section below provides an example of 
some of the challenges faced by regulators when attempting to clarify how 
member states interpret the issues of ‘consent’ in the 95/46 directive. 
 
2.3.3 Regulation Complexity: The EU Cookie Law 
 
EU Directive 2009/136/EC (or ‘Cookie Law’) set out to bring clarity on one of the 
key principles of the 95/46 Directive, the issue of consent. Most online services 
us ‘cookies’ on their websites. Cookies are small text files that a data controller 
places in an individual’s web browser when they visit their website. From a new 
media user perspective it means that when you return to a website you have 
visited before, the website may ‘remember’ you. This means that 
usernames/passwords as well as other preferences can be personalized to 
what you configured on previous visits. The 2009 directive sought to bring 
clarity in relation to how data controllers were permitted to use such cookies. 
Commonly referred to as the ‘cookie law’, regulators wanted to clarify whether 
implied or explicit consent was required by operators (data controllers) when 
using ‘cookies’.  
 
The Information Commissioners Office (ICO) in the UK summarised the issue 
here:  
“The rules in this area are essentially designed to protect the privacy of internet 
users – even where the information being collected about them is not directly 
personally identifiable. The changes to the Directive in 2009 were prompted in 
part by concerns about online tracking of individuals and the use of spyware. 
These are not rules designed to restrict the use of particular technologies as 
such, they are intended to prevent information being stored on people’s 
computers, and used to recognise them via the device they are using, without 
their knowledge and agreement.” (ICO 2012, p.2).  
 
The ICO stated that from 26th May 2012 implied consent would not be sufficient 
to meet EU data protection regulations. However, just 48 hours before the 
deadline, the ICO altered its advice/guidance stating that, “implied consent is 
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certainly a valid form of consent” (ICO 2012, p.7). This late change essentially 
shifted the responsibility for consent from the website operator to the user, thus 
shifting the burden for the user to opt-out rather than forcing the operator to get 
users to opt-in.   
 
On one hand, the late guidance issued by the ICO can be viewed as a small 
semantic change in language. However, it captures the challenges faced by 
member states when implementing the regulation. This time in a relatively 
straightforward issue of consent, we see the same organisation, the ICO, 
change its advice/interpretation in the final hours before the directive becomes 
effective in law. In this example, it would appear that objections from UK 
businesses and website operators may have contributed to the ICO late change 
to its guidance. As the implementation deadline approached, there was 
pressure from the technology industry to move away from its explicit consent 
requirement. A report from KPMG had suggested that 95% of UK companies 
had not complied with the legislation and many risked going out of business 
should the ICO apply the max permitted £500,000 fine (Arthur 2012).  
 
Overall, this example suggests that when it comes to the crunch, the promotion 
of commerce and maintaining the free flow of information trumps individual’s 
personal privacy protection. Similar issues have arisen in the US where 
proposals from the Obama administration sought to implement a clear and 
universal “Do Not Track” principle. However, successful lobbying by the new 
media industry saw Facebook’s “like” and Google’s “+1” buttons/features 
emerge exempt from Do Not Track principle (Hoofnagle et al. 2012).  
 
The contents of the ‘Cookie Law’ were originally set out in the e-Privacy 
Directive in 2003 and these did not come into play in the UK until almost a 
decade later. Additionally, by the time the new rules came into force, 
technological developments had rendered the rules somewhat irrelevant. 
Research published in the Harvard Law & Policy Review journal,  
 
“empirically demonstrate that advertisers are making it impossible to avoid 
online tracking” (Hoofnagle et al. 2012).  
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They show how tracking technologies have moved on from the use of ‘cookies’ 
that can be deleted by users to ‘flash cookies’ that can track individuals 
irrespective of whether they wish to be tracked or not.  
 
The ‘cookie law’ example captures many of the challenges regulators face when 
attempting to make (even relatively minor) changes to data protection 
regulations. Firstly, it can take a long time to implement. In this case almost a 
decade from inception to it actually becoming law (i.e. 2003-2012). Secondly, 
the rate of technical change means that by the time the rule becomes effective, 
technological developments may render it obsolete i.e. the use flash cookies.  
Thirdly, in this case it would appear that powerful lobby groups were able 
influence the advice of the national regulator, as it did with the ICO in the UK.  
 
2.3.4 Adequate Provisions – Poor Enforcement? 
 
The UK legal academic Davies (2001) believes that the founding principles of 
modern data protection laws are essentially sound. He argues that existing 
legislative provisions offer substantial privacy protection for individuals, if 
enforced. He cites three key factors that contribute to this absence of 
enforcement.  
 
Firstly, he argues governments regularly ensure their most vital areas of their 
function are exempt from privacy law, citing security or other public interest 
reasons. As a result, communication and information infrastructures are 
established with what he calls ‘surveillance by design’ as a core component.  
 
Secondly, he believes individuals are overwhelmed by the complexity and 
processes required to enforce the protection for their privacy. The campaigning 
group Privacy International has estimated that personal data for the average 
citizen in the developed world is located on at least 400 databases. They 
estimate that gaining access to this data would take more than 40 working days 
to prepare, administrate and to analyse and that this is simply not practical for 
data controllers or individuals.  
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Finally, he describes data protection regulators as having been, “corrupted and 
compromised through timidity and neglect” (Davies 2001, p289). Here he is 
essentially accusing regulators of not enforcing the existing rules. Davies does 
acknowledge that some may interpret his views as ‘extreme’ and/or alarmist. 
However, he defends his position pointing out that once a fundamental right has 
been established, the rigorous protection of these rights is in fact a conservative 
notion and this it is the transgressor who becomes radical. He believes both the 
government and the private sector conveniently invert this notion.   
 
Although one could argue that Davis views are somewhat dated, some of the 
points he raises may help inform future debates/regulations. For example, will it 
really be possible to distinguish one software application from another in terms 
of features that enhance a notion of ‘surveillance by design’ as described by 
Davies from something that includes ‘privacy by design’ as called for by 
regulators? 
 
2.3.5 Differing Regulatory Approaches – Common Issues 
 
As we have discussed, the founding principles of EU and US data protection 
regulations are based on distinctly differing founding philosophical approaches.  
One clear area of commonality is the key importance they place to the free flow 
of information. Although the philosophical approach that drives the principle 
differ greatly, both place significant importance on maintaining free information-
flows as a core driver of economic growth and prosperity. It was this common 
view that led to the creation of the ‘Safe Harbor Principle’ (and its more recent 
reincarnation as the ‘Privacy Shield’). 
 
Privacy campaigners call for tighter data protection regulation specifically to 
deal with these advances in technology. New types of databases can now store 
information across thousands of machines and process queries on trillions of 
records in just a few seconds (Varian 2014). Data protection regulators on both 
sides of the Atlantic recognize this and both sides agree that data subjects need 
greater transparency with regards to these practices.  
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Regulators in both jurisdictions have identified a number of areas where 
technological developments meant existing data protection regulations are 
failing to protect producers and consumers. We will examine these in more 
detail in the following sections.  
 
2.4 Changes to EU Data Protection: Overview 
 
The European Commission set out a comprehensive list of specific areas where 
data protection regulation requires enhancing. Addressing all of these is beyond 
the scope of this document and therefore the discussion will be limited to areas 
most relevant to the research being undertaken here. After a series of 
consultations with ‘individuals and organisations’ (i.e. a range of stakeholders) 
the report sets out what it is trying to achieve, again this is firmly in the context 
of the core principles of European data protection, namely: 
 
1) Clarity in relation to how existing data protection principles apply to new 
technologies to ensure individuals personal privacy is protected. 
 
2) The request particularly from multinational companies to reduce the 
administrative burden and increase legal certainty in order to create a 
level playing field for economic operators.  
‘Strengthening individuals’ rights’ is set out as a key objective to ensure 
appropriate protection for individuals’ personal data. Personal data is defined 
as,  
“all information relating to an identified or identifiable person, either directly or 
indirectly.” (European Commission 2010, p.5).  
 
The Commission identify three specific enablers of enhanced personal data 
protection. These are 1) transparency, 2) sensitive data categories and 3) 
control. We will examine these in more detail. 
It is also useful at this to also set out how the GDPR defines personal data, it is:  
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“any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data 
subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an 
identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors 
specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or 
social identity of that natural person;” (GDPR 2018 Article 4(1)). 
 
2.4.1 Transparency 
The European Commission describes transparency as,  
“a fundamental condition for enabling individuals to exercise control over their 
own data and to ensure effective protection of personal data. It is therefore 
essential that individuals are well and clearly informed, in a transparent way, by 
data controllers about how and by whom their data are collected and 
processed, for what reasons, for how long and what their rights are if they want 
to access, rectify or delete their data” (European Commission 2010, p7).  
Regulators describe how online behavioural advertising makes transparency 
around who is collecting personal data and for what purpose, difficult for 
individuals to understand. Privacy notices, particularly in online environments, 
are described as non-transparent and not in compliance with existing rules. It 
sets out the basic requirements for transparency as, 
“information must be easily accessible and easy to understand, and that clear 
and plain language is used” (EC 2010 p.7).  
 
2.4.2 Sensitive Data 
Advances in technology led to calls from regulators to review the list of 
categories categorized as sensitive data. In the 95/46 directive, sensitive data 
categories’ related to any data revealing, 1) racial or ethnic origin, 2) political 
opinions, 3) religious or philosophical beliefs, 4) trade-union membership, and 
the processing of data concerning 5) health or 6) sexual orientation. These 
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sensitive categories of data were initially set out in the ECHR in 1950 and 
require updating to reflect advances in technology over the last 60+ years.  
The GDPR identifies special categories of personal data (or sensitive data) as,  
“Personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic 
data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data 
concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual 
orientation shall be prohibited”. (GDPR, Article 9(1)) 
The GDPR adopts all six sensitive data categories as defined in the 95/46 
directives. It also adds two additional categories to the list, 7) genetic data and 
8) some biometric data. The regulation requires sensitive personal data to be 
treated differently from other categories of personal data i.e. it requires explicit 
consent from data subjects. It also has additional security requirements in terms 
of how the data is stored.  
Processing of data is defined in the GDPR as,  
“any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on 
sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, 
recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, 
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise 
making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction;” 
(GDPR, 2018 Article 4(2)).  
2.4.3 Control 
The Commission also set out the need for individuals to have, “effective control 
over their own data” (European Commission 2010, p8). They describe how online 
social networking poses particular difficulties and acknowledges evidence of 
circumstances where individuals have been impeded in exercising their rights in 
this area. The Commission states that it has,  
“Received various queries from individuals who have not always been able to 
retrieve personal data from online service providers, such as their pictures, and 
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who have therefore been impeded in exercising their rights of access, 
rectification and deletion.” (European Commission 2010, p.8).  
The Commission believe such rights should be clarified, made more explicit and 
possibly strengthened. It also sets out a ‘right to be forgotten’ principle for 
individuals when the data storage period has expired and/or consent has been 
withdrawn.  
The GDPR is a comprehensive regulation and a discussion on all of its 
provisions is beyond the scope of this document.  
 
2.4.4 Privacy Seals  
 
As discussed previously, Recital 100 of the GDPR clearly calls for the 
establishment of a third-party accredited Privacy Seal certification mechanism 
to allow media firms to demonstrate compliance with the relevant regulation. 
EuroPriSE is one such EU based privacy seal accreditation scheme operator.  
 
In their published ‘Cert Readiness Check’ document (available on their 
website), they set out the specific requirements the applicant must meet in order 
to be issued with one of their Privacy Seals. Many of the criteria direct reference 
the relevant EU Directive Article that the compliant is required to meet. For 
example, in relation to Online Behavioural Advertising (OBA),  
 
“In WP 171, p. 11, the Article 29 Working Party considered that while OBA 
providers are responsible for the requirements of Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy 
Directive being met, publishers (website owners) have a certain limited 
responsibility for the data processing that results from the use of an OBA 
service.” (EuroPriSE, p.9).  
 
EuroPriSE sets out the Transparency and Opt-Out criteria each website 
operator must meet in order to comply with the requirements of regulators. 
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The criteria that privacy seal operators will use to assess applications will reflect 
the specific articles from the GDPR. Firms who apply for Privacy Seals will need 
to demonstrate that they meet the criteria in the regulation.  
  
 
2.4.5 US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) - Data Protection 
Proposals: Overview 
 
Echoing their counterparts in the EU, US data protection regulators also 
acknowledge that existing provisions are not sufficient. In 2012, the then 
chairman of the US FTC Jon Leibowitz commented,  
 
"right now, it is almost impossible to figure out which apps collect data and what 
they do with it." (Arthur 2012).  
 
There have even been suggestions that if the online advertising industry in 
particular fails to adequately address the issue of consent in relation to how 
they collect, share and process data, the industry may find itself facing a 
Leveson type enquiry in the not too distant future (Kirwan 2012). An 
undermining of confidence in how personal information is collected and shared 
poses risks to the whole new media sector as well as overall economic growth. 
The following sections highlight some of the key areas where US data 
protection needs addressing.  
 
Similar to EU regulators, the FTC identifies transparency as a key issue and 
that needs to be addressed. In relation to privacy policies it states,  
 
“privacy notices should provide clear, comparable, and concise descriptions of 
a company’s overall data practices. They should clearly articulate who is 
collecting consumer data, why they are collecting it, and how such data will be 
used” (FTC 2010, p.71).  
 
Improving privacy policies is just one a series of measures can improve 
transparency. These are summarised in the table below.  
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Figure 2-2 FTC Data Protection Principles 
 
 
(FTC 2010, p.IX) 
 
As we can see from the table above, the FTC are calling for greater clarity in 
relation to what personal data is being collected and what this data may be 
used for. They later published a ‘recommendations’ report for businesses and 
policymakers outlining specific measures to improve transparency. This 
included a proposal for a food ‘nutrition labelling’ type approach with regards to 
online behavioural advertising. This includes a suggestion for standardising the 
format of privacy policies as well as outlining the potential role of icons in 
alerting users to personal data that may be used for (FTC 2012). However, it did 
not provide any detail how a ‘nutrition labelling’ approach would be 
implemented in practice. 
 
 
2.4.6 US Department of Commerce: Data Protection Proposals 
The executive summary of this report recognises the role that networked 
information technologies have played in transforming the US economy and 
social life over the last 15 years. It acknowledges a lag between what it 
describes as the ‘intensive’ use of personal information and the corresponding 
development of privacy regulations. The result of this lag,  
“leaves consumers with a sense of insecurity about whether using new services 
will expose them to harm” (DoC 2010, p.148).  
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They call for the US government to recognize a full set of Fair Information 
Practice Principles (FIPPs) as the foundation for commercial data privacy. 
These principles should promote increased transparency,  
“through simple notices, clearly articulated purposes for data collection, 
commitments to limit data uses to fulfill these purposes, and expanded use of 
robust audit systems to bolster accountability” (DoC 2010, p.150). 
However, consistent with its free-market principles, the DoC clearly indicates its 
preference for a self-regulatory approach in this area, stating it,  
“requires companies to recognize that different business models based on 
different personal data raise different privacy risks” (DoC 2010, p.18). 
 
2.4.7 The ‘White House Report’ 2012  
 
Based on the proposals/comments from both the FTC and the DoC, the 2012 
‘White House Report’, ‘Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A 
Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital 
Economy’, recognises privacy protections as, “critical to maintaining consumer 
trust in networked technologies” (White House 2012, p.95). The report declares 
the US privacy framework as ‘strong’ but lacking in two key elements, these are; 
1) a clear definition of basic privacy principles that apply to the commercial 
world, and; 2) a commitment of all stakeholders to address consumer privacy 
issues that arise from advances of technologies and their associated business 
models.  
 
Transparency and control are again identified as key enablers of privacy. The 
report states that,  
 
“Consumers have a right to easily understandable and accessible information 
about privacy and security practices. At times and in places that are most useful 
to enabling consumers to gain an meaningful understanding of privacy risks and 
the ability to exercise Individual Control” (White House 2012, p.108).  
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The report calls for the establishing of a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights to 
provide,  
 
“general principles that afford companies discretion in how they implement 
them. This flexibility will help promote innovation. Flexibility will also encourage 
elective privacy protections by allowing companies, informed by input from 
consumers and other stakeholders, to address the privacy issues that are likely 
to be most important to their customers and users, rather than requiring 
companies to adhere to a single, rigid set of requirements.” (White House, 
2012, p.98).  
 
This discretion in terms of how it is implemented is consistent with the free-
market philosophy the US has followed with regards to data protection 
regulation.  
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2.4.8 Summary 
 
As we have seen, the development of electronic communications and in 
particular the rapid growth of the new media internet based services poses 
significant challenges for data protection provisions. The regulators reports 
show the EU and US authorities united in the acceptance that their respective 
data protection environments are not providing the required level of protection 
for data subjects or data collectors. Furthermore, they identify transparency and 
control as key elements in protecting individuals’ privacy. This very much 
echoes the view of media scholars like Rohn (2018) who identify trust and 
authority as a key issue for 21st century media scholars. As well as providing 
clear definitions of key terms like ‘personal data’, EU and US regulators identify 
the importance of giving media consumers greater ‘control’ and ‘transparency’ 
over their personal data to help engender trust between the two parties.  
The focus on transparency and control by regulators is consistent with 
academic definitions of privacy discussed earlier in this chapter. However, it is 
worth noting that individuals are only in a position to exercise meaningful control 
(i.e. what elements of personal data to provide to data controllers) of their 
personal data if they are provided with a transparent view of what their data can 
be used for and if/how it will be shared with third parties. In other words, they go 
hand in hand, transparency is a key enabler of control.  
Formally, information transparency can be defined as, “the degree of visibility and 
accessibility of information” (Zhu 2002, p.93). Features that promote information 
transparency are those that give individuals access to the information that a firm 
has collected about them as well as how that information may or indeed will be 
used in the future (Awad and Krishnan 2003). Some commentators argue it is 
more than just the quantity of information made available to a consumer that is 
important. The ‘quality of the interface’ that makes their data accessible that is 
also important.  
 
While transparency is important, the complexity around how this is 
communicated to users through privacy policies, terms and conditions or some 
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other means is major area of concern for regulators (Granados, Gupta and 
Kauffman, 2009).  
EU regulators suggest that changes to user interfaces or use of icons could 
assist in improving information transparency in online environments. Article 100 
of the GDPR explicitly calls for a certification scheme that uses marks and seals 
to demonstrate compliance. Privacy seals could potentially also meet US 
regulators desire to have,  
“easily understandable and accessible information about privacy and security 
practices. At times and in places that are most useful to enabling consumers to 
gain an meaningful understanding of privacy risks and the ability to exercise 
Individual Control” (White House 2012, p.108).  
However, none of these reports examined offer any empirical evidence to 
support the use of privacy seals/icons. Will the presence of an accredited 
Privacy Seal on a firms website provide the transparency and control 
assurances for individuals? The research outlined here will empirically test how 
use of iconography in the form of privacy seals impacts on personal information 
disclosure in online environments.  
The following sections will examine examples of where icons/seals have been 
used in both online and offline environments when used to try and 
communicated messages to individuals in a standardized manner. We will also 
discuss existing empirical evidence that have examined how users behave 
when presented with privacy seals and/or similar iconography.  
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2.5 Iconography / Privacy Seals 
 
“Icons and labels both have a long history of helping communicating complex 
factual information in an easy-to-grasp way to consumers.” (Edwards and Able, 
2014, p.2).  
 
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) facilitates the establishment of 
Privacy Seal certification mechanisms, specifically to deal with the issue of 
transparency. There is no specific requirement/obligation to for individual 
member states to establish their own certification mechanism. In the UK, the 
Information Commissioners Office (IOC), who has overall responsibility for 
ensuing UK data protection complies with EU regulatory requirements, is 
developing its own privacy seal accreditation scheme (Falmer 2015). The IOC 
stated on their website,  
 
“A privacy seal is a ‘stamp of approval’ which demonstrates good privacy 
practice and high data protection compliance standards. It will work much like 
the British Standard Institute’s Kitemark symbol, which is displayed on 
numerous products and services within the UK to demonstrate quality and high 
standards.” (ICO 2016).  
 
However, the 2016 referendum result in the UK where the UK voted to leave 
the EU has created uncertainty about the UK’s future relationship with the EU 
and this seems to have stalled the progress of ICO’s plans in this area.  
 
While the EU’s explicit call for a data protection seal/mark certification 
mechanism to address online information privacy concerns is new to the 
technology sector, similar schemes, in both the offline and online work have 
been established before, with somewhat varying degrees of success. The 
following sections will provide a summary of such schemes. 
 
2.5.1 Icons, Labels and Privacy Seals  
 
In a data protection context, the primary function of ‘iconography’ (i.e. icons, 
labels, privacy seals etc) is rooted in the “notice and choice” principle. From a 
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media consumer (data subject) perspective, the presence of iconography that 
demonstrates the compliance with relevant data protection regulations may 
offer reassurances with regards to how media firms (data controller) manage 
their personal data. As already discussed, data subjects struggle to read and 
fully understand privacy policies. The use of iconography has the potential to 
aid a data subjects decision-making in terms of whether to engage with said 
service provider (i.e. data collector) or not, without having to read the whole 
privacy policy. For data collectors, displaying iconography helps communicate 
key elements of their privacy policy in a more ‘user friendly’ form. Some media 
firms may see their use as a potential source of competitive advantage, as it 
allows data controllers to demonstrate their compliance with data protection 
regulations while also offering data subjects’ greater transparency in terms of 
how their personal data is being collected/used/shared.  
 
It is important to note that iconography does not give data subjects any 
additional control over their personal data collector per se. It acts as a visual 
representation of how aspects of a particular service operates i.e. what 
categories of personal data are collected, how it is stored and does it comply 
with the relevant data protection regulations. The following sections will explore 
the use iconography in both online and offline environments and offers some 
potential insights for how media firms may be able to build trust with media 
consumers.   
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2.5.2 Offline Iconography: Energy and Nutrition  
 
The EU energy label system is a good example of how iconography is 
successfully used to aid consumer decision-making. In Sept 1992, Council 
Directive 92/75/EEC established a mandatory energy label system for all major 
household appliances. Standardized energy labels allowed consumers to see 
summary energy consumption and performance information specific to each 
appliance without having to read through an instruction manual. Below is an 
example of an energy label. As you can see, the label provides key information 
relating to the 1) energy efficiency rating; 2) estimated annual energy 
consumption; and 3) product specific information such as water consumption 
and/or noise levels, for each appliance.  
 
Figure 2-3 Energy Label Example 
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With major household appliances accounting for 35% of residential end-use 
electricity consumption, energy labels have played a key role in role in both the 
diffusion of energy efficient appliances and helping to achieve overall energy 
saving targets (Bertoldi and Atanasiu 2007). Industry data shows that 
consumers are more likely to purchase appliances with higher efficient energy 
ratings. While some minor criticisms of energy labeling do exist, overall the 
scheme is viewed as a major success in terms of its impact on consumer 
purchasing behavior as well as the wider EU energy savings.  
 
Food nutrition labels provide another useful example of offline iconography.  
  
“Nutrition labelling is an attempt to provide consumers, at the point of purchase, 
with information about the nutrition content of individual food products, in order 
to enable consumers to choose nutritionally appropriate food.” (Grunert and 
Wills 2007, p.385).  
 
In the US, the FTC believes food nutrition style labeling could play a useful role 
in communicating data protection practices (FTC 2012). In a major review of 
over 58 EU nutritional literature papers/reports, Grunert and Wills (2007) 
research concluded that consumers generally understood the link between food 
and health but that the degree of interest in this varies across situations and 
products. Their research showed that consumers were shown to generally like 
front of packet displays of nutritional information. The majority of participants in 
the study believed they understood the nutritional information presented to them 
and could recall it afterwards when prompted in some of the 
surveys/experiments. However, they also concluded that little is known in 
relation to how labeling information impacts on consumer’s overall wider dietary 
behavior/patterns.  
 
The offline examples of iconography discussed above took relatively complex 
information sets and presented summary labels/icons to consumers in the form 
of a colour coded and somewhat standardized format. Research shows both 
systems were well received by consumers. However, in the case of the nutrition 
labels, researchers are unable to isolate the overall impact on the wider 
population dietary behavior. Indeed, as obesity rates continue to rise perhaps 
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this is evidence that the nutrition labels are effective at communicating a 
message but not at altering behavior on a wider level.   
 
In the following sections will examine the use of iconography in online 
environments.  
2.5.3 Online Iconography: Creative Commons Licences 
In broad terms, individuals who create and distribute copyrighted works do so 
under an “all rights reserved” principle. This means that the creator retains the 
exclusive rights to reproduce/copy, adapt, distribute/publish, display or perform 
the work in public unless they have specifically given someone else such rights 
permissions.  
The philosophy behind Creative Commons (CC) licenses is that it allows 
copyright owners to distribute their works with only “some rights reserved” 
(rather than all). Creating a CC license is user friendly and does not require 
extensive copyright legal knowledge. The image below sets out the different 
criteria for granting rights to use the works and these include; a) Attribution, this 
requires the accreditation of the original creator/author; b) No Derivative Works, 
the work can only be reproduced in its original format i.e. with no 
editing/alterations; c) Share Alike, others can distribute the original work but 
only under identical CC licenses; and, d) Non-Commercial, permits copy, editing 
and distribution of the original work if for non-commercial purposes only.  
Figure 2-4 Creative Commons Licence 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Edwards and Able 
2014, p.12).  
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As we can see in the figure above, CC licenses have adopted a set of 
standardized icons.  
“The icons appear clear and concise, and communicate otherwise complex 
intellectual property and copyright concepts in an easy to understand way.” 
(Edwards and Able 2014, p.10).  
However, there has been no formal research to specifically assess the success 
of the icon approach adopted by CC.  
The CC ‘tools’ operate as a globally recognized framework, developed in 
conjunction with legal experts in over 70 jurisdictions. Over 350 million CC-
licensed works have been published by authors on the Internet (Creative 
Commons Factsheet 2017). While many CC licenses are sought for non-profit 
uses, a number of large commercial websites including Google and Flickr as 
well as a host of national governments use them, thus demonstrating a global 
acceptance.  
 
The relative success of the CC license led to attempts to adopt a similar 
icon/graphical tool specifically for web users. The following sections highlight 
some of these attempts. 
 
2.5.4 Online Privacy Seals 
In an online context, privacy seals are used to,  
“symbolically communicate a third-party authority designed to engender trust in 
the Web site’s information practices as stated in their privacy policy” (Rifon, La 
Rose and Choi 2005, p.341).  
Privacy seals primarily serve two key functions. Firstly, they potentially raise the 
practices/standards of data collectors (who generally have to demonstrate 
compliance with the seal awarding body); and, secondly, to influence consumer 
(data subjects) perceptions (Miyazaki and Krishnamurthy 2002).  
A number of organizations run their own online privacy seal schemes. TRUSTe 
is one such third party online privacy seal program and was founded in 1997 by 
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the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and CommerceNet Consortium. 
Website owners (i.e. data collectors) pay an annual fee to participate in the 
program and in return for this,  
“Seal authorities provide a set of guidelines and a voluntary enforcement 
mechanism to assure that the site abides by its own privacy policy.” (Rifon et 
al. 2005, p.341).  
For website users, the presence of the seal is considered to help build trust in 
the data collectors stated privacy practices. The seals credibility depends on 
both voluntary compliance as well as monitoring from the seal program 
administrators. 
Figure 2-5 TRUSTe Privacy Seal 
 
 
A number of major online brands participate in the TRUSTe system including 
Paypal, Apple, eBay and Oracle. However, the scheme is not without its critics. 
TRUSTe was itself found to have used a third party to track information on its 
website, breaching its own privacy standards! It also faced criticism for failing to 
take actions against Microsoft and RealNetworks on the basis that the deemed 
software glitches were responsible for data breaches rather than it being a 
deliberate act (Rifon at al, 2005). The results of the limited empirical research to 
examine assessing the impact privacy seals like the TRUSTe program will be 
discussed in greater detail in later sections of this document. 
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Figure 2-6 ePrivacy Seal 
In the EU we have seen a small number 
of relatively ‘new’ privacy seal 
accreditation schemes emerge in recent 
years. These private firms include the 
EuroPriSe ‘European Privacy Seal’ and 
ePrivacy ‘European seal for your 
privacy’ accreditation scheme operators 
(see figures above/below). In broad 
terms both schemes operate in a similar 
way. Firms who wish to display a 
privacy seal must be able to demonstrate to the accreditation body that the way 
they manage their software (website/apps etc) or products meet the EU data 
protection regulations requirements under GDPR.  
 
Figure 2-7 EuroPriSe Privacy Seal 
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2.5.5 Privacy Bird   
 
Privacy Bird is an initiative from the Wordwide Web Consortium (P3P).  
 
Figure 2-8 Privacy Bird 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Users were required to set their privacy ‘framework’ settings in a web browser 
add-on and the host websites privacy policy was machine read when they 
visited a website. The privacy bird would then appear colored green, amber or 
red depending on how the user privacy requirements compared against the 
host websites stated privacy policy. However, Privacy Bird has not enjoyed 
widespread adoption.   
 
2.5.6 Privacy Icons  
 
A number of academic projects have created custom sets of privacy icons to 
use in their own research into how they may help users navigate the complex 
area of online privacy. The ‘Prime Life’ project from Stanford University in the 
US, who launched a set of ‘PrivIcons’ is one such example. However, to date, 
academic initiatives developed exclusively for the research objectives being 
undertaken in a specific study, have not been put to practice in a commercial 
‘real world’ environment.   
 
In 2014, TRUSTe in conjunction with open source software company 
Disconnect, launched a set of privacy icons (knows as PIS, Privacy Icons 
Software). The intention here is to create a system for commercial rather than 
for academic use.  
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Figure 2-9 Disconnect Privacy Icons 
 
The icons operate as a browser plug-in and are displayed for each website 
visited by the user. However, similar to issues with P3P, the icons purely report 
how the website operates with respect to its stated privacy policy and does not 
guarantee that the data collector is actually operating in accordance with the 
rules defined by relevant regulators.  
 
The Open Law Laboratory at Carnegie Mellon University developed an initiative 
looking at Privacy Nutrition Labels (see example below). The idea is that for 
each website, a privacy nutrition label would detail what information is collected 
and for what purpose, while also detailing when information is going to be 
shares with partners on publically.  
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Figure 2-10 Privacy 'Nutrition' Style Label 
 
 
There is no information available on privacy ‘nutrition’ labels being used 
commercially (i.e. outside of academic research).  
 
 
2.5.7 Summary 
 
The offline Standardized Energy Labels scheme is viewed as a success and 
there is potential for this approach to be replicated in online environments. The 
initiative saw complex technical descriptions of device performance displayed in 
easy to understand visual standardized labels that summarized key 
performance metrics. Standardized labels made it easy for consumers to 
compare the performance of different makes/models. Data shows that after their 
introduction, consumers generally opted for more energy efficient models. This 
enabled regulators to achieve the overall goal of reducing energy consumption 
and the related emissions from white good appliances.  
 
With food nutrition labels the position is less clear. While at a micro level 
research shows that individuals understand the message being communicated, 
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there is little evidence of how it impacts at a macro level and rising obesity rates 
suggest that these labels are not achieving their desired behavioral impact.  
 
In the online world, we see that the use of standardized icons/labels in the form 
of CC licenses has been widely adopted to communicate copyright restrictions.  
 
In varying formats, privacy seals/icons have been developed to help 
communicate data protection practices by data controllers but the impact of this 
is less clear. While the TRUSTe initiative was widely adopted, it only indicated 
data controller’s compliance with stated privacy policies rather than 
demonstrating compliance with a baseline standard or similar. The type of 
privacy seal accreditation system envisaged by EU regulators in the GDPR has 
only been attempted commercially relatively recently. There is no data available 
with regards to how widespread it has been adopted. More significantly, there is 
little or no empirical data showing what affect these seals have on personal 
information disclosure. 
 
While many data subjects state concern about their online privacy, there is little 
evidence to confirm that privacy is a driving factor in terms of deciding what 
services users engage with. The lack of clear evidence offers little incentive for 
data controllers to implement major privacy enhancing programs or to 
participate in the type of privacy seal accreditation scheme as envisaged in the 
GDPR. In fact, one could argue the opposite, that by not collecting and/or 
sharing/selling personal information from their website visitors, data controllers 
may be putting themselves as a competitive disadvantage in terms of revenues 
they could derive from said data.   
 
This is the information gap the research undertaken in this thesis will address. 
How do privacy seals that communicate data collectors compliance with 
relevant data protection regulations impact on the amount and types of data 
that data subjects are willing to disclose? 
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2.6 Media Economics Approaches to Privacy  
 
The term media economics is often used to refer to the business and financial 
activities of firms operating across varying media industries. Robert Picard 
formally defines media economics as the field of study that examines how,  
 
“media operators meet the informational and entertainment wants and needs of 
audiences, advertisers and societies with available resources” (Picard 1989, 
p.7).  
 
Economics is an appropriate lens to examine media firms because,  
 
“decisions taken by those who run media organisations are, to a greater or 
lesser extent, influenced by resource and financial issues. So, economics, as a 
discipline, is highly relevant to understanding how media firms and industries 
operate” (Doyle 2013, p.1). 
 
Albarran expands the scope of media economics, describing how it,  
 
“strengthens our understanding of the role and function of mass media in 
society…..by adding important dimensions regarding the structure, conduct, 
and performance of media firms and industries; the interplay of economics, 
policy, and regulation; and audience behaviors and preferences” (Albarran, 
2004 p. 303).  
 
How media markets are governed is a fundamental component of media 
economics. The regulatory environment impacts on how media operators meet 
the needs of advertisers, audiences and indeed wider society. We will now look 
at some of these key roles/features in more detail.  
 
2.6.1 Media Markets 
 
“Most media organizations are, in the simplest terms, in the business of 
connecting media texts with audiences, to earn money through direct purchase 
or pairing audiences with advertisers” (Arsenault 2017, p.12) 
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The economics model of traditional ‘media’ firms like newspapers and TV 
channels is based on the notion of ‘two-sided’ markets. The ‘first’ market can be 
thought of as relatively straightforward content delivery. Examples include 
newspaper/magazine copy/content or tv programmes and these are sold to 
consumers at point of sale or through subscriptions. An important ‘secondary 
market’ also exists where audiences attracted to this content earn advertising 
revenues based on content ratings and demographics (Picard 1989).  
 
Developments in the media sector, primarily driven through advances in 
networked technology, have seen a fundamental change in how revenue 
streams are generated in the two-sided market. We now see a multitude of 
examples ‘new media’ firms, who provide digital services (search, social 
networking, email, messaging and mapping) where the ‘first’ market (i.e. 
content) is not physically sold to consumers and therefore earns almost no 
revenue. Indeed many of these firms provide their content/services for ‘free’. 
Almost all income in this new media sector is generated through secondary 
audience markets i.e. advertising.  
  
 “In the era of social media, where expremely large volumes of personal data 
are being created, harvested and cross referenced for the benefit of these secondary 
markets, it is immediately obvious that the waste products of everyday social 
interaction are being subjected to an alchemical transformation……A base material is 
being transformed into gold” (Athique 2018, p.63-64)  
 
Although there are numerous firms operating in this industry, perhaps two of the 
best-known players include Facebook and Google. In terms of their dominance 
of digital advertising, in 2016 these two firms captured over 70% of digital 
advertising spend in the UK and in 2017 they had over 63% of the US digital ad 
spend (Koetsier 2018).  
  
“Twitter, Facebook and YouTube focused on social media content delivery and 
organization. As they have matured, in an effort to monetize user-generated content, 
the companies have transformed from content driven enterprises into data-collection 
companies. Data that can be packaged and sold to advertisers and marketers is their 
main product”. (Arsenault 2017, p.10) 
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There are trade-offs for both users and providers of ‘free’ online media 
applications. For example, in the case of social networking, users share 
personal data about their interests, hobbies and locations. In return, they have 
access to a media service that lets them communicate and interact with their 
‘network’ of friends, share location information and share photos etc.  
 
“The take-home message from existing studies on personal information 
collection and privacy is that consumers are willing to share personal 
information, as long as the perceived benefits (personalized offerings) exceed 
the perceived costs (privacy)”. (Evens and Van Damme 2016, p.6) 
 
As the service provider, new media firms earn revenues from online advertisers 
where users 'public' data allows them to create more efficient targeted 
advertising campaigns.  
 
Many new media firms operations are enabled through networked technologies 
where privacy has become,  
 
“an issue of strategic importance for companies operating in the information-
centric networked global economy” (Awad & Krishnan, 2006, p 25).  
 
As fixed costs associated with managing data have rapidly declined, we are 
seeing many new entrants mostly in the form of startups in this industry sector 
(Varian 2014). These developments bring risks for both individual as well as 
new media service providers and this has attracted the attention of both privacy 
campaigned and regulators.  
 
Data from multiple databases can now be linked to create digital dossiers of 
individuals’ activities and interests, often without their knowledge or explicit 
consent. As discussed earlier in this chapter, EU and US media industry 
regulators are concerned about in impact technological advances are having on 
privacy. The US Department of Commerce warns about the potential ‘harms’ 
and related impacts on new media consumers. They say,  
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“Commercial data privacy policy must address a continuum of risks to personal 
privacy, ranging from minor nuisances and unfair surprises, to disclosure of 
sensitive information in violation of individual rights…..In the aggregate, even the 
harms at the less severe end of this spectrum have significant adverse effects, 
because they undermine consumer trust in the Internet environment. Diminished 
trust, in turn, may cause consumers to hesitate before adopting new services and 
impede innovative and productive uses of new technologies” (DoC 2010, 
p.148).  
 
Data protection regulations that fail to adequately protect risks to personal 
privacy may undermine consumer confidence and have wider negative 
implications for the new media industry.  
 
 
2.6.2 Media Regulation 
 
Governments play an important role in creating the legal frameworks necessary 
to make markets function effectively. Regulatory intervention in specific media 
markets can take the form of, 1) technical/structural and 2) behavioral regulation 
(Picard 2002). The rational that supports the role of regulatory intervention 
includes the need to control the behaviors of media firms,  
 
“when they do not serve important social, political, and economic needs of 
society” (Picard 2002, p.70).  
 
Technical/structural regulation may come in the form of limiting the number of 
mobile phone operators to ensure stable operations or limiting monopoly power 
etc. Behavioral regulation of media firms can take the form of prohibiting certain 
practices as well as enforcing compliance with specific rules or practices. 
Proscriptive regulation may limit economic benefits available to media firms. For 
example, the prohibiting of alcohol and tobacco advertising on television cuts off 
potentially lucrative income streams for broadcasters from those industry 
sectors. Prescriptive regulation may take the form of requiring broadcasters to 
include specific mix of content in their schedules i.e. children’s programs, 
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news/current affairs etc. In his seminal 1978 paper, George Akerlof makes the 
argument for government intervention on the grounds that it may increase the 
welfare of both buyers and sellers in the marketplace.  
 
The rule requiring UK broadcasters to show a product placement symbol to 
broadcast content where advertisers have paid for specific products to appear is 
a recent example of behavioral regulation. Critics of the EU media regulatory 
framework argue there is too much focus on rules that extend competition within 
the sector while discouraging rules that protect wider conceptions of the public 
interest (Harcourt 2005).  
 
2.6.3 Economic Approaches to Privacy 
 
Privacy economics is primarily concerned with 1) understanding the costs and 
benefits that data subjects (or collectors) bear or enjoy when their personal 
information is either protected or shared and 2) understanding how market 
mechanisms, technology or public policy can assist in achieving a desirable 
balance between information revelation and privacy protection (Acquisti et al. 
2016).  
 
“Privacy as a subject of public policy refers to the possession and acquisition of 
knowledge about people and implicitly or explicitly also knowledge about 
associations” (Stigler 1980, p.624).  
 
There are effectively 3 phases of the development of economics being used as 
an approach to privacy. They are: 
 
 Phase I: First economic approaches to privacy appear in the late 1970’s 
and represent a classical approach based on rational expectations.  
 
 Phase II: Not much by way of research from this period. Economists 
focused on ‘new’ information technologies focussing on privacy 
‘calculus’. 
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 Phase III: The development of the commercial Internet (and related data 
gathering/mining technologies) from approx.. 2000 on saw a large 
increase in theoretical and empirical studies.   
(Acquisti et al. 2016) 
2.6.3.1 Privacy Economics - Phase I [1970’s & 1980’s]  
 
The first economics approaches to privacy appear in literature from the late 
1970’s. Posner sets out three different meanings of privacy; 1) the concealment 
of information, 2) peace and quiet and 3) as a synonym for freedom and 
autonomy. He argues concealment of information is the most interesting 
definition from an economic perspective. Posner believes that privacy laws and 
statutes result in a reduction of market efficiency i.e. the additional costs lead to 
reduced wages and ultimately higher unemployment (Posner 1978).  
 
Posner’s views very much represent a free-market neoliberal approach to 
privacy. He relates the economics of privacy to the economics of information 
through the ‘market’ and asserts symmetry between ‘selling’ oneself and selling 
a product. A consumer purchasing a product is operating in a utility maximising 
mode. Posner argues that this also occurs when a consumer sells ‘information’; 
the purchasing of a product and the selling of personal information are both 
utility maximising decisions. If fraud (i.e. the concealment of defects in a good) 
is bad in the latter context of selling a product, why is it acceptable in the former 
where it reduces the amount of information available and thus makes the 
market less efficient? Posner asks,  
 
“Why would someone want to conceal a fact, except to mislead others in 
transacting with him?” (Posner 1981, p.408).  
 
Using the jobs market as an example, he argues that a person protecting their 
personal information may negatively impact on the firms hiring decision by way 
of misrepresenting their background and work experience. This may negatively 
impact on the firms hiring decision and ultimately the profitability of a firm i.e. 
the opportunity cost of not having hired the correct person. Therefore, 
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regulations that assist tor give a legal right to remove an individuals personal 
information from the ‘marketplace’ serves to,  
 
“ultimately transfers the cost of that person’s possibly negative traits onto other 
market participants” (Acquisti et al. 2016, p.10).  
 
Stigler (1980) identifies a certain irony in the enormous interest in privacy as 
“evident in the public press and statute books” (Stigler 1980, p.623), citing the fact 
that the ‘average’ citizen lives with greater privacy by virtue of living in large 
cities and working in large organisations. Individuals also have the option of 
moving to another part of the country to shake off their past. He suggests the 
increase in privacy concerns is due to the growth of government and its access 
to larger quantities of data than ever before. He asserts,  
 
“Technology has enormously changed the mechanics of gathering and 
disseminating information, but it is politics and economics that direct the uses of 
the machinery” (Stigler 1981, p.623).  
 
Both Posner and Stigler represent a classical rational approach theory to 
decision-making where users maximise their ‘utility’ over time using all available 
information and expressing consistent preferences. They argue that 
government regulation through establishing rights to privacy distorts the market 
by reducing efficiencies. The finance industry argues this position by claiming 
that if they had more detailed information on loan applications personal data 
then they could lend more money at lower interest rates to low risk borrowers 
and that this would benefit the wider economy in terms of growth and stability 
(Acquisti et al. 2016).  
 
However, there are competing theories as to the overall effect privacy 
regulations have on technology. The Classical approach sees privacy regulation 
as imposing costs on the exchange of information therefore inhibiting the 
diffusion of technology. Others argue that effective privacy regulation promotes 
the use of technology by providing reassurances to the public that their 
personal data will be safe (IBID). 
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2.6.3.2 Privacy Economics - Phase II: [1990’s] 
 
Privacy economics literature developed in the 1990’s and this change was 
driven by the emergence of ‘new’ information technologies. Varian (1996) re-
visits the classic rational approach model and gives examples of when 
disclosure of certain pieces of information may promote efficiency by bringing 
buyers and sellers together. Although his work pre-dates Google’s behavioural 
targeting technologies, the success of AdWords could be viewed as 
representing as a major step forward in advertising market efficiency. 
Information about users’ preferences gleaned from their search terms and 
viewing habits helps advertisers to target audiences more efficiently. Market 
efficiency leads to reduced prices, more demand, lower unemployment and 
ultimately higher levels of economics growth and prosperity.  
 
However, Varian identifies examples where information disclosure may not 
promote market efficiency. A seller knowing how much a buyer is willing to pay 
may in fact work to reduce efficiency by creating opportunities for price 
discrimination. Other challenges to the rational approach are also given. If AIDS 
test results were to be made publically available this may act as a disincentive 
to taking the test. A reduction the number of people who are tested may in fact 
contribute to the spread of the virus resulting in wider economic and social costs 
(Varian 1996). He also addresses how technology is facilitating person/private 
information to be re-sold and suggests that regulation is required to deal with 
this area. Arguably data protection legislation that appeared in both UK and EU 
at around this time was introduced to deal with the types of concerns these 
issues raised.  
 
Noam (1997) also addresses the privacy issues that new technologies portend 
and discusses how encryption may be used to prevent personal information 
from being disclosed. Noam puts forward the notion of ‘markets for privacy’ and 
argues that encryption tools will allow consumers to keep personal information 
private unless they choose to sell it (Noam 1997). However, recent revelations 
in relation to the operations of the UK and US national security agencies by 
whistle-blower Edward Snowdon can perhaps be seen a blow to the encryption 
argument. Papers show that encrypted data was specifically targeted by 
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security agencies (Greenberg 2013), perhaps reinforcing early neoclassical 
arguments of excessive private behaviour signals that the individual has 
something to hide? 
 
The ‘Phase II’ development of privacy economics literature represents an 
important challenge to the free market (i.e. market efficiency) approach put 
forward by Neoclassical economists. Here we see arguments and examples 
where access to individuals personal data my promote price discrimination or 
lead to other undesirable outcomes that inhibit market efficiency,  
 
“the ability to track buyers makes it possible for sellers to implicitly collude.”  
(Acquisti et al. 2016, p.19). 
 
2.6.3.3 Privacy Economics - Phase III: [2000’s - present] 
 
The development of the commercial Internet (and related data gathering/mining 
technologies) from circa 2000 has led to large increase in the theoretical and 
empirical studies exploring economic approaches to privacy. Since 2000, a 
major departure from the traditional rational choice theories has emerged. This 
work encompasses pioneering work from Herbert Simon’s contribution in terms 
of bounded rationality. Rational choice theory as related to personal information 
disclosure argues that individuals make 1) sensible and consistent trade-offs 
between privacy and other concerns and 2) engage in “disclosure 
management” providing information when they expect a net benefit (John, 
Acquisti and Loewenstein 2010).   
 
Addressing rational choice theory, Simon argues,  
 
“Rationality denotes a style of behavior that is appropriate to the achievement 
of given goals….Theories of rational behavior may be normative or descriptive 
– that is, they may prescribe how people or organisations should behave in 
order to achieve certain goals under certain conditions, or they may purport to 
describe how people or organisations do, in fact, behave” (Simon 1972, 
p.361).  
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Bounded Rationality challenges this classical rational approach theory and 
focuses on the inability of an individual to calculate all the potential 
parameters/outcomes when specific choices presented.  
 
“The concept of bounded rationality has its roots in H. A. Simon’s attempt to 
construct a more realistic theory of human economic decision making” (Selten, 
1999, p.5). 
 
Simon (1986) cites empirical research that examined the purchase of flood 
damage insurance as an example of where rational choice theory does not hold 
(Kunreuther, Ginsberg, Miller, Sagi, Slovic, Borkan, and Katz, 1978). 
Neoclassical theory would predict the decision on whether to buy flood 
insurance (or not) is dependent on the buyers expectation that damages 
received in the event of a flood will be greater than the insurance premium. 
However, research findings suggest that decisions to purchase insurance 
premiums are mainly based on whether individuals (or close associates of those 
individuals) have had experience of flood damage – independent of any 
cost/benefit ratio analysis. Utility maximisation is therefore not sufficient for 
deducing who will buy insurance but,  
 
“the process that puts the item on the decision agenda - is the important thing” 
(Simon 1986, p.216).  
 
Studies have looked at this issue in relation to decision-making in privacy 
sensitive situations (Acquisti 2004). Research outputs show how specific 
framing of questions or scenarios may influence our choice of options. Similarly, 
heuristics (i.e. acting intuitively) may replace rational searches for the best 
alternative and as such biases and other anomalies affect the way we address 
alternative options etc. Research outputs from Acquisti and Grossklags (2007)  
argue,  
 
“Behavioral economics studies how individual, social, cognitive and emotional 
biases influence economics decisions…. Predominantly based on neoclassical 
models of economics behaviour but aims to integrate rational choice theory with 
convincing evidence from individual, cognitive, and social psychology. 
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Behavioral economic models often abandon some of the tenets of rational 
choice theory: that agents possess consistent preferences between 
alternatives, chose the utility maximizing option, discount future events 
consistently, and act upon complete information or known probability 
distributions for all possible events” (Acquisti and Grossklags 2007, p.6).  
 
Kahneman (2003) describes bounded rationality as an architecture that moves 
away from the rational model where ‘agents’ don’t necessarily reason poorly but 
in fact often act intuitively. Behaviour is,  
 
“not guided by what they are able to compute, but by what they happen to see 
at a given moment” (Kahneman 2003, p.1469).  
 
He also identifies emotion is an important consideration in decision-making.   
 
Behavioural economics builds on some of the key themes addressed in 
bounded rationality. While it will not provide a set of rules or lessons in how to 
avoid all risks/mistakes in behavioural economics, it can assist privacy research 
through providing a better understanding of privacy decision-making and 
behaviour. One of the main challenges identified in privacy research is 
incomplete information (e.g. information asymmetries and/or concealment), 
framing, heuristics and biases – all these elements play interdependent roles 
while not always being present (Acquisti and Grossklags 2007). Behavioural 
research in economics draws on findings from disciplines including psychology 
and cognitive science in an attempt to attain a better understanding of human 
behaviour as they relate to economics issues.  
 
2.6.4 Privacy, Advertising and Electronic Commerce 
 
“Personal data is considered a new currency in many digital business models” 
(Evens and Van Damme 2016, p.12) 
 
Website operators, data aggregators and digital advertising networks can 
together track users behaviour across multiple online services using a variety of 
tracking technologies such as cookies, web bugs and flash cookies. While many 
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data subjects are often unaware they are being tracked, advertisers have 
developed new methods of tracking such as flash cookies to counteract 
sophisticated consumers attempts to avoid being tracked (Hoofnagle et al. 
2012).  
 
“Online advertising is perhaps the most common example of how firms use the 
large amounts of data that they collect about users. The greater availability of 
personally identifiable data on the Internet in terms of scope, quantity, and the 
precision with which firms can target specific users challenges the traditional 
distinction between personal selling and remote communication.” (Acquisti et 
al. 2016, p.24).  
 
Online Behavioural Advertising (OBA) technologies also allow advertisers to 
target specific subsets of consumers based on their browsing and/or purchasing 
history in a way not possible by traditional advertising methods. The detailed 
measurement metrics available in OBA allows advertisers to make continuous 
refinements/improvement to their campaigns.  
 
Regulators have attempted to restrict the ability of data collectors to gather 
personally identifiable information and the EU’s so-called ‘cookie directive’ (i.e. 
requirement for explicit consent as discussed earlier) is perhaps a good 
example of this. However, issues with interpretation of the provision led to some 
member states not requiring explicit consent (requiring consumers to opt-in) and 
only requiring implied consent instead. We see a similar call from the FTC with 
their 2012 Do-Not-Track proposal. However, again data subjects are required to 
opt-out rather than opt-in. One of the aims of the GDPR was to address some of 
these inconsistencies of implementation among member states.  
 
A 2012 study undertaken at MIT provides empirical analysis in relation to how 
the EC 2002 e-Privacy Directive impacted on the effectiveness of banner 
advertising. The Directive had made it illegal for websites to use ‘web bugs’ 
(different to cookies because they are invisible to users) and other hidden so 
called ‘spyware’ technologies without users’ consent. While the findings primary 
focus on the negative effects of the regulation (i.e. neoclassical inefficiency 
arguments), it can be seen as an example for how a EU regulation can be 
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effective in limiting how user-browsing data is shared across applications 
without users knowledge (Goldfarb and Tucker 2011).  
 
 
2.6.5 ‘Nothing to hide nothing to fear’  
 
When discussing privacy issues, an argument regularly put forward is that no 
privacy problem exists if an individual has “nothing to hide” (Solove 2007). 
Comments made by the then Google (Alphabet) CEO Eric Schmidt in 2009 very 
much echo this view. In an interview relating to the Google search engine 
product, Mr Schmidt was asked if users should be prepared to share 
information with Google as a “trusted friend”. Schmidt replied to this by saying if 
you are doing something you do not want others to know about, then perhaps 
you shouldn’t be doing it in the first place (Gelles et al. 2009).  
 
In a related argument, Judge Richard Posner contends,  
 
“people today decry lack of privacy, what they want, I think, is mainly something 
quite different from seclusion: they want more power to conceal information 
about themselves that others might use to their disadvantage.” (Posner 1981, 
p.406).  
 
This position is a very much from the Neoclassical school of thought, equating 
an individual’s privacy to a product sold in the marketplace. If we are not 
permitted to conceal information about a product or service defect then why 
should the law permit persons to conceal discreditable information about them?  
 
The ‘nothing to hide’ argument can be problematic to dismiss in the context of 
surveillance by security agencies, where the direct implication is that those who 
object to such monitoring are involved in criminal or illicit activities and therefore 
do have something to hide/fear. The primary problem with the ‘nothing to hide’ 
argument is the underlying assumption that privacy is about hiding bad things. 
This is not the case,  
“Even surveillance of legal activities can inhibit people from engaging in them.” 
(Solove 2007, p.745).  
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Solove identifies two key problems with surveillance, 1) ‘aggregation’, where 
smaller pieces of innocuous data are combined to reveal a lot more about an 
individual’s interests and activities, and 2) ‘secondary use’, where data collected 
for one use is used in the future for an unrelated purpose. The potential future 
uses of data are vast and difficult to know/regulate once the data has been 
collected.  
 
2.6.6 Information Asymmetry 
 
Both EU and US regulators see information asymmetry as a key issue that 
needs to be addressed to protect privacy for data subjects. Information 
asymmetry,  
 
“refers to situations, in which some agent in a trade possesses information 
while other agents involved in the same trade do not.” (World Bank 2003). 
 
As such, information asymmetry creates an information imbalance between 
data subjects and data controllers and regulators seen to think that the balance 
is weighted in favour of the data controllers (i.e. new media firms). The 
imbalance has the potential to have much wider macro effects on the new 
media industry.  
 
“It is well recognized that informational asymmetries may, at times, result in 
market failure” (Doyle 2018, p.61) 
 
We can see information asymmetry issues at play in the context of privacy 
decision-making. Most data subjects lack awareness of how data controllers 
could potentially use and/or share their personal information and this may result 
in data subjects engaging in more risky behaviour from a privacy perspective 
(Tsai, Egelman, Cranor and Acquisti 2011). Website privacy policies represent 
the clearest attempt to address this issue of information asymmetry (Milne and 
Culnan 2002). This ‘notice and choice’ approach has been widely and is indeed 
a legal requirement for many new media services (i.e. data controllers). In 
principle, privacy policies fill the information gap between data subject and data 
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collector by setting out what data is collected and how it is used/shared. 
However, as discussed, issues with the length and complexity of privacy 
policies makes them difficult and time consuming to read (Jensen and Potts 
2004) resulting in people rarely reading them (Jensen at al 2005). Research 
also shows there is a considerable economic cost associated with reading the 
privacy policies of all the website and applications an average user engages 
with (McDonald and Cranor 2009). Even when users do take the time to read 
privacy policies, they often make mistaken assumptions about the meaning of 
the privacy policy. There are also issues with interpretation of what a privacy 
policy actually represents. Research from the US shows that many people 
incorrectly believe that the mere presence of a hyperlink to privacy policy 
means their personal data is protected (Turow, Hoofnagle, Mulligan and Good 
2007).  
 
In 2012, the White House Report set out some of the issues that arise in 
relation information asymmetry. The report notes,  
 
“individuals who actively share information with their friends, family, colleagues, 
and the general public through websites and online social networking sites may 
not be aware of the ways those services, third parties, and their own associates 
may use information about them. Unauthorized disclosure of sensitive 
information can violate individual rights, cause injury or discrimination based on 
sensitive personal attributes, lead to actions and decisions taken in response to 
misleading or inaccurate information, and contribute to costly and potentially 
life-disrupting identity theft.” (White House 2012, p.100-101) 
 
A 2013 survey by the Pew Research Centre found that 68% of US adults 
believe that the existing regulatory framework does not sufficiently protect their 
online privacy (Rainie, Kiesler, Kang, Madden, Duggan, Brown and Dabbish 
2013). A 2015 study from the same centre shows that only 9% of US adults felt 
they have ‘a lot’ of control over what information is collect about them and how it 
is used. This is despite 93% stating they believed that being in control of who 
can get information about them is important (Madden and Rainie 2015).  
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Although the widespread adoption of privacy policies represent an attempt to 
reduce this information gap, research demonstrates that data subjects rarely 
read privacy policies and in the rare instances when they do, they struggle to 
understand them. Data protection regulators in the EU and US agree this is an 
issue and have called for greater ‘transparency’ and ‘control’ to negate the 
information asymmetry imbalance between data subject an data controller. A 
number of research studies have used experimental research to gather to 
assess the impact privacy enhancing features have on reducing information 
transparency (i.e. reduce information asymmetry). The following section outlines 
some of the key findings. 
 
2.6.7 Enhancing User Control & The ‘Privacy Paradox’ 
 
Research from John, Acquisti and Loewenstein (2010) looking specifically at 
what triggers a data subject’s information disclosure suggests peoples’ 
willingness to divulge personal information is influenced by contextual clues and 
not by rational choice. Findings show different levels of information disclosure in 
situations where the same potential dangers exist thus demonstrating,  
 
“consumer vulnerabilities in navigating increasingly complex privacy issues 
introduced by new information technologies” (John et al. 2010, p.858). 
 
Their findings show how contextual cues associated with an increased risk of 
personal information disclosure can act to suppress privacy concerns resulting 
in the perverse effect of increasing information disclosure.  
 
“These findings provide support for the idea that cues affect divulgence by 
rousing, or downplaying, privacy concerns”. (John et al. 2010, p.859). 
 
Related to a phenomenon known as homeostasis or the Peltzman effect, 
privacy researchers have identified behaviour they have labelled ‘the control 
paradox’. It is an idea analogous to the user of seatbelts in cars. Although 
seatbelts do save lives, research suggests that people who wear them tend to 
drive more recklessly, resulting in increased fatalities amongst cyclists and 
pedestrians (Peltzman 1975). We see this effect in the context of online privacy 
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where people may respond to measures intended to protect their personal 
privacy in ways that counteract the intention of that protection. Brandimarte et 
al, (2012) note that,  
 
“People often display a notable inconsistency in concern for privacy. They 
eagerly disclose intimate facts to others, but are bothered when the same 
information is circulated without their consent. Many online social networks 
users willfully reveal even self-incriminating information to others – yet, non-
substantive changes in privacy policies can generate widespread protests. 
What can account for these seemingly contradictory behaviors?” (Brandimarte 
et al. 2012, p.3). 
 
In a series of behavioural experiments, they specifically examine how different 
levels of perceived control impacts on personal information disclosure and the 
findings demonstrate sometimes counter-intuitive findings. The authors describe 
their findings as,  
 
“Consistent with the Peltzman effect, however, we document a “control 
paradox” such that people who experience more perceived control over limited 
aspects of privacy sometimes respond by revealing more information, to the 
point where they end up more vunerable as a result of the measures ostensibly 
meant to protect them” (Brandimarte et al. 2012, p.1).  
 
These results have important implications for data protection regulators. They 
demonstrate cases where features intended to explicitly give data subjects 
greater control over the release of their personal data, can lead to the 
unintended consequence of data subjects revealing more personal and risker 
information disclosures by data subjects. As such, data protection regulations 
that are designed to give greater control to data subjects may not have the 
desired effect on user behaviours that legislators intend i.e. more control can 
actually lead to less privacy.  
 
An experimental study by Carolan & Castillo-Mayen (2014) examined the 2002 
EU e-Privacy Directive rule with regards to data controllers obtaining explicit 
consent from website visitors (data subjects) to allow them to use cookies to 
tack their behaviour. Their findings show that participants who were given more 
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control over their privacy options showed a greater willingness to disclose 
personal information when compared to groups not offered the same control.  
 
“The results demonstrated that the provision of a specific and visible instruction 
to pay attention to information about cookies had no significant impact on any of 
the measures assessed. Participants who were presented with this instruction 
prior to visiting the website demonstrated no greater knowledge of cookies than 
those who were not. Nor did they show any evidence that they were less likely 
to trust the website or to disclose information during their visit” (Carolan and 
Castillo-Mayen 2014, p.377). 
 
These results again demonstrate a somewhat counter-intuitive conclusion i.e. 
that mechanisms designed by legislators to empower data subjects with greater 
control may actually encourage disclosure counter to their intentions. The 
authors believe their findings,  
 
“casts doubt on the efficacy of any legal strategy that assumes that providing 
visible or salient information about cookies will influence user behaviour, 
whether positively or negatively, consciously or otherwise” (Carolan and 
Castillo-Mayen 2014, p.377).  
 
Their research has further implications for companies who have generally 
resisted EU cookie regulation interventions on the grounds that they are 
onerous and likely to stifle innovation. The results in fact suggest that facilitating 
active user engagement with a website may have longer-term benefits in with 
respect of user willingness to disclose information to them.  
 
Experimental research from Norberg, Horne and Horne (2007) and Taddicken 
(2014) identify the existence of what they call a ‘privacy paradox’. Observed 
online behaviours show that levels of actual personal information disclosure 
across a range of categories (i.e. including financial, demographic and 
personally identifying) significantly exceeded participants stated intentions to 
disclose.  
 
“It appears that, in the realm of privacy, behavioral intentions may not be an 
accurate predictor of actual behavior” (Norberg et al. 2007, p.118).  
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2.6.8 Privacy Seal Empirics 
 
The Information Commissioners Office (IOC) in the UK describes a privacy seal 
as,  
“a ‘stamp of approval’ which demonstrates good privacy practice and high data 
protection compliance standards.” (Falmer 2015).  
 
The provision in the GDPR for establishing privacy seal accreditation schemes 
demonstrate that regulators believe they have a role to play in reducing the 
information asymmetry that exists between data subjects and data controllers. 
There is only a small body of empirical research that specifically examines the 
impact of privacy seals on personal information disclosure and/or purchasing 
decisions and these studies are outlined below. 
 
In an offline study, Miyazaki and Krishnamurthy (2002) found privacy seals were 
interpreted by some as signaling a firm’s intention to abide by their stated 
privacy policies and not violate a data subjects privacy. However, the findings 
highlight an issue where the mere presence of a privacy seal may,  
 
“create a false sense of trust with no basis in the actual specifics of a privacy 
policy” (Rifon et al. 2005 p.343).  
 
Their research conducted a series of online experiments to examine the impact 
privacy seals had on a group of consumers with known higher privacy concerns. 
The experiment design involved creating a website offering music for sale. Two 
versions of the website were created, one containing the TRUSTe and 
BBBOnline privacy seals (described earlier) and one with no privacy seals. A 
pretest survey contained a scale measuring concern for online privacy and a 
post-test survey measured participants concern for privacy while they were 
actually participating in the experiment. The results showed that the presence of 
a privacy seal increased beliefs in the seal assurances in relation to its 
information practices (i.e. how data was collected, shared etc). Privacy seals 
were found to have,  
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“engendered more trust but did not significantly and consistently influence 
disclosures of personal information for access to site benefits” (Rifon et al. 
2005, p.358).  
 
The findings also showed that privacy self-efficacy moderated data subjects 
responses to the presence of seals i.e. the more confident participants were in 
their own ability to protect their privacy the more faith they had in data 
controller, irrespective of the presence of a privacy seal. Overall the study finds 
that data subjects,  
 
“may use privacy seals as an efficient assurance that privacy will not be 
violated. Privacy seals seem to act as a safety heuristic” (Rifon et al. 2005, 
p.360).  
 
The findings further suggest that,  
 
“Consumers may use privacy seals heuristically to confirm the Web site as 
“privacy safe” (Rifon et al. 2005, p.340).  
 
However, the authors also warn that,  
 
“Seal programs can only protect privacy if and only if consumers recognise the 
assurances seal programs afford” (Rifon et al. 2005, p.342).  
 
That is to say, the mere presence of a privacy seal does not mean that a data 
subject’s personal information will not be shared with third parties. It means that 
the data controller will only use data in the way the program/regulation that the 
seal relates to states it is committed to. Two of the leading seal programs, 
TRUSTe and BBBOnline rely on voluntary compliance although they do engage 
in ongoing monitoring and offer customer complaint resolution procedures.  
 
Mai, Menon and Sarkar (2010) conducted research into how the use of privacy 
seals by online vendors impacting on consumers purchasing behaviour. The 
authors differentiate between what they call ‘scrupulous’ and ‘unscrupulous’ 
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vendors. Scrupulous vendors are those implement and monitor stringent privacy 
policies and incur additional costs because of this. Unscrupulous vendors do 
not incur these costs. The research adopts the premise that when making 
purchases online, consumers face a choice between buying from privacy seal 
bearing vendors or from non-privacy seal bearing vendors. The latter is 
associated with an enhanced risk of privacy violation for the purchaser (data 
subject). There is almost no way for potential consumers to distinguish between 
the ‘scrupulous’ and ‘unscrupulous’ vendors and therefore privacy seals 
potentially have a role here.  
 
The wider risks to the new media industry from unscrupulous vendors are very 
real. In Akerlof’s (1978) paper examining the second hand car industry, he 
warns that there of the potential risk of market failure from, 
 
“the presence of people who wish to pawn bad wares as good wares tends to 
drive out legitimate business” (Akerlof 1978, p.495). 
 
There are costs related to dishonesty and dishonest dealings tend to drive 
honest dealings out of the market. This should serve as a warning to new media 
service providers, where unscrupulous (i.e. dishonest) vendors pose a risk to 
the whole new media market (Doyle 2018). Akerlof believes, “The purchaser’s 
problem, of course, is to identify quality” (Akerlof 1978, p.495). In new media 
markets, privacy seals/icons have the potential to assist data subjects/service 
users to identify ‘quality’ who have been verified to comply with the relevant 
regulations. Couldry and Turrow (2014) see audience trust as a potential barrier 
to the seemingly unstoppable momentum of the new media industry.  
 
A Mai at al (2010) study specifically investigates whether privacy seal bearing 
vendors can charge a premium for the products they sell compared to non-
privacy seal bearing vendors. Their study selected a number of ‘highly 
homogenous’ products (e-books, audiobooks and textbooks) and found that 
seal bearing vendors charged a price premium of approx 1.5% compare with 
non-privacy seal bearing vendors. The findings further suggest that privacy seal 
bearing vendors are able to charge a premium and that this,  
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“reinforces the notion that seal programs can provide a viable market-based 
mechanism for providing privacy protection” (Mai et al. 2010, p.207) 
  
However, the authors note that a major limitation of their research is small 
number of vendors who carry the privacy seal.  
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2.6.9 Privacy Icon Empirics 
 
Privacy icons operate in a similar way to privacy seals in so far as they 
represent a visual indicator of how the data controller may use a data subject’s 
information. Research from Tsai et al (2011) examined how prominent displays 
of privacy icons impacted consumers’ online purchasing decisions. Their 
research uses a microeconomic framework to represent the consumers’ utility 
maximisation problem. This innovative experimental study was specifically 
designed to examine the impact of making privacy policy information available 
to consumers (data subjects) in different way to standard privacy policies. The 
experiment included the use of a modified search engine that displayed an 
image/icon indicating the privacy rating associated with each of the merchants 
listed in the search results. The study found that participants did take the 
privacy information displayed (via the icon) into consideration when making 
purchase decisions and were more likely to purchase items from websites with 
medium or high levels of privacy (as indicated through privacy icon).   
 
Their findings provide evidence that privacy information affects online shopping 
decision-making and that consumers (i.e. data subjects) may be willing to pay a 
premium for privacy. They also demonstrate how a,  
 
“business may use their technological means to showcase their privacy-friendly 
policies and thereby gain competitive advantage” (Tsai, Egelman, Cranor, 
and Acquisti 2011, p.266)  
 
Firms can strategically manage their privacy settings in ways that fulfil best 
practice guidelines and maximise profits.  
 
“Our results indicate that, contrary to the common view that consumers are 
unlikely to pay for privacy, consumers may be willing to pay a premium for 
privacy” (Tsai et al. 2011, pg.266).  
 
The advertising industry itself is in favour of the use of icons. In 2011, the UK 
Internet Advertising Bureau (IAB) called for transparency in relation to how and 
when consumer data was being collected.  The IAB called for greater use of 
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privacy icons to increase trust-building perceptions with users about data 
collection practices.  
 
“Such tools can offset negative reactions to personalized advertising, enhance 
website credibility, and make personalized advertising more acceptable” 
(Aguirre, Mahr, Grewal, de Ruyter and Wetzels 2015, p.44).  
 
However, we also know that marketers have made it clear that they require 
more and more data from media platforms about audience members (i.e. data 
subjects) if publishers want to continue to earn revenues in online exchanges 
(Couldry and Turrow 2014). 
 
 
2.6.10 Icons and Seals: Summary 
 
The empirical research findings discussed have important implications for 
media firms as they suggest that privacy seals potentially have a role to play in 
communicating compliance with data protection regulations. The third-party 
verified seals set out in the GDPR could potentially be standardised to operate 
in a similar way to the successful energy-labelling scheme. Accredited privacy 
seals offer increased transparency for media consumers and help reduce the 
information symmetry that privacy policies alone are failing to address. The 
GDPR provision for privacy seal accreditation schemes represents an 
opportunity for data collectors to have their compliance with EU data protection 
rules externally verified. Evidence from the Tsai et al (2011) study suggests this 
could also be a source of competitive advantage firms, with consumers willing 
to pay a premium for such privacy.  
 
However, as we have seen, the research findings in this area are inconsistent. 
The Leslie, Acquisti and Loewenstein (2010) and Brandimarte, Acquisti and 
Loewenstein (2012) studies suggest that data subjects can behave in 
unpredictable and counter-intuitive ways in relation to privacy, i.e. the so called 
‘privacy paradox’. The use of privacy seals as envisaged in the GDPR may 
result in a Peltzman effect where data subjects effectively behave more 
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recklessly and disclose more personal information. We have also seen that 
explicit assurances of anonymity can, contrary to their intended purpose, trigger 
data subjects privacy concerns. This can result in less information being shared 
in circumstances where the risk of personal information disclosure is lower 
(Acquisti  and Grossklags 2012).  
 
Perceived control also impacts on personal information sharing as it highlights 
how,  
“technologies that make individuals feel more in control over the release of 
personal information may carry the unintended consequence of eliciting riskier 
disclosures” (Brandimarte et al. 2013, p.15).  
 
Overall, this research suggests that the more control you give data subjects the 
more personal information they disclose.  
 
However, it is important to note that in the existing privacy research examined 
above, the displaying of the seals were used to indicate a firm’s compliance with 
its own stated privacy policy only. This has led to a miss-interpretation of what 
the presence of the privacy seal actually represents.  For new media 
consumers, the only way for them to be clear about what would happen to their 
data was to read the privacy policy for each data-controller (i.e. new media 
service provider) they visit. This is because data-controllers could all potentially 
have different privacy policies. We know from literature that this is not practical 
and that there is evidence to confirm that the vast majority of data subjects 
simply do not read privacy policies.   
 
The research carried out in this thesis examines the use of privacy seals as 
envisaged in the GDPR approach. This means that rather than simply acting as 
a symbol to denote compliance with the data controllers stated privacy policy, 
the display of an accredited privacy seal represents the validation by an 
independent third-party that the data-controllers privacy practices are in 
compliance with the relevant data protection regulation. This provides a 
benchmark for data-subjects and allows them to differentiate between data-
collectors/vendors etc in a meaningful way. Crucially, it also means they do not 
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need to read each data-controllers privacy policy to understand how their data 
will be collected and shared etc.  
 
While in the process of designing the experiments conducted in this thesis I 
sought and received permission to use two ‘privacy seals’ that are commercially 
in use. The company ePrivacy operates one such privacy seal accreditation 
scheme in the EU. Anyone who wants to display their seal must undertake an 
in-depth audit of their products. They award their privacy seal as testament to,  
 
“a product's compliance with the list of ePrivacyseal EU criteria, which reflects 
the requirements imposed by EU data protection legislation. This includes the 
principles of the new EU General Data Protection Regulation.” (ePrivacy 
2018) 
 
The company EuroPriSe operates a similar accreditation scheme. Their website 
states,  
 
“The EuroPriSe website privacy certification is awarded to websites that are 
compliant with EU data protection law and that meet all of EuroPriSe's high-
quality data protection requirements.” (EuroPriSe 2017).  
 
There is no published empirical data on how the display of these third-party 
verified privacy seals impact on personal information disclosure. If the presence 
of privacy seals becomes a clear source of differentiation between media firms, 
this may well precipitate a widespread adoption of privacy seals. However, 
should the use of privacy seals result in data subjects ‘clamming up’ and not 
disclosing personal information, then this has the potential to impact on core 
revenue streams. The research conducted for this thesis provides insights on 
how service users behave when a privacy seal is displayed.  
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2.6.11 Media Economics: Summary: 
 
Early approaches to privacy economics in the late 1970’s viewed consumers as 
rational agents who made decisions on their privacy based on a trade (or 
transactional) approach. Acting with perfect information, users traded their 
personal information in return for the ‘utility’ gained from the product or service 
they were consuming. For example, when applied to a new media service like 
Facebook, people who set up an account and use the service are in fact trading 
their personal information in return for services and features that allow them to 
connect with friends and share information on likes etc. Both sides of the trade 
are rational actors and making their decisions with full knowledge. The granting 
of privacy rights through regulation is considered to distort the free market. Any 
costs associated with adhering to regulation leads to inefficiencies (i.e. inflated 
prices) and ultimately lower economic growth on a macro level.  
 
From the 1990’s, privacy economics literature incorporated more complex 
concepts like bounded rationality, where framing and heuristics also influence 
decision-making transactions. Rapid technological advances are seen to have 
created information asymmetry, where individuals could not 
understand/consider all potential future uses/sharing of their personal data 
when making personal information disclosure decisions. To this extent they are 
not in possession of full information when making decisions. This approach 
represented a major departure from the existing rational choice theory.  
 
From approx. 2000, the emergence of the Internet and related technologies saw 
the rapid growth of new media firms. Many of these firms provided the majority 
if not all of their services for ‘free’ relying on advertising income for revenue. 
Data protection regulators recognise the complex trade-offs consumers face 
when making information disclose decisions and believe that data subjects (i.e. 
consumers) must be given greater control and transparency of their personal 
information in order to reduce information asymmetry.   
 
A relatively small but developing body of literature has attempted to gain a 
deeper understanding of how data subjects make these privacy trade-off 
decisions. Empirical research outputs demonstrate at times counter-intuitive 
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findings. Although users express a desire for privacy, their behaviours 
contradict this i.e. the ‘privacy paradox’. Furthermore, privacy-enhancing 
features that are designed to improve transparency (i.e. reduce information 
asymmetry) can result in data subjects revealing more personal information in 
situations where they are more at risk of unwanted disclosure. Further research 
is needed to improve models of user behaviour and to ascertain the most 
appropriate policy mechanisms by which consumer privacy might be best 
served.  
 
2.7 Chapter Summary and Research Gap: 
 
As discussed, academic definitions of privacy drawn form a range of disciplines 
all see control as the key characteristic required to enable an individual to 
maintain their desired level of privacy. It is important to note that privacy is not 
the opposite of sharing, it is the control over sharing. There may be costs to 
both parties should too much information be disclosed (Acquisti et al 2016). 
Data protection authorities agree and see transparency as a key enabler to 
allow data subjects to exercise control over how and when their personal 
information is obtained and shared, as well as potential futures uses. This is 
especially relevant in the in the Internet era where technology advances have 
reduced barriers to entry and costs, allowing vast amounts of personal data 
across a range of devices to be collected and stored indefinitely.  
 
Technological development has had a major impact on how media firms 
operate. The rapid growth of new media service providers has seen the 
expansion of online services where the provider does not explicitly charge for 
‘first’ content market. This leaves firms completely reliant on the ‘secondary’ 
audience markets as a revenue stream and we see new media service 
providers like Alphabet and Facebook dominate the online advertising market at 
a time when traditional advertising in sectors like newspapers in terminal 
decline. There are benefits to both data subjects and data controllers when 
certain data is shared. We only have to look to the growth in new media 
platforms like Facebook and Twitter are to see how popular these platforms are. 
Many of the new media firms who operate these social media platforms are 
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highly profitable.EU and US data protection regulators agree that the existing 
data protection provisions in their respective jurisdictions are not adequate. 
Media economics literature recognises that regulation of the market may be 
required to prohibit certain types of behaviour within a sector. Regulators 
believe that lack of adequate data protection poses a risk to consumers (data 
subjects), service providers (data collectors) and ultimately the wider macro 
economy. They warn of risks to the growth and sustainability of this industry 
sector should appropriate provisions to protect personal privacy not exist. EU 
regulators have attempted to address some of these concerns in the form of the 
GDPR, which came into force in 2018.  
 
A lack of data protection can lead to economic benefits for data controllers 
through efficiency gains and increased revenues. This can also bring benefits 
for data subjects, as firms can pass on efficiency gains through lower prices for 
products/services. However, this same lack of data protection can also be costly 
for data controllers through costs and reputational damage associated with data 
breeches or misuse (Acquisti et al. 2016). Data subjects may be negatively 
impacted by a lack of data protection through tangible costs such as identity 
theft and price discrimination as well as by less tangible risks such as 
psychological discomfort and/or anxiety (Stone and Stone1990; Feri, Giannetti 
and Jentzschal 2015).  
 
Since 2000, challenges to the classical rational choice theory argue that privacy 
decision-making is complex and influenced by other factors like framing and 
heuristics. Studies show inconsistencies and contradictions in individuals’ 
behaviour when choosing to protect or share personal information. These 
highlight a dichotomy between attitudes to privacy and actual behaviour, the 
privacy paradox. They demonstrate that individuals’ privacy decisions are 
complex and differ substantially from each other depending on opinions, 
attitudes and behaviours. Consumers often lack the required information to 
make privacy-sensitive decisions and are ‘likely’ to exchange long-term privacy 
for short-term benefits (Aquisti, 2004; Acquisti and Grossklags 2005; Acquisti et 
al. 2016 ).  
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Despite contrasting philosophical approaches in terms of regulatory 
frameworks, European and American regulators have all explicitly stated that 
current data protection regulations are not sufficient to deal with advances in 
technology. They identify specific areas that require changes including 
suggestions for how these changes may operate. In the EU, the new GDPR 
represents a comprehensive revision of data protection regulations. It explicitly 
calls for the establishment of a privacy seal accreditation system. No empirical 
research exists that examines the use of privacy seals that indicate compliance 
with a specific benchmark regulation. The limited empirical research that looks 
at the use of privacy seals and icons is outdated and was conducted on US 
based respondents only.  
 
Research from Evens and Van Damme (2016) shows that while consumers 
were willing to share basic demographic data like name, date-of-birth, job status 
and e-mail address, they were more reluctant to share income, contact and 
financial details. The research conducted for this thesis will explore users 
willingness to disclose more ‘sensitive’ data categories (as defined in the 
GDPR) when a privacy seal is displayed.  
 
As discussed on this chapter, there are a number of gaps in the existing 
literature and this research addresses some of these gaps. Specifically, it sets 
out to empirically test the impact privacy seals have on personal information 
disclosure.  
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3 Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
This research adopts a mixed methods approach, gathering primary data from 
surveys and a randomised experimental study. Experiment and survey 
participants are recruited through the online labour market Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk). The survey conducted in relation to RO1 examines whether EU 
based respondents can identify what categories of data are classified as 
sensitive personal data under EU data protection provisions. The survey 
conducted in relation to RO2 asks EU and US respondents to identify the 
categories of data they believe should be classified as ‘sensitive personal data’. 
The findings in from the RO2 surveys are then used in experiments conducted 
in relation to RO3, to examine personal information disclosure under different 
treatments.  
 
Experiment participants are randomly assigned a control treatment group(s) 
where interface changes/manipulations are made. The Fisher Exact Test 
statistical technique is used to analyse the results. These statistical methods, 
combined with the experimental design allows for causality claims to be made in 
relation to the treatment. Specifically, this study examines how the presence of 
a privacy seal impacts on personal information disclosure. The following 
sections articulate how the research objectives of this thesis have shaped the 
philosophical, methodological, method and data analysis approaches adopted.  
 
We will begin by briefly recapping on the research question and research 
objectives of this study. 
 
The overarching research question this thesis aims to address is the following: 
 
What impact(s) do changes to data protection regulations have on 
personal information disclosure in online environments? 
 
In order to answer this research question, the following research objectives are 
addressed: 
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RO1 – To examine if respondents can identify the types of data 
categorised as ‘sensitive data’ status under current EU data protection 
regulations. 
 
MTurk is used to recruit survey respondents based in EU member states only. 
This is because only EU data protection explicitly declares some types of data 
as sensitive personal data. Categorising data as sensitive imposes restrictions 
on how that data is collected and processed i.e. what it can be used for. 
Sensitive data includes any data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership as well as 
data concerning health or sexual orientation.  
 
EU data regulators see sensitive data as an important issue for data subjects 
as,  
“misuse of these data could have more severe consequences on the 
individual’s fundamental rights, such as the right to privacy and non-
discrimination, than misuse of other, “normal” personal data” (Article 29 
Working Party 2011, p.4).  
 
The US regulation authorities take a similar view stating that,  
  
“disclosure of sensitive information can violate individual rights, cause injury or 
discrimination based on sensitive personal attributes, lead to actions and 
decisions taken in response to misleading or inaccurate information, and 
contribute to costly and potentially life-disrupting identity theft” (White House 
2012, p.100-101).  
 
The survey results will provide a useful overview of levels of awareness in 
relation personal data categorised as ‘sensitive personal data’ under current EU 
data protection regulations. The results may also provide insights from a public 
policy perspective. Do regulation authorities need to do more to inform its 
citizens about why these categories are classified as sensitive personal data? 
Are there categories of data that people believe are sensitive (and therefore 
afforded more protection) when they are not? The results also provide further 
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context in relation to RO2 where EU and US respondents are asked to what 
categories of data should be categorised as sensitive data.  
 
 
RO2 – To examine what categories of personal data respondents consider 
‘sensitive personal data’.  
 
While RO1 examines respondents’ knowledge of data that is currently classified 
as sensitive data under EU data protection regulations, RO2 sets out to identify 
what categories of data respondents believe should  be classified as sensitive 
data. 
 
A number of White papers and reports that preceded the publication of the 
GDPR proposed expanding the list of categories of personal data that are 
categorised as ‘sensitive’ data. However, in the end the GDPR only expanded 
the list to include genetic and biometric data. 
 
MTurk service is used to recruit survey respondents from EU member states 
and the US. As discussed, sensitive data categories were initially set out in the 
1950 ECHR and these were subsequently adopted into relevant EU data 
protection regulations.  
  
The purpose of conducting this survey is to examine what categories of data EU 
and US respondents consider ‘sensitive’ personal data is threefold.  
 
Firstly, the global nature new media firms means it is useful to compare the 
types of data respondents think should be sensitive and compare common 
grounds and differences across EU and US jurisdictions.  
 
Secondly, if a significant number of respondents believe that certain categories 
of personal information that are not sensitive data should be considered as 
such, then will may help to inform future public policy debates.  
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Thirdly, and most significantly in the context of this thesis, the categories of data 
that respondents identify as most sensitive personal data will then be used in 
the experiments conducted in this thesis (see RO3 described below).  
 
 
RO3 – Conduct experiments to test if use of ‘privacy seals’ effect data 
subjects personal information disclosure.  
 
Although the GDPR calls for the establishment of privacy seal accreditation 
schemes, there is no EU based empirical research and only limited US based 
empirical research relating to the impact privacy seals have on personal 
information disclosure. Widespread adoption of the use of privacy seals by data 
collectors is unlikely in the absence of an evidence-based understanding of how 
privacy seals impact on personal information disclosure.  
 
Using the results of the survey conducted in relation to RO2, MTurk workers are 
asked to participate in the survey on business ethics. At the end of the survey, 
respondents are asked to complete some questions about to, ‘tell us a bit about 
yourself’ (i.e. their age, gender etc). They are also asked questions that will 
reveal details identified as ‘sensitive’ data in the survey outlined in RO2 above. 
Respondents are assigned to control and treatment groups where the treatment 
applied represents very minor changes to the survey presentation. Using 
appropriate statistical techniques we can establish whether a causal 
relationship exists between the treatments and the personal information 
disclosed by the experiment participant.  
 
This experiment was conducted separately on both EU and US audiences. 
Again, the global nature of new media firms means it will provide a useful 
comparison of results between the different jurisdictions. 
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3.1 Research Philosophy 
 
This research adopts a positivist research philosophy. The positivist approach 
can be described as a,  
 
“position that advocates the application of methods to the study of social reality 
and beyond” (Bryman and Bell 2003, p.14).  
 
Knowledge is derived by the gathering of facts, which, through the process of 
deduction provide the foundations for the creation of new knowledge. The 
Positivist approach relies on a quantitative approach, collecting data to be 
tested through statistical techniques and is free from emotional or feelings in 
their interpretation. The results further inform the underlying theory which may 
in turn be tested through further research.  
 
3.1.1 Ontology 
 
From an ontology perspective, this research adopts a behavioral economics 
approach with respect to human behaviour as it relates to media consumption. 
Individual choice and decision-making are viewed as not stable and may be 
subject to influence from rules, emotions, framing, desires, and other things 
(Angner 2015). This approach contrasts with, and rejects, the neoclassical 
reductionist view where individuals are considered to behave in a consistent 
manner (i.e. profit-maximizing) with respect to their preferences and decision-
making. As we saw in the literature review, early economic approaches to 
privacy assumed individuals behaved in this reductionist approach i.e. behaved 
as rational agents. However, privacy economics literature developed over the 
years to take on themes from behavioural economics, recognizing the 
complexity individuals face when in their decision-making.  
 
Behavioural economics recognizes that individuals face cognitive limits when 
making decisions (Sharif and Mullainathan 2013). Faced with uncertainty, a lack 
of full information means individuals’ decision-making is based on heuristics, i.e. 
they behave in a utility-satisfying way rather than utility-maximising way. 
Whether individual preferences are stable and rooted inside individuals or 
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whether they are influenced by external factors is still a contested question 
(Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, and McElreath 2001).  
 
As data protection regulators have identified, the speed of technological 
development in recent years (Oliver 2014; Oliver 2018; Oliver 2018b; Küng 
2018) means individuals face complex cognitive challenges when using these 
technology services. They also recognise that privacy policies are not effective 
in communicating what data is being collected, for what purpose and who it will 
be shared with etc. This lack of transparency and control is something the 
GDPR sets out to address. The establishing of a privacy seal accreditation 
scheme is something the EU regulators have called for to address the lack of 
transparency and control.  
 
A number of privately held (i.e. not part of a formal EU institution) European 
based businesses operate privacy seal accreditation schemes. In broad terms, 
the scheme works as follows. Any firm can apply for a privacy seal from one of 
a firm that offers an accreditation scheme. The accreditation firm then works 
with the applicant and checks all relevant data protection provisions relating to 
data collection, storage and processing systems to ensure these practices 
comply with the relevant data protection regulation in that area i.e. the GDPR. 
Firms that demonstrate compliance with the GDPR are ‘awarded’ the privacy 
seal and can display the seal demonstrating third party verified compliance.   
 
There is an up-front fee related to this assessment process. If the applicant is 
successful, they receive permission to use the accredited privacy seal. There is 
generally an annual fee charged by the accreditation firm and with monitoring 
ever 6, 12 or 18 months to ensure the holders data practices remain within the 
relevant regulatory requirements.  
 
The core goal of this research is to examine if the presence of privacy seals 
have an impact on personal information disclosure. Related research in this 
area suggests that the presence of privacy enhancing icons/symbols triggers 
privacy concerns and results in at times somewhat counter-intuitive effect of 
reducing personal information disclosure.  Therefore, from an ontology 
perspective, behavioural economics is a valid way to examine how decision-
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making in relation to personal information disclosure is affected (or otherwise) 
by the presence of a privacy seal. 
 
3.1.2 Epistemology 
 
Epistemology is the examination of, “how we make knowledge” (Dillon and Wals 
2006, p.550). Rejecting the neoclassical view that individuals exercise 
consistent rational choice with regards to preferences, behavioural economics 
instead sets out to test theories with regards to decision making by means of 
experiments. This approach reflects the development of privacy economics 
literature discussed in the literature review where early rational choice models 
are superseded by approaches that account for bounded rationality and 
recognise the complexity in decision-making.  
 
Nobel Prize winning economist Daniel Kahenman explains how a behavioural 
economics approach explores,  
 
“systematic biases that separate the beliefs that people have and the choices 
they make from the optimal beliefs and choices assumed in rational-agent 
models” (Kahneman 2003, p.1449).  
 
He describes different two different ‘systems’ that are involved in decision-
making, the ‘intuitive’ and the ‘reasoning’. The intuitive system is characterised 
as fast, effortless and often inconsistent with regards to choices made. The 
reasoning system is more elaborated, slower and more reliable in terms of the 
consistency of choices. The intuitive system deviates from the type of behaviour 
a rational behavioural model would predict, we assume that individuals are 
biased by bounded rationality. This epistemological realism assumes human 
behaviour can be observed and described by scientists. With regards to 
classifying empirical findings, the assumed behaviour of individuals is seen as 
the benchmark for analysing observable behaviour. We can therefore 
measuring observable behaviour and analyse how far these deviate from the 
benchmark.  
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3.2 Research Methodology 
 
This is an interdisciplinary study incorporating philosophies and norms from the 
media economics and law disciplines. An interdisciplinary approach is 
appropriate as the research objectives involve,  
 
“answering a question, solving a problem, or addressing a topic that is too 
broad or complex to be dealt with adequately by a single discipline or 
profession… [It] draws on disciplinary perspectives and integrates their insights 
through construction of a more comprehensive perspective” (Klein and Newell 
1998, p.393-394).  
 
The data collection for this research was carried out in 2016 and 2017. 
From a methodological perspective, this thesis employs a quantitative 
methodology. Measurement is a key emphasis of a quantitative approach. The 
use of quantifiable variables combined with appropriate statistical method gives 
researchers the ability to identify more precise estimates of the differences 
between respondents and/or groups of respondents. Quantitative research 
goes beyond description of how things are and is concerned with causality i.e. 
why things are the way they are (Bryman 2012).   
It is important to note that while a quantitative approach is often associated with 
the development of hypothesis, this is not always the case as,  
“a great deal of quantitative research does not entail the specification of a 
hypothesis” (Bryman 2012, p.161).  
Rather than develop specific predictions in the form of hypothesis, this research 
applies appropriate statistical methods to interpret the empirical evidence 
gathered from the survey and experiments.   
Consistent with both our epistemological realism and ontological approach, a 
quantitative approach enables the researcher to potentially make causal claims 
in relation to the independent and dependent variables used in experiments.  
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However, quantitative research is not without its critics. Phenomenologist  
Schutz (1962) believes that while a quantitative approach might be appropriate 
for the natural world, it is not useful when applied to the social. The core 
accusation is that the quantitative researcher approaches fail to distinguish 
individuals and social institutions from the natural world.  
Cicourel (1964) argues from a similar perspective and points out how 
respondents may interpret the meaning of key phrases in questionnaires 
differently. This ay results in the concepts social scientists attempt to measure 
being assumed and therefore not real. Suggestions that the inclusion of fixed-
choice answers mitigates this risk merely demonstrate,  
“a solution to the problem of meaning by simply ignoring it” (Cicourel 1964, 
p.108).  
He questions whether respondents have the required knowledge to answer the 
question being addressed to them.  
The GDPR calls specifically for the establishment of a privacy seal accreditation 
scheme. However, it does not cite any empirical evidence to suggest whether 
such a system will in fact deliver the improved information transparency and 
control that regulators believe is missing from current data protection 
regulations.  This research sets out to address the research gap that exists in 
this area. It is important to note that all methodological approaches have their 
drawbacks and as discussed above. Similarly, quantitative approaches have 
both its critics and supporters. As we will see later in this chapter, the use of 
randomised treatment and control groups is used to help isolate the effect the 
presence of a privacy seal has on personal information disclosure.  
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3.3 Research Methods 
 
 
“A research method is simply a technique for collecting data” (Bryman 2012, 
p.46).  
 
Consistent with a positivist research philosophy, this research employs online 
randomised experiments to examine how features proposed by data protection 
regulators (i.e. privacy seals) to improve data subjects control and transparency 
over their personal information impacts on the actual behaviour of data 
subjects. A number of surveys are also conducted examining if respondents can 
identify what types of data should be categorised as sensitive personal data. 
Categories of data that the highest percentages of respondents consider 
‘sensitive personal data’ are then used to inform specific elements of the 
experiments.  
 
The experiments conducted here help to redress this imbalance in data 
collection methods. They examine individuals’ personal information disclosure 
and specifically to test if the display of privacy seals as ‘kite-marks’ impacts on 
personal information disclosure. Participants are randomly assigned to control 
and treatment groups. The control group represents the benchmark for our 
analysis. We then apply specific features or ‘treatments’ to examine how they 
impact on personal information disclosure. . 
 
From a methodological perspective, this research gathers data from two 
sources. They are: 
 
1. Surveys: In total, three online surveys are carried out to answer RO1 
and RO2. The findings establish whether ‘sensitive data’ is a concept 
respondents are familiar with i.e. which categories of data are 
considered ‘sensitive’ under existing EU regulations. The results also 
inform us as to which categories of personal data EU and US based 
respondents believe should be classified as ‘sensitive personal data’. 
The results of the surveys feed into the design of the experiments 
described below. 
 
124 
 
2. Experiments: Two online experiments are conducted in relation to 
RO3. They test if displaying a privacy seal impacts on personal 
information disclosure. The experiments take the form of an online 
survey but crucially they also include control and treatment groups. 
The use of treatment and control groups gives the potential for causal 
claims to be made in relation to independent and dependent 
variables. 
 
The following sections provide justification as well as explanation of the 
structure and composition of each method. 
 
 
3.3.1 Online Survey Method 
 
New media firms have played a significant role in the transition of many 
developed countries from an industrial society to an information society.  
 
“Our “society,” thus, requires a prompt and accurate flow of information on 
preferences, needs, and behavior. It is in response to this critical need for 
information on the part of the government, business, and social institutions that 
so much reliance is placed on surveys” (Scheuren 2004, p.7).  
 
This research conducts three surveys directly related to RO1 and RO2.   
 
“Low-cost computing and rapid development of technology have created new 
environments for conducting survey research” (Sue and Ritter 2012, p.1). 
 
This research uses one such new environment for conducting research in the 
form of the ‘crowd-sourcing’ application MTurk to recruit survey (and 
experiment) participants. Research from Dupagne (2018) shows that over the 
period 2004-2016, many media management researchers used Internet based 
samples, often due to their cost effectiveness. However, as with many research 
methods, there are advantages and disadvantages in relation to the use of 
online surveys.  
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Online surveys offer a number of advantages as a research method. First and 
foremost they can be very quick to administer. For example, for one of surveys 
carried out for this research, the MTurk platform was used to recruit hundreds of 
survey participants in less than 48 hours. Online surveys also have much lower 
constraints in terms of geographical coverage and as this thesis examines the 
differences between EU and US citizens this was an important consideration in 
terms of participant recruitment. Sue and Ritter (2012) highlight another 
potential advantage of online surveys. As no researcher is present, respondents 
can answer at their own pace, resulting in more honest answers to questions. 
These were all important considerations in this research.  
 
Critics of online surveys highlight the fact that as participants are not randomly 
selected, we cannot generalise findings. For example, as not everyone has 
Internet access, some socio-economic groups are excluded from the sample 
data collected. Furthermore, as the number of people who actually have 
Internet access is both difficult to estimate and changing it is difficult to state 
how representative this type of sample is. This issue is somewhat mitigated by 
the fact that the research we are conducting is specifically related to online 
behaviour so the fact that participants require Internet access is not a significant 
issue. Research from Cliffford, Jewell and Waggoner (2015) showed MTurk 
‘workers’, 
  
“tend to be more politically liberal, younger, less religious and less racially 
diverse” (Cliffford, Jewell and Waggoner 2016, p.1)  
 
as compared to the general US population. Clearly this would be more of an 
issue if one is conducting politics related research, but it is also useful to be 
aware of generally.  
 
Participants in this research were recruited from MTurk and therefore represent 
a non-probability convenience sample (Dupagne, 2018). In later sections of this 
chapter we will address this issue of generalisation in more detail. However, this 
issue is somewhat mitigated by the fact that the focus of this research is to 
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examine how the presence of privacy seals impact on online personal 
information disclosure so limiting the sample to Internet users is justified.  
 
A more detailed description of the steps including screen shots of how the 
survey was presented is detailed in the Appendices. However, the survey 
operates broadly as follows: 
 
Overview: How the Surveys Operated: 
The exact criteria used to select MTurk workers to participate in these surveys 
are detailed in later sections of this chapter. However, broadly speaking they 
operated as follows: 
 
 Registered MTurk ‘worker’ who meets the experiment criteria is 
presented with a link to a survey with the title ‘A survey about data 
protection’  
 
 Participant selects the hyperlink to the survey.  
 
 All participants presented with the same ‘Overview’ page explaining what 
the survey is about. They select the <Next> button to continue.   
 
 Participants are then presented with a ‘Survey Instructions’ page briefly 
telling them what to do. 
 
 Participants are presented with questions relating to the relevant 
research objective.  
 
 The experiment then asks respondents for some additional information 
about themselves including age, gender etc 
 
 Participant selects the <Finish Survey> button and they are presented 
with a ‘completion code’ and they enter this on MTurk application to 
confirm completion of the task.  
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The results of these surveys inform what categories of personal data requested 
in the experiments detailed below.  
 
Please see Appendix chapter at the end of this document for links and example 
screenshots for the surveys and experiments carried out for this thesis. 
 
 
3.3.2 Experiment Method 
 
Analysis of methodological approaches the media management journals 
International Journal of Media Management between and the Journal of Media 
Economics publications from 2004-2016 by Dupagne (2018) shows that, 
 
“the three most frequent used data collection methods at the aggregate level 
were secondary data (32%), survey (25%), and literature review (14%). Most of 
the other research methods (experimental, legal analysis, qualitative content 
analysis, field observation, focus groups and historical method) were scarce in 
these two journals from 2004 to 2016. (Dupagne 2018, p.369). 
 
Online experiments are carried out in order to answer RO3. As a research 
method, one of the primary advantages experiments offer is,  
 
“a simple approach for determining cause and effect, and it has produced 
convincing findings on a wide range of substantive topics” (Gaines, Kuklinski, 
and Quirk 2007, p.5).  
 
Varian (2014) argues that experiments represent,  
 
“the gold standard for causality. More specifically, what you want are randomly 
assigned treatment-control experiments.” (Varian 2014, p.29).  
 
Causality can also be inferred from cross-section and/or panel data. However, 
these approaches pose a number of methodological challenges including 
selection biases, mutual causation and correlated measurement errors. The 
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survey experiment avoids many of the issues associated with more traditional 
cross-sectional and panel data research approaches (Gaines et al 2007).   
 
An additional advantage of an experimental methodology is that,  
 
“Randomized experiments are more likely to yield unbiased estimates of causal 
effects than typical observational studies because the randomization of 
treatment and control groups equal on average in terms of all (observed and 
unobserved) characteristics” (Horiuchi, Imai and Taniguchi 2007, p.669).  
 
Importantly, “experimenters usually intend their studies to reveal the workings of the 
real world” (Gaines et al 2007, p.9).  
 
In research that focuses on economic approaches to privacy, experiment 
methodological approaches are common adopted.  
 
Experiment participants are presented with statements and asked to select an 
answer from a list of options in a drop down menu. Through the use of 
treatment and control groups, the experimental design can isolate the impact of 
a policy measure or change of situation i.e. the presence or otherwise of a 
privacy seal and or alternative logo/kite-mark. Applying appropriate statistical 
techniques to the results we can accurately measure if a causal link between 
policy measures and user behaviour exists. These types of empirical 
investigations create new and/or extend existing economic models.  
 
Randomised experiments are built on 4 key principles: 
 
 Control: Differences between treatment and control groups are kept to a 
minimum for each experiment so as to control for possible confounding 
effects. In this research, exactly the same questions are presented to the 
participants. The only difference between control and treatment groups 
are the images displayed in the header and footer of the web pages 
displayed 
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 Randomisation: Participants will be randomly assigned to treatment and 
control groups. The randomisation to groups is done automatically by the 
Qualtrics software and the participant does not get to choose their 
treatment group, is not aware of what group they have been assigned to 
nor is the participant aware that other groups exist.  
 
 Replication: The higher the number of cases observed the more 
accurately we can estimate the causal effect of the explanatory 
(independent) variable on the response (dependent) variable. All control 
and treatment groups have a minimum of 70-80 participants in each.  
 
 Blocking: If we know or suspect variables other than the treatment 
variables will influence the response variable then we can choose to 
groups individuals based on these blocks i.e. blocking. Blocking was not 
used in the experiments conducted here.    
  
(Diez, Barr and Cetinkaya-Dundel 2012) 
 
Data collection for experiments may encompass a number of steps.  
 
“In experimental research, this is likely to entail pre-testing subjects, 
manipulating the independent variable for the experimental group, and post-
testing respondents” (Bryman 2012, p.162).  
 
The methodology of this thesis follows many of these steps. The RO2 survey 
described above establishes the categories of data respondents believe should 
be categorized as sensitive personal data (a sort of pre-test). We then 
incorporate these findings into the experiments where the independent variable 
is an image that is then presented/manipulated in the treatment(s).  
 
While experimental research has many advantages and allows us to make 
causal links, like any method, it also has its limitations. Among what they 
describe as ‘Practices That Could Produce Misleading Inferences’, Gaines et al 
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(2007) highlight how ‘single-shot survey experiments’ fail to measure the 
duration of their effects. They question whether survey experiment findings are 
relevant if the treatment effect no longer persists shortly afterwards. The 
authors distinguished between accepting a message and learning from that 
message. Drawing on political science literature, they cite examples of how 
messages seen by experiment participants from ‘highly credible sources’ had a 
larger immediate effect than less-credible sources. They identified a so-called 
‘sleeper effect’, where credible sources increased short-term acceptance but did 
not improve long-term learning (Hovland and Weiss, 1951). A further study in 
this area from Druckman and Nelson in 2003 found that framing effects in their 
experiments had dissipated after 10 days.  
 
Gaines et al (2007) identify a further complication that survey experimenters 
face in relation to the contamination of experimental settings. They argue that in 
order for experimental research to have merit, the effects that experiments seek 
to uncover must occur or have occurred in the real world i.e. if the effects had 
never occurred then they would be no motivation for the research. This means 
that respondents are likely to have come across the treatment before and 
therefore have been contaminated by their previous experiences. 
Experimenters therefore must be aware that respondents are likely to have 
already participated in a similar real world experiment and that this may impact 
the treatment effects observed.  
 
While there is no doubt that the limitations discussed above do apply to 
respondents recruited on MTurk, they also apply to all behavioural 
experimentation approaches. Paolacci, Chandler and Ipeirotis  (2010) looked at 
tradeoffs across a range of experimental recruitment methods including 
laboratory, traditional web study and a web study using a purpose built and 
MTurk As you can see from the summary table below, across a range of 
potential recruitment issues like non-response errors, risk of dishonest errors 
etc, MTurk actually holds up quite well.  
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Figure 3-1 Trade-off of Different Recruitment Methods 
 
 
(Source: Paolacci et al 2010, p414) 
 
Overview: How the Experiments Operated: 
The exact criteria used to select MTurk workers to participate in these surveys 
are detailed in later sections of this chapter. However, broadly speaking they 
operated as follows: 
 
 Registered MTurk ‘worker’ who meets the set criteria sees a link to a 
survey with the title ‘A survey exploring ethical behaviour’  
 
 Participant selects the hyperlink to the survey.  
 
 All participants presented with the same ‘Welcome Page’ and are asked 
to select <Next> button to begin.   
 
 Participants see an overview page telling them there are 2 parts to the 
task.   
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 The Qualtrics software randomly assigns the participant to one of the 
treatment/control groups. Note: the participant is not aware that there are 
other groups or which group they have been assigned to. 
 
 All experiment participants (irrespective of group) are presented with the 
exactly the same survey questions with the same sets of answers 
available in the drop down menu of responses available. The only 
manipulations in the user interface will be the presence of logos and/or 
privacy seals.  
 
 The experiment then asks respondents for some additional information 
‘about themselves’ including age, gender, education and income etc 
 
 Participant selects the <Finish Survey> button and they are presented 
with a ‘completion code’ and they enter this on MTurk application to 
confirm completion of the task.  
 
In order to determine the causal effects, the only differences between the 
treatment and control groups are very minor changes (or manipulations) to the 
user interface. In the experiments conducted for this research the manipulation 
involves changing the independent variable displayed in the header and/or 
footer to display a different image (or no image). If the outcome (dependent 
variable), which in our case is the categories of personal information that 
participants choose to disclose about themselves, are different between control 
and treatment groups, we claim that these are a result of the user interface 
manipulation i.e. our independent variable. The Fisher Exact Test is used to 
determine if the differences in effects/responses across control and treatment 
group’s are statistically significant.  
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3.4 Sample 
 
As the research conducted in this thesis examines the impact privacy seals 
have on personal information disclosure, the potential target population is 
anyone who enters personal information on any new media service on the 
Internet.  
 
“Population refers to the entire group of people, events, or things of interest that 
the research wishes to investigate” (Sekaran 1992, p.225).  
 
Accurately estimating the population frame relevant to the target population for 
this is very difficult due the geographical spread and dynamic nature of potential 
relevant citizens (i.e. those with Internet access) across multiple countries. This 
complexity makes the construction of a valid subset/sample by way of simple 
random sample extremely difficult. 
 
The absence of a clearly defined target population means we cannot accurately 
estimate the odds (or probability) of a person participating in our survey. The 
participants in surveys and experiments in this research are all recruited 
through the Amazon Mechanical Turk application and this therefore represents 
a non-probability convenience sample. A non-probability sample does not mean 
that the sample is not representative of the population but it does mean that we 
cannot generalise our results to the wider population (Sue and Ritter 2012).  
 
Sample size is also an area to consider. Roscoe (1975) proposes a number 
basic ‘rules of thumb’ for determining sample sizes. Firstly, sample sizes greater 
than 30 and less than 500 are appropriate for most research. Secondly, where 
samples are broken into subsamples (i.e. treatment groups etc), a minimum 
sample size of 30 in each subcategory is necessary. All of the surveys and 
treatments in this thesis meet these approximate rule of thumb sample sizes.  
 
3.4.1 Sample Recruitment 
 
“Online labor markets are ideal for conducting incentivised behavioural 
experiments” (Rand 2012, p.174).  
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Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is one such online labour market. It operates 
as, 
  
“a crowdsourcing web service that coordinates the supply and demand of tasks 
that require human intelligence to complete” (Paolacci et al 2010, p.410).  
 
Broadly speaking the online MTurk marketplace operates as follows. Potential 
employers (requesters) post Human Intelligence Tasks (or HITs) in return for 
set rewards (payment in US$’s). In this case the HIT is a survey or experiment 
but other types of HITs may include writing product descriptions or reviews, 
identifying music performer etc, basically anything that requires human 
intelligence to complete. MTurk has a database of thousands of registered 
employees (workers) from all over the world. Requesters post HITs that include 
a short description, the payment being offered as well as a preview of the task. 
The MTurk software allows requesters to specify criteria that workers must meet 
in order to be permitted to complete a HIT. The criteria settings available 
include gender, approval rating, workers country of residence, now many times 
they would like the HIT completed etc. Then, when workers access their MTurk 
account, they only see a list of HITs where their criteria matches the criteria set 
by the requester.  
 
HITs can vary in length of time but generally take only a few minutes to 
complete. The requester can check to ensure the task has been completed 
correctly before authorising payment to be made. Conveniently, the software 
generates a unique code for each HIT and workers are asked to enter this code 
on the MTurk application when the task is complete. Requester’s pre-load 
money into their AMT account and the software enables a straightforward 
worker batch payment authorisation system. Requesters can also choose to 
pay bonuses to workers who have or alternatively can refuse payments workers 
who they believe have not completed the task correctly. Requesters who refuse 
to pay workers for any reason run the risk of being listed on some of the 
‘workers’ community forum websites. This can result in requesters being 
blacklisted and therefore avoided by sections of workers.  
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All of the respondents to the surveys and experiments conducted for this thesis 
were recruited through MTurk. The actual survey questions and control groups 
for the experiments were all created using the Qualtrics survey application to 
which Bournemouth University has a multi-user licence agreement.  The 
following sections set out some key overview data including when the 
surveys/experiments were conducted, how many participants were recruited, 
and how much they were paid etc.  
 
3.4.1.1 MTurk ‘workers’: Criteria 
 
The MTurk application allows you configure certain criteria that ‘workers’ have 
to meet in order to participate in your Human Information Task. Only those 
workers that meet your set criteria are given the option to select the link to that 
HIT. Setting worker criteria is a useful way to ensure you collect quality data 
from your respondents. Existing research in this area offers guidance on what 
settings should be considered and these are set out in the ‘Validation of Data’ 
section of this chapter (below).  
 
All survey and experiment participants in this research were required to meet 
two core criteria. These were; (a) ‘HIT Approval Rate’ greater than 95 and; (b) 
their ‘Number of HITS completed greater than 100’. Additional ‘other’ criteria, 
such as location and award (payment) did vary depending on the 
survey/experiment and these are set out below. Initially it was difficult to know 
what price to pitch the assignments at. A couple of test pilots/trials were run at 
$1.00 and then at $0.50 per assignment and eventually the payment was set at 
$0.65 per HIT was decided on.   
 
The tables below provide a summary of the survey and experiment recruitment 
through MTurk. 
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Figure 3-2 RO1 Survey: Sensitive Data (EU) 
RO1 Survey: Sensitive Data  - current categories (EU) 
Total Responses: 153 responses 
Title: A survey about data protection 
Description:  What types of personal data are categorised as sensitive 
data 
Reward:  $0.65 
Time allowed:  1 hour 
Location:  EU based workers 
Started: July 2016 
Ended: July 2016 
N 
Note: As this survey relates to current EU categories of sensitive it recruited 
participants from EU member states only.  
 
 
Figure 3-3 RO2 Survey 1: Sensitive Data (EU) 
RO2 Survey_1: Sensitive Data – new categories  (EU) 
Total Responses: 225 responses6 
Title: A survey about data protection 
Description:  What types of data do you consider as sensitive data? 
Reward:  $0.65 
Time allowed:  1 hour 
Location:  EU based workers only 
Started: 30th July 2016 
Ended: 31th July 2016 
 
 
Figure 3-4 RO2 Survey 2: Sensitive Data (US) 
RO2 Survey_2: Sensitive Data – new categories  (US) 
Total Responses: 201 responses6 
Title: A survey about data protection 
Description:  What types of data do you consider as sensitive data? 
Reward:  $0.65 
Time allowed:  1 hour 
Location:  US based workers only 
Started: 30th July 2016 
Ended: 31th July 2016 
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Figure 3-5 RO3 Experiment 1 - Privacy Seal (EU) 
RO3 Experiment_1: Privacy Seal Experiment  (EU) 
Total Responses: 337 responses6 
Title: A survey exploring ethical behaviour 
Description:  Answer questions about personal ethical behaviour. 
Reward:  $0.80 
Time allowed:  1 hour 
Location:  EU based workers only 
Started: 2nd Feb 2017 
Ended: 4th Feb 2017 
 
 
Figure 3-6 RO3 Experiment 2 - Privacy Seal (US) 
RO3 Experiment_2: Privacy Seal Experiment  (US) 
Total Responses: 312 responses6 
Title: A survey exploring ethical behaviour 
Description:  Answer questions about personal ethical behaviour. 
Reward:  $0.75 
Time allowed:  1 hour 
Location:  US based workers only 
Started: 21st Feb 2017 
Ended: 21stFeb 2017 
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3.5 Research Design 
 
Reliability, replication and validity are all key criteria we must consider in social 
research design. The following sections set out how the surveys and 
experiment elements in this thesis are designed.   
 
3.5.1 Online Survey Design 
 
The best survey questionnaires,  
 
“look professional and motivating, are easy to comprehend, are inviting and not 
intimidating, and are accessible to everyone in the target population” (Sue and 
Ritter 2012, p.76).   
 
With this in mind, the survey and experiments in this thesis followed many of the 
key design principles for online survey design as described by Dillman (2000). 
This includes giving due consideration to important areas such as welcome 
screen, access control, first question, conventional format, colour, instructions, 
formats of response options, navigation guides, text size and font and 
appearance on multiple devices.  
 
All of the surveys carried out for this research displayed a welcome screen to 
provide a brief introduction to the survey. Dillman (2002) suggests that when 
working with probability samples it is necessary to issue a password to ensure 
unwanted respondents do not get access to the survey. However, as discussed 
earlier, respondents in these surveys and experiments represent a non-
probability sample and as such a password was not required for those who took 
part in the surveys. That said, it is work noting that MTurk workers who taking 
part with a unique code to enter when the survey is completed. The MTurk 
software application prevents the same worker from participating in a survey 
more than once and thus duplication is avoided.  
 
Dillman (2002) believes that displaying a short first question in a survey is 
considered useful as this helps set the tone for the rest of the survey (see 
section on ‘Survey Questions’ below). If the first question is complicated or 
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unclear in terms of what the respondent is expected to do, this may lead to 
assumptions that this is indicative of the rest of the survey, resulting in high 
survey abandonment rates. Presenting the first and indeed all questions in a 
conventional format including left justified text and answer options appearing to 
the right of or directly below the question asked is considered desirable and 
these conventional formats are included in the survey design.  
 
Colour is also an important consideration and Qualtrics templates were used 
with a neutral/white background so as to avoid potential issues with colours 
displaying differently on different types of devices. The Qualtrics application 
automatically formats the survey so that it displays correctly on mobile devices.  
 
Instructions are also provided for all surveys providing brief directions to 
respondents. All survey questions are answered via radio buttons (for 
demographic related questions) or via drop down menus and all questions are 
closed-ended. Next and back buttons are available on pages and all questions 
and all survey text is presented in Ariel font size 12.  
 
Navigation buttons are displayed and respondents can navigate using back and 
next or start buttons as required. As all of the surveys are relatively short a 
status bar was not included to show the percentage complete etc.  
 
The survey design in this thesis has adopted many of Dillman’s (2002) design 
guidelines, adapting them where appropriate.    
 
3.5.2 Survey: Questions 
 
“A survey question is a measurement tool, a way for researchers to discover a 
respondent’s opinion, knowledge and behaviour” (Sue and Ritter 2012, p.51).  
 
The questions in the surveys (and experiments) in this thesis are closed-ended 
questions where respondents must select an answer from the range of options 
presented. There are two types of closed-ended questions. Firstly, there are a 
number of dichotomous questions (i.e. they only offer two possible responses 
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such as yes/no, or males/female etc). Secondly, a number of multiple-choice 
with a range of mutually exclusive answers available to select are used. Closed 
questions offer a number of advantages including the easy of processing the 
answers from a coding. This in turn makes the subsequent analysis easier to 
conduct. Closed questions are easier and quicker for respondents to answer. 
However, closed questions do by their very nature limit responses and this may 
result in potentially interesting replies not being recorded. Care also needs to be 
taken to ensure there is no overlap in the answer options provided (Bryman 
2012).  
 
All survey and experiment questions in this research force respondents to select 
one answer only from a drop down list. Existing research show this is preferable 
to a ‘check all that apply’ format in online surveys (Smyth, Dillman, Christian, & 
Stern, 2006). They found that respondents took longer to answer forced choice 
questions compared to ‘check all that apply’ questions suggesting a deeper 
level of processing in response to the options presented. In the experiments 
conducted for this research, the demographic questions all include a ‘would 
rather not say’ option. This was included in light of the core research objective 
examining what impact the presence of certain icons would have on information 
disclosure. So rather than force respondents to select an option in cases where 
they did not want to disclose the ‘would rather not say’ option was included.  
 
Findings from Krosnick, Holbrook, Berent, Carson, Hanemann and Kopp (2002) 
found that offering a ‘no opinion’ may discourage respondents from sharing 
their true feelings on a subject and it was therefore not included as an answer 
to any of the survey questions addressed in this thesis. This author argues that 
a ‘would rather not say’ option is different to a ‘no opinion answer’.  
 
Our survey requires the participants to answer an 11-question survey where 
each of the questions asks:  
 
“How do you believe data revealing your [insert category 1-11] should be 
classified under data protection laws?”  
 
The choice of answers available to select from the drop down menu were: 
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 Sensitive personal data 
 NOT sensitive personal data 
 Not sure / do not know 
 
Please see Appendices for detail and screenshots of actual survey. 
 
The results of this survey element are analysed and the four categories of data 
the highest percentage of survey respondents identify as ‘sensitive personal 
data’ are identified. These are the categories of data that the experiments 
(detailed in next section) will request from respondents.  
 
3.5.2.1 Survey: Demographic Questions 
 
Much of the discussion on survey questions above is also relevant to 
demographic questions. We consider them separately for two main reasons,  
 
“(a) they are ubiquitous on survey questionnaires, and (b) many people 
consider these items to be sensitive in nature” (Sue and Ritter 2012, p.69). 
 
Demographic questions typically include questions relating to gender, age and 
level of education. This data allows for the result to be analysed and examine if 
a particular gender, age group and/or level of education considers certain 
categories of data as sensitive particular data.  
 
 
3.6 Experimental Research Design 
 
“Experimental research is frequently held up as a touchstone because it 
engenders considerable confidence in the robustness and trustworthiness of 
causal findings. In other words, true experiments tend to be very strong in terms 
of internal validity“ (Bryman 2012, p.50).  
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Existing experimental studies in this subject area often choose not to present 
their studies as specifically addressing attitudes to privacy as this is considered 
to trigger privacy concerns in participants and therefore distort results through 
non-response errors etc. In order to mitigate against pre-existing privacy beliefs 
that may result in self-selection biases, experiments are often presented as 
surveys exploring ‘attitudes to business ethics’ or similar (John et al, 2010; Tsai 
et al, 2011Acquisti and Grossklages, 2012; Brandimarte et al, 2013). This 
research adopts a similar approach and respondents will not be explicitly told 
they are participating in a study that has anything to do with privacy or data 
protection. The following sections will detail the key elements that required in 
experimental research design. 
 
3.6.1 Experiment Design  
 
A ‘classical’ experimental design incorporates a number of key elements 
including manipulation, control and treatment groups’ assignment as well as 
random assignment to those group(s). A true experiment is one where the 
independent variable is manipulated in order to determine if it has any effect on 
the dependent variable. In the experiments conducted for this research, the 
independent variable is an image (i.e. Privacy Seal and or BU Logo) and the 
dependent variable(s) are the four sensitive personal data fields presented to 
participants. The experiments conducted here are post-test only design and 
there is no experiment pre-test.  
 
Experiment participants are randomly allocated to the experimental groups 
(control or treatment), where the independent treatment variable has been 
manipulated. As the only difference between the treatment and control groups 
is the manipulation of the independent variable, we can analyse how the 
changes to independent variable (i.e. the manipulation of the treatment group) 
have impacted on the dependent variable. In the context of this thesis, we 
examine if the presence of Privacy Seal (independent variable) impacts on 
personal information disclosure (dependent variable). Any difference observed 
between the treatment and control group dependent variable outcomes are 
deemed to have been caused by the experimental manipulation or change in 
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independent variable (Bryman 2012). In other words, we are testing to see if the 
changes to the independent variable have a causal effect on the dependent 
variable.  
 
3.6.1.1 Experiment: ‘Survey’ Questions 
 
It is worth noting that from a participant’s perspective, both the survey and 
experiments appear the same, that is, they both present themselves as surveys. 
By employing the use of control and treatment groups the survey becomes an 
experiment. From the participants perspective, they are not aware that 
control/treatment groups exist and are unaware they are participating in an 
experiment. The MTurk software only allows each worker to participate in the 
experiment once and this means participants are not aware of independent 
variable manipulations that take place (or whether they are in a control or 
treatment groups etc).  
 
The survey questions element used in this experiment is taken directly from a 
paper ‘Strangers on a Plane: Context-Dependent Willingness to Divulge 
Sensitive Information’ published in the Journal of Consumer Research in 2011. 
The authors Leslie John, Alessandro Acquisti and George Lowenstein are 
leading privacy research academics and this experimental research study that 
examined the impact contextual clues have on personal information disclosure. 
The questions are shown below. The survey questions are deliberately intrusive 
so as to,  
 
“affect the divulgence of privacy-relevant information, which we operationalize 
by the sensitivity of the information that participants are asked to divulge. 
Information on one’s food preferences, for example, is inherently less sensitive, 
and hence less privacy relevant, than information one one’s sexual 
preferences” (John et al 2011, p.860). 
 
By asking the participants to answer more intrusive questions about 
themselves, we assert that they will give greater consideration on whether they 
choose to disclose (or otherwise) their sensitive personal information. Please 
see the section below for more details. 
144 
 
 
Figure 3-7 Survey questions taken from John et al, 2011 
 
 
(Source: John et al. 2011, p.863) 
 
Respondents are required to answer all 15 questions presented by selecting 
either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ from a drop down menu (for each question). When they have 
answered all 15 questions the select the <next> button and they see a page 
that requests some demographic information from them. Please see section 
below for more details.  
 
3.6.1.2 Experiment: Demographic Questions  
 
Having completed the survey element of the experiment, the participants are 
asked for ‘Please tell us a little bit about yourself’. In this section they are asked 
for 7 pieces of personal information. For all questions, respondents are required 
to select and answer from the drop down menu. All questions include the option 
to answer the question by selecting the ‘would rather not say’ response.  
 
The first three pieces of information requested are gender, age and level of 
education achieved. Questions 4-7 request additional pieces of personal 
information. The data requested here are the categories of data the greatest 
number of respondents identified as ‘sensitive personal data’ in the survey 
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carried out before this experiment was conducted (as described in earlier 
sections). 
 
The four ‘sensitive personal data’ categories represent the core test for 
causality in this experiment. All experiment participants are presented with 
exactly the same survey questions and demographic questions. The only 
difference between the control and treatment groups is the manipulation of the 
independent variable. Please see section below for more detail on how the 
independent variable is manipulated between conditions.  
 
This research assumes that experiment participants would give greater 
consideration to the decision on whether to disclose personal information (or 
not) if the data they were being as to disclose was considered to be sensitive 
personal data as apposed to ‘normal’ personal data. This would in turn help us 
to establish if the presence of the independent variable in the form of a Privacy 
Seal offered assurances (or otherwise) that impacted on disclosure.    
 
3.6.1.3 Independent and Dependent Variables 
 
A key part of any experimental design is the independent and dependent 
variables. Thorough the application of appropriate statistical techniques we can 
establish if a causal relationship exists between them and in turn answer the 
overarching research question.  
 
Independent Variable: 
 
An independent variable,  
 
“is one that influences the dependent variable…..To establish causal 
relationships” (Sekaran 1992, p.66)  
 
between it and the dependent variable. As the overarching research question 
this in this thesis examines, ‘What impact(s) do changes to data protection 
regulations have on personal information disclosure in online environments?’ 
The independent variable in the experiments conducted here is therefore an 
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image. Please see table below for details on the actual privacy seal images 
used in the treatments in the experiments. The table below describes the 
audiences and treatments applied: 
 
Figure 3-8 Independent Variable display by Experiment Groups 
 
Group Jurisdiction Image Displayed 
 
Control  
 
EU and US 
 
No Image Displayed 
 
Treatment_1 
 
US only 
 
ePrivacy Seal 
 
 
 
Treatment_1 
 
EU only 
 
Europrize Privacy Seal 
 
 
 
Treatment_2 
 
EU and US 
 
BU_logo_image 
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Treatment_3 
 
US 
 
ePrivacy Seal and BU Logo 
 
 
 
 
Treatment_3 
 
EU  
 
Europrize Privacy Seal and BU Logo 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable(s): 
A dependent variable is,  
 
“A variable that is causally influenced by another variable (i.e. and independent 
variable)” (Bryman 2012, p.711). 
 
As the overarching research question address in this thesis examines how 
privacy seals impact on personal information disclosure, we are examining how 
the manipulation of the independent variable (i.e. privacy seal image) impacts 
on our dependent variables (i.e. personal data).  
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The expectation is that experiment participants will give greater consideration 
as to whether they disclose personal data that they consider sensitive rather 
than data they consider not to be sensitive. To answer RO2 a survey was 
carried out where respondents to indicate across a range of categories what 
data they consider as sensitive data. The survey results are used to identify the 
categories of personal data the highest number of respondents (in relevant 
jurisdiction) indicates as ‘sensitive personal’ and these are the dependent 
variables we use in the experiment.   
 
The survey included six categories of data that are classified as ‘sensitive 
personal data’ under current EU data protection regulations. These are; 1) 
racial or ethnic origin, 2) political opinion(s), 3) religious and/or philosophical 
beliefs, 4) trade union membership, 5) health or medial history and 6) sexual 
orientation. These categories were initially set out in the 1950 ECHR and have 
been included in 95/46 EU data protection regulations and the GDPR.   
 
The survey also includes an additional five categories of personal data that 
were discussed in various US and EU white papers that preceded the 
publication of the final draft of the GDPR. These are; 7) physical location or 
movement, 8) date of birth, 9) home address postal (zip) code, 10) current/past 
employment details and 11) personal income details.  
 
 
3.6.1.4 Control and Treatment Groups 
 
Control and treatment groups play a key role in experimental design. The 
control group is the group of respondents who does not receive any treatment 
and is used as a benchmark that we measure the results from the treatment 
group. In our experiment design the independent variable in the control group is 
blank i.e. no privacy seal image is displayed to experiment participants in the 
control group. Treatment groups are identical to the control group with the 
exception of the experimental treatment. In the experiments conducted here, 
the treatment involves displaying an image (i.e. privacy seal).   
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The independent variables manipulated in the experiments are images. These 
are the only changes between the control and treatment conditions. All 
‘business ethics’ and demographic questions asked are the same, including 
background colours and instructions given to participants. There are some very 
minor changes from UK to American English and the use of the € and $ 
currency symbols in accordance with relevant jurisdictions.  
 
Control Group -> No image  
In the control group the independent variable is blank, that is to say no privacy 
related image (or any other logo or seal) is displayed in the header and/or footer 
of the pages displayed to the experiment participant.  
This is our baseline condition. We compare the treatments described below 
against this control condition and test for statistical significance. 
 
Treatment_1 -> Privacy Seal image  
In the treatment_1 condition, a privacy seal is displayed in the header and 
footer of each page displayed to the experiment participant. EU and US 
experiment participants see different privacy seals. However, both privacy seals 
are currently in use commercially through accrediting organisations.   Written 
permission was grated by both seal accreditation schemes to use their images 
in these experiments. This is a key treatment for this experiment. Does the 
presence of a privacy seal impact on participant’s personal information 
disclosure?  
 
Treatment_2 -> Bournemouth University (BU) Logo  
In the treatment_2 condition we display the same BU Logo image in EU and US 
jurisdictions.  
This treatment condition is included to test if the presence of any logo has the 
same impact on the dependent variable as the Privacy Seal(s) used in 
treatment_1 (as described above).  
 
Treatment_3 -> Privacy Seal and Bournemouth University Logo  
In the treatment_3 condition we display the relevant Privacy Seal and BU Logo 
image together.  
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This condition is included to see if the presence of a privacy seal in conjunction 
with the BU logo has any impact on the dependent variable. 
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3.7 Data Analysis 
 
As outlined in the previous sections, we conduct a number of surveys and the 
results of these then inform the dependent variables in the online experiments 
conducted. The treatments manipulate the independent variable and examine 
the impact it has on our dependent variable. The following sections outline the 
analysis techniques we use arrive at our research findings and the implications 
that follow from that. Broadly speaking our data analysis is broken down into 1) 
descriptive statistics and 2) inferential statistics. The following sections describe 
these in more detail. 
 
3.7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The data collected in the surveys and experiments carried for this thesis 
presented in later chapters using both descriptive and inferential statistics.  
 
“Descriptive statistics are used to describe the basic features of the data in a 
study. They provide summaries about the sample characteristics and responses 
to individual survey questions. Together with tables and charts, descriptive 
statistics form the basis for quantitative data analysis” (Sue and Ritter 2012, 
p.150). 
 
The findings chapter will provide an overview of all responses from survey and 
experiment participants. Where appropriate these may also be shown in 
graphical format including frequency distributions etc.   
 
3.7.2 Inferential Statistics 
 
The summary descriptive statistics discussed above provide a useful  overview 
of individual survey/experiment responses data. However, to answer the 
research objectives we also need to examining how two or more variables 
interact with each other i.e. do male/female respondents answer questions in a 
particular way or do respondents who have achieved a certain level of 
education respond a certain way? When we do this we are no longer simply 
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describing the data, we are making inferences from the data (Sue and Ritter 
2012). 
 
The experiment results are analysed using relevant inferential statistical 
methods (i.e. Fisher Exact Test detailed below) to see if the results are 
statistically significant when compared to our baseline control group.  
 
“The level of statistical significance is the level of risk that you are prepared to 
take that you are inferring that there is a relationship between two variables” 
(Bryman 2012, p.348).  
 
In other words, it tells us how confident we are that the treatment(s) have a 
causal effect on user information disclosure. In social sciences, the maximum 
level of statistical significance is generally a p-value < 0.05 which implies that 
there is a less than 5 chances in 100 that your sample shows a relationship 
where there is in fact not one.   
 
The treatment(s) represent the ‘effect’ and care is taken to minimise the effects 
so as not to introduce confounding variables i.e. manipulations other than the 
desired effect that may influence the participants responses. For each of the 
experiments undertaken in this research, the effects and response variables are 
clearly identified.  
 
To answer our RO3, we examine if there is a relationship between the presence 
of a Privacy Seal (independent variable) and whether the respondents has 
disclosed the relevant ‘sensitive personal data’ (dependent variable). Here we 
are looking at the relationship between two nominal categorical variables. By 
creating contingency tables and apply the appropriate statistical technique, we 
can establish if a statistically significant relationship exists between the two 
variables. In many cases a chi-squared test can be applied to test of the 
observed pattern in the contingency table is statistically significant or not i.e. by 
examining the difference between the observed and expected frequencies. 
There are instances where with small frequencies the chi-squared test 
assumptions are not met and in these cases the Fisher Exact Probability test is 
a more appropriate test.  
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The Fisher Exact test is used in the analysis of contingency tables to test for 
statistical significance and although it is generally used for small sample sizes, it 
is valid for all sample sizes (Fisher 1922).  
 
Unlike many other statistical tests that use a mathematical function to estimate 
the probability of a test statistic, the Fisher Exact Test calculates the probability 
of getting the observed data and compares this to your treatment data to see if 
the differences between the groups are statistically significant (McDonald 2014). 
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3.8 Validation of Data 
 
In all original research, it is important to validate whether the data and 
measures applied is valid. 
 
“When we ask a set of questions (i.e., develop a measuring instrument) in 
hopes that we are tapping the concept, how can we be reasonably sure that we 
are measuring the concept we set out to measure and not something else? This 
can be determined by applying certain validity tests” (Sekaran 1992, p.171).  
 
There are a number of areas where validity needs to be considered and these 
include internal/ external validity as well as specific validity tests. The following 
sections address these areas. 
 
3.8.1 Internal Validity 
 
Internal validity is especially relevant to research that attempts to establish 
causal relationships i.e. were we are trying to establish the 
manipulation/treatment that caused the change in outcomes. Internal validity 
means that you have evidence that the intervention caused the change in 
outcomes. Establishing internal validity is very much relevant to the experiments 
in this thesis.  
 
Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) highlight a number of threats to internal 
validity. They believe historical events in the wider environment may have 
impacted on participants’ attitudes (in our case attitudes to Privacy Seals) and 
this may affect how participants perform in the experimental conducted. If 
historical events are an issue then this may that the outcome (i.e. dependent 
variable) is being influenced by events outside of the experiment settings. 
However, the presence of a control group combined with random assignment 
mitigates such concerns, as we would expect both the control group and any 
treatment group(s) to include participants that have being influenced by any 
such history. Any differences between treatment and control groups can be 
attributed to independent variable manipulation and not as a result of historical 
influences.  
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Other potential issues include the possibility that experiment participants have 
become sensitized to the aims of the experiment from participating in a pre-test 
is another area identified as a potential threat to internal validity. However, the 
experiments conducted for this research do not employ pre-tests. Additionally, 
the MTurk application does not permit workers to participate in the same 
survey/experiment (or HIT to use the MTurk term) more than once. Other 
potential internal validly issues identified include what the authors call Mortality. 
This is where studies span a long period of time and participants may leave the 
study. Maturation is also a potential issue. This recognises that people and their 
views change over time and this impacts on the dependent variable in ways that 
cannot be attributed to the independent variable. Selection, where a non-
random process means that the control and treatment groups have structural 
differences is also a threat to internal validity.  
 
The random assignment of participants to control and treatment groups 
combined with the fact that the experiments are conducted post-test only means 
that all of the internal validity risks discussed above are mitigated. However, it is 
worth noting that just because a study is considered to be internally valid it does 
not mean that it is beyond reproach and cannot be questioned. For example, it 
would be ask if independent variable manipulation valid? Do the privacy seals 
displayed actually look like privacy seals? Are the dependent variable(s) a valid 
measure of what the research sets out to address? These issues are addressed 
in the sections below. 
 
3.8.2 External Validity 
 
External validity is concerned with,  
 
“Whether the results of a study can be generalized beyond the specific 
 research context in which it was conducted” (Bryman 2012, p.711).  
 
This is important as it tells us to what extent the results of this study can be 
generalized to other situations and to the wider population.  
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Cook and Campbell (1979) identify a number of threats to external validity and 
these are relevant to experimental research. The first area of concern is the 
‘Interaction of selection and treatment’ i.e. are a large portion of the participants 
from a particular gender, race/ethnicity, social class, income group, educational 
achievement etc? The demographic details of participants in the survey and 
experiments conducted for this research will help to identify these types of 
issues. In our research analysis chapter and demographic issues are addressed 
and any limitations in relation to external validity are addressed.  
 
‘Reactive effects of experimental arrangements’ is an issue where participants 
are aware they are participating in an experiment and this may in turn affect 
their responses. It is also linked with social desirability. In the experiments 
conducted here, the ‘survey’ component was deliberately described as a survey 
examining ‘business ethics’ so as not to minimise self-selection bias and 
potential social desirability issues. Additionally, participants are not aware that 
they are participating in an experiment and this combined with the fact that 
there is no pre-test means that this potential external validity issue is 
successfully mitigated. However, the possibility also exists that the experiment 
participant is blind to the treatment effect i.e. they do not see the logo/seal 
presented to them. This issue was considered in the experiment design. 
Highlighting the presence of the privacy seal to participants had the potential to 
trigger privacy concerns and induce potential self-selection bias. When running 
limited pilots for the experiments to test if they worked correctly, the pilot 
participants confirmed that they had seen the privacy seal. 
 
‘Interaction of setting and treatment’ is another concern highlighted by Cook 
and Campbell (1975). How confident are we that the results from this 
experiment conducted here are applicable to other similar situations? In the 
context of this research one could ask, would experiment participants react in 
the same way in terms of disclosure of personal information if they were 
purchasing something online? This will be considered in greater detail in later 
chapters.  
 
As with internal validity, the effect of any pre-testing in terms of participants 
becoming desensitized to the topic being examined is something that can 
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impact on external validity. However, there was now pretesting in the 
experiments conducted here so this is not an issue in terms of external (or 
internal) validity. A further threat exists in terms of whether the experiment 
findings can be generalized to the past and the future? If we ran the same 
experiment in 5 years time or 5 years ago would the results be the same.  
 
3.8.3 Validity Tests 
 
Validity tests can be grouped under three broad headings: content validity, 
criterion-related validity, and construct validity.  
 
‘Face validity’ is the most basic index of content validity and it is essentially an 
intuitive process. Kidder and Judd (1986) cite an example where researchers 
design a test to measure degrees of speech impediment amongst a group of 
individuals. They took the step to have the test evaluated by a group of 
professional speech therapists who deemed it was valid.   
 
Criterion-based validity comprises both concurrent and predictive validity. 
Concurrent validity relates to the criterion on which individuals are known to 
differ in relation to the concept in question. Bryman (2012) cites absenteeism as 
an example. We would expect those who are satisfied with their jobs to be 
absent from work less often than those who are less satisfied with their job. 
Should research findings show no difference in levels of job satisfaction 
amongst workers who are more frequently absent then this may cast doubt on 
the actual measure of job satisfaction used. Predictive validity is similar but 
adopts a future criterion measure rather than a current. The limited research 
available in this subject area makes concurrent and predictive validity difficult to 
measure/estimate for this research.   
 
Construct validity, 
  
“testifies to how well the results obtained from the use of the measure fits the 
theories around which the test is designed” (Sekaran 1992, p.173).  
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This is assessed through both convergent and discriminant validity. Convergent 
validity is established when the scores obtained by different instruments that 
measure the same concept are highly correlated. Discriminate variability is the 
opposite of this, when we expect the instrument to be uncorrelated.  
 
As we have seen there are a number of internal and external threats to validity 
and we will revisit these again in the later discussion chapters. 
 
3.8.4 Social Desirability Bias 
 
“Social desirability and political correctness can often lead to respondents to 
give the ‘right’ answer rather then the real or valid answer to a survey question” 
(Sue and Ritter 2012, p.53).  
 
This is driven by the desire to confirm to social normal. Survey respondents 
generally give more honest answers to online surveys than they do in face-to-
face interviews. However, this is not to say that surveys taken online are 
immune to issues related such bias.  
 
Techniques to reduce social desirability bias include giving respondents 
assurances/promises regarding the anonymity and confidentiality of their data. 
However, as previously stated and consistent with existing research in this area, 
the surveys and experiments conducted here do not give explicit assurances 
regarding anonymity or confidentiality. This is done so as not to trigger privacy 
concerns and reduce self-selection bias. However, participants are told that the 
surveys and experiments are being undertaken for academic purposes.  
 
Phillips (1973) outright condemns social science research on the basis of such 
bias. Others argue that awareness of the potential of such issues has led to 
measures to limit the impact of such issues (i.e. such as approval rating on 
MTurk etc).  
 
3.8.5 MTurk Data Validity  
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Paolacci et al (2010) identify two major areas of concern in relation to the 
reliability and generalizability of data generated using MTurk workers. Concerns 
include; 1) whether MTurk workers are representative of the population as a 
whole; and, 2) concerns of the quality of the data that MTurk workers provide.   
 
MTurk does not make demographic information about their workers available 
publically. However, a number of academic studies address the issues of 
uncertainty around both the demographic and data quality of workers. Paolacci 
et al (2010) conducted a comparative study, recruiting subjects for their 
experiments from three different sources, 1) MTurk, 2) a large Midwestern US 
university and 3) visitors to an online discussion board. All experiments were 
run using Qualtrics survey software. The HIT was only visible to workers who 
had at least a 95% approval rating and were based in the US. For the university 
sample, the experiment was conducted in an experimental lab setting and 
subjects were recruited from a pre-existing ‘introductory subject pool’ at the 
university. Discussion board subjects were recruited by posting a link to the 
survey on online discussion boards that host psychology experiments.  
 
The findings examined a range of areas including respondents’ demographics, 
non-response rates, attention, numeracy ability and performance in the actual 
experimental tasks. Overall the findings, “confirm that Mechanical Turk is a reliable 
source of experimental data”, and that results,  
 
“obtained in Mechanical Turk did not substantially differ from results obtained in 
a subject pool at a large Midwestern University. Moreover, response error was 
significantly lower in Mechanical Turk than in Internet discussion boards” 
(Paolacci et al 2010, p.416-417). 
 
A paper by Rand (2012) sought to explore self-reported demographics of MTurk 
workers. The author posted a HIT where workers were asked to complete a 
short demographic questionnaire that included a question about the subjects 
country of residence. As MTurk automatically logs (and makes available to 
requesters) the IP address of each respondent, the author was able to check if 
the self-reported country of residence was the same as what their IP address 
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resolved to. Of the 176 respondents, the author found 97.2% self-report 
accuracy.  
 
While the IP address was a convenient way to verify respondents’ country of 
residence, it was not possible to verify the other self-reported demographic data 
with the same level of accuracy. However, the author did attempt to gain some 
insights into the reliability of such data by examining the consistency of workers 
data across different studies. Two studies were identified, each with in excess 
of 1,000 MTurk responses, where 100 MTurk workers had participated in both 
studies. The author found a high level of consistency across demographic 
information such as age, country of residence, education level, income level, 
and religious beliefs. The author concluded that the results,  
 
“clearly indicate that most subjects are not merely making random selections” 
(Rand 2012, p.176).  
 
Another strategy used by MTurk requesters to try an improve data quality is the 
use of attention check questions (ACQ’s). A series of studies show how ACQ’s 
can be effective at screening out inattentive MTurk workers and thus improve 
data quality (Aust, Diedenhofen, Ullrich and Musch 2013; Buhrmester, Kwang 
and Gosling 2011; Downs, Holbrook, Sheng and Cranor 2010; Oppenheimer, et 
al 2009). ACQ’s are generally inserted in tasks as either a “trick” question(s) or 
an instruction requiring the respondent to answer a specific question(s) in a 
certain way. MTurk workers not paying sufficient attention to the HIT they are 
participating in (i.e. who fail to answer the ‘trick’ question(s) as directed by the 
requester) can be ‘filtered out’ of results (Peer, Vosgerau,  and Acquisti 2014). 
 
An alternative way of maintaining data quality is to use the information the 
MTurk application stores about workers based on their performance on previous 
tasks. Each time a worker completes a task, the requester has the option to 
approve or reject the workers submission (this decision also dictates whether 
they get paid or not). Over time workers build up their reputation (or approval 
rating) based on the number of approved/rejected tasks completed. Requesters 
can require that only workers with an approval rating above a certain 
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percentage (i.e. 95%) and/or only workers that have successfully completed a 
certain minimum threshold of tasks to participate in their HIT. 
 
Research from Peer at al (2014) examined the ACQ and reputation based 
approaches used to improve MTurk data quality HIT results. Their research 
recruited both high-reputation and low-reputation workers to a series of HIT 
experiments. They also used an ‘arbitrary’ 95% approval rating to differentiate 
between high and low reputation workers. Their analysis compared the results 
from both groups in the context of data reliability, central-tendency bias and 
socially desirability of responses. The results show that high-reputation workers 
provided high quality data irrespective of whether ACQ’s were used or not. This 
led the authors to conclude that,  
 
“sampling high-reputation workers is not only a necessary, but also a sufficient, 
condition for obtaining high-quality data. Using ACQs does not seem to help 
researchers to obtain higher quality data” (Peer et al. 2014, p.1030). 
 
Based on these findings, all surveys and experiments carried out in this 
research used a combination of worker reputation and number of completed 
tasks in order to maintain data quality.  
 
3.8.6 MTurk: Limitations  
 
As we have seen, there are measures requesters can take to improve the data 
quality collected from HITs on MTurk. However, that is not to say that this data 
collection method is flawless.  
 
MTurk does not permit workers to have more than one account and the 
software has a default setting that only lets workers complete a requesters HIT 
once. This helps to reduce potential duplication of responses i.e. the same 
worker completing the task over and over again. However, requesters need to 
be aware that if they post the same task twice (i.e. if they decide they need a 
bigger sample), there is the potential a ‘sizable fraction’ of repeat participants 
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for the same HIT  (Rand 2012). As such, requesters need to be conscious of 
this possibility. 
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3.8.7 Ethics 
 
Bournemouth University requires all research to have ethical approval from the 
BU Research Ethics Committee prior to data collection. Ethical approval was 
sought and granted for this research project. 
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4 Chapter 4: Findings and Analysis 
 
This chapter presents the key findings in relation to the survey(s) and 
experiments conducted for this thesis. Each of the three research objectives is 
addressed separately. For each research objective, a summary of the key 
conclusions from existing relevant literature is presented. Key findings from the 
surveys and/or experiments conducted in this research are then presented. An 
interpretation of key findings, including consistencies/inconsistencies of these 
findings in context of existing literature is then addressed.  
 
We begin with a quick recap of the research objectives and their context. 
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4.1 Research Objective 1: Analysis and Discussion 
 
To examine if respondents can identify the types of data categorised as 
‘sensitive data’ status under current EU data protection regulations. 
 
The 1995 Data Protection Directive (95/46/EU) is where we first see a formal 
establishment of ‘sensitive data’ protection in European law. The overall aim of 
the directive was to promote the functionality of the single market by addressing 
divergent data protection provisions among member states (Cate 1999). 
Harmonized data protection law creates a level playing field for all EU member 
states and this is a key goal of the single market. It is important that common 
laws are applied in all member states thus preventing firms from choosing one 
location to seek competitive advantage i.e. to take advantage of less stringent 
privacy rules in a particular member state.  
 
The 1995 directive sets out a number of broad principles covering purpose 
limitation, data quality, data security etc. One of the principles included special 
protection for ‘sensitive data’. This imposed restrictions on the collection and 
processing of data that can be used to identify a person’s racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious or philosophical belief or concerning health or sexual 
orientation (Loring 2002). The EU Directive adopted these categories from 1950 
European Convention on Human Rights which itself was created as a result of 
the horrific experiences in concentration/death camps in Europe during WWII.  
 
There is no existing literature this author is aware of that specifically examines 
individual’s knowledge or ability to identify of categories of sensitive data under 
EU data protection regulations. Therefore the findings described in the sections 
below represent one of the original contributions to knowledge of this thesis.  
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4.1.1 RO1: ‘Sensitive Data’ Survey Findings 
 
 
This section presents the findings from the survey conducted in relation to RO1. 
The demographics of the respondents are presented and then the response to 
each of the 8 x survey questions are presented.   
 
4.1.2 RO1 Survey: Demographics 
 
This section presents the basic demographics of those who participated in the 
survey including gender, age and level of education in relation to survey the 
MTurk ‘workers’ who responded to the survey.  
4.1.2.1 RO1 Survey: Gender 
 
Respondents were asked: “What gender are you?”  
 
Figure 4-1 RO1 - Gender (EU) 
 
As we can see from the chart above, male participants represented 69.8% of 
232 valid responses while females represented 28.9%. Respondents who 
selected ‘other’ were just 1.3% of respondents.  
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4.1.2.2 RO1 Survey: Age 
 
Respondents were asked: “What age are you?”  
 
A drop down menu required the respondent to select from one of six options, 
they were: a) 18-24 years old b) 25-34 years old c) 35-44 years old d) 45-54 
years old e) 55-65 years old and f) 65+ years 
 
Figure 4-2 RO1 – Age (EU) 
 
 
Out of the 232 valid survey responses, the 25-34 year age range were the 
largest group representing 42.7% of all respondents. Next was the 35-44 age 
range making up 28.9%. The third largest group were 18-24 year olds at 19.8%. 
The 45-54 age range constituted 6.9% of the sample while 55-65 year range 
made up just 1.7% of respondents. There were no respondents in the 65+ age 
range.  
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4.1.2.3 RO1 Survey: Education 
 
Respondents were asked: “Please indicate your level of education?”  
 
A drop down menu required the respondent to select from one of three options, 
they were: a) Less than secondary/high school b) Secondary/high school 
completed c) Undergraduate degree completed d) Masters degree completed e) 
Professional Degree completed f) Doctorate completed 
 
Figure 4-3 RO1 – Education (EU) 
 
 
As we can see, 99% of respondents had at least finished high school with 
77.1% having completed an undergraduate degree. 
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4.1.2.4 RO1 Survey: Home Address Details 
 
Respondents were asked: “Do you believe details that identify your home 
address details (i.e. postcode/zipcode) are categorized as 'sensitive data' 
under current EU data protection regulations? 
 
Figure 4-4 RO1 – Home Address Details (EU) 
 
 
The results show that out of the 232 valid responses, 54.3% thought that details 
that identify your home address are categorised as sensitive data under current 
EU data protection regulations. 38.4% of respondents thought it was not 
sensitive data and 7.3% indicated they were not sure/did not know.  
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4.1.2.5 RO1 Survey: Race / Ethnic Origin 
 
Respondents were asked: “Do you believe details that identify your racial or 
ethnic origin are categorized as 'sensitive data' under current EU data 
protection regulations?” 
 
Figure 4-5 RO1 – Race / Ethnic Origin (EU) 
 
 
The findings show that out of the 232 responses, 53.4% believe details that 
identify your racial or ethnic origin are not categorised as sensitive data under 
current EU data protection regulations. 37.9% of respondents thought it was 
classified as sensitive data and 8.6% indicated they were not sure/did not know.  
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4.1.2.6 RO1 Survey: Mobile Phone Number 
 
Respondents were asked: “Do you believe your mobile telephone number is 
categorized as 'sensitive data' under current EU data protection regulations?” 
 
Figure 4-6 RO1 – Mobile Phone Number (EU) 
 
 
The results here were a pretty even split with 45.7% of respondents indicating 
that they thought that their mobile phone number was categorised as sensitive 
data under current EU data protection regulations, while 44.8% thought it was 
not sensitive data. The remaining 9.5% of respondents indicated they were not 
sure/did not know.  
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4.1.2.7 RO1 Survey: Religious Beliefs  
 
Respondents were asked: “Do you believe that details that identify your 
religious beliefs are categorized as 'sensitive data' under current EU data 
protection regulations?” 
 
Figure 4-7 RO1 – Religious Beliefs (EU) 
 
 
The results show that 53.4% of respondents believe that details disclosing their 
religious beliefs are categorised as sensitive data under current EU data 
protection regulations, while 32.8% thought it was not sensitive data. The 
remaining 13.8% of respondents indicated they were not sure/did not know.  
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4.1.2.8 RO1 Survey: Email Address  
 
Respondents were asked: “Do you believe that your email address (i.e. work 
or personal) details are categorised as 'sensitive data' under current EU data 
protection regulations?” 
 
Figure 4-8 RO1 – Email Address (EU) 
 
 
The results show that 46.6% of respondents thought a work or personal email 
address was not categorised as sensitive data under current EU data protection 
regulations, while 40.5% thought it was sensitive data. The remaining 12.9% of 
respondents indicated they were not sure/did not know.  
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4.1.2.9 RO1 Survey: Health Data  
 
Respondents were asked: “Do you believe details that identify any existing 
physical and/or mental health condition you might currently have or have 
suffered from in the past are categorized as 'sensitive' data under current EU 
data protection regulations?” 
 
Figure 4-9 RO1 – Health Data (EU) 
 
 
The results show that 81.9% of respondents said that they thought details 
relating to any existing physical and/or mental health condition is categorised as 
sensitive data under current EU data protection regulations, while only 8.6% 
thought it was not sensitive data. 9.5% of respondents indicated they were not 
sure/ did not know.  
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4.1.2.10 RO1 Survey: Employment  
 
Respondents were asked: “Do you believe details relating to your employment 
status/history are categoriszed as 'sensitive data' under current EU data 
protection regulations?” 
 
Figure 4-10 RO1 – Employment Status/History (EU) 
 
 
The results show that 48.7% of respondents thought details relating to 
employment status/history is not categorised as sensitive data under current EU 
data protection regulations, while only 36.6% thought it was sensitive data. The 
remaining 14.7% of respondents indicated they were not sure/ did not know.  
 
  
176 
 
4.1.2.11 RO1 Survey: Sexual Orientation  
 
Respondents were asked: “Do you believe details that identify your sexual 
orientation are categorized as 'sensitive data' under current EU data protection 
regulations?” 
 
Figure 4-11 RO1 – Sexual Orientation (EU) 
 
 
The results show that 61.6% of respondents said that they thought details that 
identify sexual orientation were categorised as sensitive data under current EU 
data protection regulations, while 28% thought it was not sensitive data. 10.3% 
of respondents indicated they were not sure/ did not know.  
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4.1.2.12 RO1 Survey: Analysis & Discussion 
 
One of the difficulties associated with a non-probability convenience sample like 
MTurk is that it is likely your sample data does not represent the wider general 
population. This is certainly true with the findings here. With 69.8% of 
respondents saying they are male as compared to 28.9% female respondents, 
the data is skewed towards male respondents. Similarly, 61.2% of respondents 
indicated that they had completed an undergraduate degree and this is a higher 
level of educational achievement than one would expect across EU member 
states.  
 
It was not possible to establish if this survey sample is representative of overall 
registered MTurk ‘workers’. Having contacted MTurk support team by email, 
they confirmed that they do not make information detailing age, gender or 
education levels of their registered workers available publically. With this in 
mind we now examine the results in more detail.  
 
Below is a summary table that has been sorted (highest to lowest) by the 
highest number of respondents who indicated they thought that category of data 
was classified as ‘sensitive personal data’ under current EU data protection 
rules. The actual categories of data that are sensitive data are displayed in 
bold.  
 
Table 4-1 RO1 (EU) Responses Ordered By Sensitive Percentages 
Rank  Data Type Sensitive Not sensitive Not Sure 
1st Physical and/or mental health  81.9% 8.6% 9.5% 
2nd Sexual orientation 61.6% 28% 10.3% 
3rd Home address details 54.3% 38.4% 7.3% 
4th Religious beliefs 53.3% 32.8% 13.8% 
5th Mobile telephone number 45.7% 44.8% 9.5% 
6th Email address 40.5% 46.6% 12.9% 
7th Racial or ethnic origin 37.9% 54.4% 8.6% 
8th Employment status 36.6% 48.7% 14.7% 
 
Note:  All figures have been rounded to 2 decimal places. 
 Sensitive data categories are in bold 
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The results displayed in Table 4-1 above show that three out of the top four 
categories that have the highest percentages of ‘sensitive’ responses are 
indeed categories of data that are afforded sensitive personal data 
status/protection under current EU data protection regulations. The three 
categories identified correctly identified are Physical and/or mental health 
(81.9%), Sexual orientation (63.8%) and Religious beliefs (53.3%). These 
findings indicate that respondents have a reasonably good understanding of 
what is currently classified as sensitive personal data.  
 
However, only 37.9% of respondents indicated ‘Racial or ethic origin’ as a 
category of personal data classified as ‘sensitive’, despite it having this 
protection under current regulations. 
 
Interestingly, significant numbers of respondents thought that personal 
information that indicated their ‘home address details’ (54.3%), ‘mobile 
telephone number’ (45.7%) and ‘email address’ (40.5%) were given additional  
‘sensitive personal data’ protections even though they are not afforded this  
protection in law.  
 
This would suggest that in terms of data protection, regulations including the 
new GDPR, have failed to keep up with technological developments and data 
subjects expectations in terms of what they consider to be sensitive data.  
 
In advance of the GDPR becoming effective in EU member states on 25th May 
2018, social media service Facebook explicitly sought consent from users in 
order to share sensitive personal information on sexual preferences, religious 
views and political views. This explicit consent had not been sought under the 
95 directives.  
 
The main purpose of this survey was to establish what, if any, understanding 
data subjects had of the ides of sensitive categories of personal data. The 
findings clearly show that out of the 8 categories of data presented, over 50% of 
respondents correctly identified 3 out of the 4 sensitive categories of personal 
data (i.e. physical and/or mental health (81.9%), sexual orientation (63.8%) and 
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religious beliefs (53.3%)). Only 37% of respondents thought that personal data 
revealing a data subjects ‘Racial or Ethnic origin’ was afforded ‘sensitive’ data 
protection under the EU 95/46 directive even though it is afforded such 
protection under the directive.  
 
Interestingly, the results also show that significant percentages of respondents 
wrongly believe that some categories of data are afforded additional protection 
under data protection regulations when they are not. These data categories can 
be used/shared to target advertising messages by data controllers who users 
have disclosed their personal data to.  
 
These results do provide some positives and some negatives for regulators. On 
a positive note, the findings show that many respondents are able to identify 
many of the categories of sensitive personal data as per the 95 directive. 
However, the findings also highlight some issues of potential concern for 
regulators. Significant percentages of respondents thought that categories of 
data were regarded as ‘sensitive’ personal data when they are not afforded this 
protection under EU data protection provisions.     
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4.2 Research Objective 2: Analysis and Discussion 
 
We now address our research objective 2: 
 
To examine what categories of personal data respondents consider 
‘sensitive personal data’.  
 
As far as this author is aware, there is no existing research that specifically 
examines what categories of personal data people consider/believe are  
‘sensitive’ personal data or otherwise.  
 
To address this research objective a survey is conducted. The survey presents 
respondents with a series of data categories and asks them whether they think 
the category should be classified as sensitive data (or not). As the questions in 
this survey do not relate to any specific piece of legislation, survey participant 
recruitment does not need to be limited to EU member state citizens only. The 
results of the survey will give us a number of important insights, including the 
following:  
 
 Are categories of ‘sensitive data’ still relevant: As the original 6 
categories of ‘sensitive’ data date from 1950, the survey findings here 
will examine if respondents believe these types of data should still be 
considered ‘sensitive’ data.  
 
 Identify ‘new’ sensitive data categories: The survey asks 
respondents whether specific categories of personal data should be 
classified as sensitive personal data. The categories with the highest 
percentage of respondents consider ‘sensitive personal data’ will be 
used in the experiments conducted in RO3 (described in later 
sections of this chapter). The findings will provide insights into 
whether regulators should consider expanding the categories of data 
that should be considered ‘sensitive personal data’ and given 
additional regulatory protection. 
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 Compare EU and US survey responses: The survey participants 
are recruited through MTurk and are from two discrete audiences i.e. 
the EU and the US. As discussed in the literature review, the origins 
of data protection in the EU and US come from opposing 
philosophical approaches. The findings here will allow for a 
meaningful comparison of the results from the different jurisdictions. 
Do EU and US respondents differ in terms of what categories of 
personal data they consider should be classified as ‘sensitive’ 
personal data? 
 
We address these and related issues in the following sections.  
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4.2.1 RO2 Sensitive Data: Survey 
 
The 95/46 data protection directive specifically set out 6 x categories of 
personal data that are considered ‘sensitive’ personal data and this provision 
limits how data controllers can share and use these. The categories are listed in 
the table below.  
 
Figure 4-12 Existing Sensitive Data Categories 
Num Sensitive data category 
1. Racial or ethnic origin 
2. Political opinions 
3. Religious and/or philosophical beliefs 
4. Trade union membership 
5. Health or medial history 
6. Sexual orientation  
 
The survey carried out in relation to RO2 will present these 6 categories of data 
and examine whether respondents believe these should be considered 
sensitive data.  
 
In addition to this, the survey will explore the idea of including additional 
categories of sensitive data. In the years preceding the publication of the final 
draft of the GDPR, a number of reports/white papers from EU and US Data 
Protection regulators proposed expanding the categories of data classified as 
‘sensitive personal data’. For example, a 2010 report from the FTC discussed 
how any future privacy framework,  
 
“should recognize additional harms that might arise from unanticipated uses of 
data. These harms may include the unexpected revelation of previously private 
information, including both sensitive information (e.g., health information, 
precise geolocation information) and less sensitive information (e.g., 
purchase history, employment history) to unauthorized third parties” (FT, 
2010, p.8).  
 
The report goes on to describe,  
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“a general consensus that information about children, financial and health 
information, Social Security numbers, and precise, individualized geolocation 
data is sensitive and merits heightened consent methods. In addition, some 
commenters suggested that information related to race, religious beliefs, 
ethnicity, or sexual orientation, as well as biometric and genetic data, constitute 
sensitive data” (FTC 2010, p.58-59) 
 
Date of birth was included as recent data shows that only 3% of Facebook 
users disclose this information publically i.e. beyond their friends lists 
(Farahbakhsh, Mohammadi, Han, Cuevas and Crespi 2017) and it will be 
interesting to see whether respondents consider this data sensitive (or not).   
 
Home address or postcode was included to see how respondents view this 
data. Many mobile phone applications use phone GPS data and this can be 
used to establish you home address.  
 
We know (see above) that the FTC considered including ‘financial information’ 
as sensitive data so we ask respondents here how they view data related to 
their personal income. The survey questions will include the 5 x categories of 
data outlined in the table below.  
 
Figure 4-13 ‘New’ Sensitive Data Categories 
Num Sensitive data category 
7. Physical location or movement 
8. Date of birth 
9. Home address or postcode 
10. Current/past employment details 
11. Personal income details 
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4.2.2 RO2 Sensitive Data: EU Findings  
 
The results of the EU survey are presented in a series of tables in this section. 
Some basic demographics (gender, age, education etc) are presented. We then 
present the answers to each of the questions asked. A summary table then 
shows the answers to the questions indexed by highest percentage of ‘yes’ 
answers.  
 
 
4.2.2.1 RO2 EU Survey: Gender  
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your racial or 
ethnic origin should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
Figure 4-14 RO2 - Gender (EU) 
 
 
The results show that a majority of the survey participants are make and make 
up 73.2% of the 213 valid responses. Female respondents represented just 
over a quarter of the total at 25.8%.  
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4.2.2.2 RO2 EU Survey: Age 
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your racial or 
ethnic origin should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
Figure 4-15 RO2 - Age (EU) 
 
 
 
Out of the 213 valid survey responses, the 25-34 year age range were the 
largest group representing 42.7% of all respondents. Next was the 35-44 age 
range making up 28.2%. The third largest group were 18-24 year olds at 22.5%. 
The 45-54 age range constituted 4.7% of the sample while 55-65 year range 
made up just 1.9% of respondents. There were no respondents in the 65+ age 
range.  
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4.2.2.3 RO2 EU Survey: Education 
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your racial or 
ethnic origin should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
Figure 4-16 RO2 - Education (EU) 
 
 
As we can see, 99% of respondents had at least finished high school with 
71.4% having completed an undergraduate degree. In total 36.1% of 
participants said they had completed a Masters, Doctorate or professional 
degree. 
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4.2.2.4 RO2 EU Survey: Racial / Ethnic Origin 
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your racial or 
ethnic origin should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
Figure 4-17 RO2 – Race / Ethnic Origin (EU) 
 
 
Out of the 213 valid responses, 63.9% believe details that identify your racial or 
ethnic origin should not be categorised as sensitive data under current EU data 
protection regulations. 32.2% of respondents thought it should classified as 
sensitive data and 3.9% indicated they were not sure/did not know.  
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4.2.2.5 RO2 EU Survey: Political Opinions 
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your political 
opinion(s) should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
Figure 4-18 RO2 – Political Opinions (EU) 
 
 
When asked about their political opinions, 67.1% of respondents thought that 
this should be categorised as sensitive data under data protection regulations. 
Only 27.2% of respondents thought it this category of personal data should not 
be classified as sensitive data. The remaining 5.6% indicated they were not 
sure/did not know.  
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4.2.2.6 RO2 EU Survey: Religious Beliefs 
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your religious 
and/or philosophical belief(s) should be classified under data protection 
laws?” 
 
Figure 4-19 RO2 – Religious Beliefs (EU) 
 
 
When asked about their religious beliefs, 62.4% of respondents thought that 
this should be categorised as sensitive data under data protection regulations. 
31% of respondents thought it this category of personal data should not be 
classified as sensitive data and the remaining 6.6% indicated they were not 
sure/did not know.  
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4.2.2.7 RO2 EU Survey: Trade Union  
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your trade union 
membership should be classified under data protection laws? 
 
Figure 4-20 RO2 – Trade Union Membership (EU) 
 
 
When asked about their trade union member ship, 50.2% of respondents 
thought that this should be categorised as sensitive data under data protection 
regulations. 39.4% of respondents thought it this category of personal data 
should not be classified as sensitive data and the remaining 10.3% indicated 
they were not sure/did not know.  
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4.2.2.8 RO2 EU Survey: Health Data 
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your health or 
medical history should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
Figure 4-21 RO2 – Health or Medical History (EU) 
 
 
When asked about their data disclosing their health or medical history, 93.4% of 
respondents thought that this should be categorised as sensitive data under 
data protection regulations. Only 5.2% of respondents thought it this category of 
personal data should not be classified as sensitive data and the remaining 1.4% 
indicated they were not sure/did not know.  
 
 
  
192 
 
4.2.2.9 RO2 EU Survey: Sexual Orientation  
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your sexual 
orientation should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
Figure 4-22 RO2 – Sexual Orientation (EU) 
 
 
When asked about their data disclosing their sexual orientation, 84% of 
respondents thought that this should be categorised as sensitive data under 
data protection regulations. Only 13.1% of respondents thought it this category 
of personal data should not be classified as sensitive data and the remaining 
2.8% indicated they were not sure/did not know.  
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4.2.2.10 RO2 EU Survey: Location  
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your physical 
location or movement should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
Figure 4-23 RO2 – Physical Location (EU) 
 
 
When asked about their data disclosing their physical location or movement, 
91.1% of respondents thought that this should be categorised as sensitive data 
under data protection regulations. Only 6.1% of respondents thought it this 
category of personal data should not be classified as sensitive data and the 
remaining 2.8% indicated they were not sure/did not know.  
  
194 
 
4.2.2.11 RO2 EU Survey: Date-of-birth  
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your date of 
birth should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
Figure 4-24 RO2 – Date-of-birth (EU) 
 
 
When asked about their data disclosing their date-of-birth the results we an 
even split with 47.4% of respondent’s thought that this should be categorised as 
sensitive data and 47.4% thought it this category of personal data should not be 
classified as sensitive data. The remaining 5.1% indicated they were not 
sure/did not know.  
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4.2.2.12 RO2 EU Survey: Home Address  
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your home 
address postal code should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
Figure 4-25 RO2 – Home Address / Postcode (EU) 
 
 
When asked about their data disclosing their how address post/zip code, 75.6% 
of respondents thought that this should be categorised as sensitive data under 
data protection regulations. 20.7% of respondents thought it this category of 
personal data should not be classified as sensitive data and the remaining 3.8% 
indicated they were not sure/did not know.  
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4.2.2.13 RO2 EU Survey: Employment  
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your 
current/past employment details should be classified under data protection 
laws?” 
 
Figure 4-26 RO2 – Employment (EU) 
 
 
When asked about their data disclosing their how address post/zip code, 63.8% 
of respondents thought that this should be categorised as sensitive data under 
data protection regulations. 31.7% of respondents thought it this category of 
personal data should not be classified as sensitive data and the remaining 5.2% 
indicated they were not sure/did not know.  
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4.2.2.14 RO2 EU Survey: Income 
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your personal 
income details should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
Figure 4-27 RO2 – Personal Income (EU) 
 
 
When asked about their data disclosing their personal income details, 87.3% of 
respondents thought that this should be categorised as sensitive data under 
data protection regulations. Only 8.9% of respondents thought it this category of 
personal data should not be classified as sensitive data and the remaining 3.8% 
indicated they were not sure/did not know.  
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4.2.2.15 Summary: RO2 -New Categories EU Survey  
 
In the table below summarises the responses to the survey questions. The 
order has been sorted based on questions where the responses have the 
highest percentages of ‘Sensitive data’ responses. The categories in bold are 
classified as sensitive data categories under EU data protection regulations.  
 
Table 4-2 Summary of RO2 Responses (EU)  
  
Data type 
 
Sensitive 
Not-
sensitive 
 
Not sure 
1. Health or medical data 93.4% 5.2% 1.4% 
2. Physical location or movement 91% 6.1% 2.8% 
3. Personal Income Details 87.3% 8.9% 3.8% 
4. Sexual orientation 84% 13.1% 2.8% 
5. Home address or postcode 75.6% 20.7% 3.8% 
6. Political opinions 67.1% 27.2% 5.6% 
7. Religious and/or philosophical belief(s) 62.4% 31% 6.6% 
8. Current/past employment details 63.8% 31% 5.2% 
9. Trade union membership 50% 39.4% 10.3% 
10. Date of birth 44.9% 47.9% 5.2% 
11. Racial or ethnic origin 41.8% 54% 4.2% 
 
 
The table above shows that there out of the 11 categories of data presented, 
there are 5 categories where over 75% of respondents believe these should be 
classified as sensitive personal data under data protection regulations. Only two 
of these (i.e. health or medical data and data relating to sexual orientation) are 
actually categorised as ‘sensitive data’ under EU regulations.  
 
This means there are three categories of personal data where over 75% of 
respondents believe should be treated as ‘sensitive’ data under data protection 
regulations. The three categories are, Physical location or movement; Personal 
Income Details; and Home address or postcode. These findings suggest that 
EU regulators have failed to incorporate respondents views/expectations on 
what they personal data they deem sensitive into relevant data protection 
regulations.    
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We will now go on to examine how US based responded to the same survey.  
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4.2.3 RO2 Sensitive Data: US Findings 
 
The results of the US survey are presented in a series of tables below. MTurk 
allows requesters to only permit workers registered in the US to answer the 
survey. There were a total of 201 valid responses in this survey.  
 
4.2.3.1 RO2 US Survey: Gender  
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your racial or 
ethnic origin should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
Figure 4-28 RO2 – Gender (US) 
 
 
The results show a majority of the survey participants are male and these make 
up 57.2% of the survey responses. Female respondents made up 42.8% of 
responses and none of the participants identified as ‘other’.   
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4.2.3.2 RO2 US Survey: Age 
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your racial or 
ethnic origin should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
 
Figure 4-29 RO2 – Age (US) 
 
 
 
Out of the 201 valid survey responses, the 25-34 year age range were the 
largest group representing 52.2% of all respondents. Next was the 35-44 age 
range making up 22.4% of responses. The third largest group were 45-54 year 
olds at 10.9%. The 18-24 year age range constituted 9% of the sample while 
55-65 year range made up just 4% of respondents. The 65+ age range 
represented 1.5% of the sample.  
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4.2.3.3 RO2 US Survey: Education 
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your racial or 
ethnic origin should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
 
Figure 4-30 RO2 – Education (US) 
 
 
As we can see, 99% of respondents had at least finished high school with 
65.2% having completed an undergraduate degree. Over 55% of respondents 
had achieved an undergraduate degree while a further 10% of participants said 
they had completed a Masters, Doctorate or professional degree. 
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4.2.3.4 RO2 US Survey: Racial / Ethnic Origin 
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your racial or 
ethnic origin should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
 
Figure 4-31 RO2 – Race / Ethnic Origin (US) 
 
 
The findings show that out of the 201 valid responses, 60.2% believe details 
that identify your racial or ethnic origin should not be categorised as sensitive 
data under current EU data protection regulations. 34.3% of respondents 
thought it should classified as sensitive data and 5.5% indicated they were not 
sure/did not know.  
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4.2.3.5 RO2 US Survey: Political Opinions 
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your political 
opinion(s) should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
 
Figure 4-32 RO2 – Political Opinions (US) 
 
 
When asked about their political opinions, 50.5% of respondents thought that 
data revealing political opinions should be categorised as sensitive data under 
data protection regulations. 42.5% of respondents thought it this category of 
personal data should not be classified as sensitive data. The remaining 7% 
indicated they were not sure/did not know.  
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4.2.3.6 RO2 US Survey: Religious Beliefs 
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your religious 
and/or philosophical belief(s) should be classified under data protection 
laws?” 
 
Figure 4-33 RO2 – Religious Beliefs (US) 
 
 
When asked about their religious beliefs, 54.7% of respondents indicated that 
they thought that this should be categorised as sensitive data under data 
protection regulations. 37.8% of respondents thought it this category of 
personal data should not be classified as sensitive data and the remaining 7.5% 
indicated they were not sure/did not know.  
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4.2.3.7 RO2 US Survey: Trade Union  
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your trade union 
membership should be classified under data protection laws? 
 
Figure 4-34 RO2 – Trade Union Membership (US) 
 
 
When asked about their trade union member ship, 54.7% of respondents 
thought that this should be categorised as sensitive data under data protection 
regulations. 33.8% of respondents thought it this category of personal data 
should not be classified as sensitive data and the remaining 11.4% indicated 
they were not sure/did not know.  
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4.2.3.8 RO2 US Survey: Health Data 
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your health or 
medical history should be classified under data protection laws? 
 
Figure 4-35 RO2 – Health or Medical History (US) 
 
 
When asked about their data disclosing their health or medical history, 97% of 
respondents thought that this should be categorised as sensitive data under 
data protection regulations. Only 2% of respondents thought it this category of 
personal data should not be classified as sensitive data and the remaining 1% 
indicated they were not sure/did not know.  
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4.2.3.9 RO2 US Survey: Sexual Orientation  
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your sexual 
orientation should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
Figure 4-36 RO2 – Sexual Orientation (US) 
 
 
When asked about their data disclosing their sexual orientation, 71.6% of 
respondents thought that this should be categorised as sensitive data under 
data protection regulations. 27.4% of respondents thought it this category of 
personal data should not be classified as sensitive data and the remaining 1% 
indicated they were not sure/did not know.  
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4.2.3.10 RO2 US Survey: Location  
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your physical 
location or movement should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
Figure 4-37 RO2 – Physical Location (US) 
 
 
When asked about their data disclosing their physical location or movement, 
91.5% of respondents thought that this should be categorised as sensitive data 
under data protection regulations. Only 5.5% of respondents thought it this 
category of personal data should not be classified as sensitive data and the 
remaining 3% indicated they were not sure/did not know.  
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4.2.3.11 RO2 US Survey: Date-of-birth  
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your date of 
birth should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
Figure 4-38 RO2 – Date-of-birth (US) 
 
 
When asked about their data disclosing their date-of-birth the results show that 
66.2% of respondent’s thought that this should be categorised as sensitive data 
while 29.9% thought it this category of personal data should not be classified as 
sensitive data. The remaining 4% indicated they were not sure/did not know.  
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4.2.3.12 RO2 US Survey: Home Address  
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your home 
address postal code should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
Figure 4-39 RO2 – Home Address (US) 
 
 
When asked about their data disclosing their how address post/zip code, 76.1% 
of respondents thought that this should be categorised as sensitive data under 
data protection regulations. 21.9% of respondents thought it this category of 
personal data should not be classified as sensitive data and the remaining 2% 
indicated they were not sure/did not know.  
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4.2.3.13 RO2 US Survey: Employment  
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your 
current/past employment details should be classified under data protection 
laws?” 
 
Figure 4-40 RO2 – Employment (US) 
 
 
When asked about their data disclosing their how address post/zip code, 74.1% 
of respondents thought that this should be categorised as sensitive data under 
data protection regulations. 22.9% of respondents thought it this category of 
personal data should not be classified as sensitive data and the remaining 3% 
indicated they were not sure/did not know. 
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4.2.3.14 RO2 US Survey: Income 
 
Respondents were asked: “How do you believe data revealing your personal 
income details should be classified under data protection laws?” 
 
Figure 4-41 RO2 – Personal Income (US) 
 
 
When asked about their data disclosing their personal income details, 85.1% of 
respondents thought that this should be categorised as sensitive data under 
data protection regulations. Only 10.9% of respondents thought it this category 
of personal data should not be classified as sensitive data and the remaining 
4% indicated they were not sure/did not know.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
214 
 
4.2.3.15 Summary: RO2 - New Categories US Data 
 
The findings from the US based survey show there are 5 categories of personal 
data where more than 74% of respondents thought they should be classified as 
‘sensitive’ personal data. The data categories are, 1) health or medical data; 2) 
Physical location or movement; 3) personal income details; 4) home address or 
postcode, and 5) current/past employment details. 
 
 
Table 4-3 RO2 – Responses Ranked (US) 
  
Data type 
 
Sensitive 
Not 
Sensitive 
 
Not sure 
1. Health or medical data 97% 2% 1% 
2. Physical location or movement 91.5% 5.5% 3% 
3. Personal Income Details 85.1% 10.9% 4% 
4. Home address or postcode 76.1% 21.9% 2% 
5. Current/past employment details 74.2% 22.9% 3% 
6. Sexual orientation 71.6% 27.3% 1% 
7. Date of birth 66.2% 29.9% 4% 
8. Religious and/or philosophical belief(s) 54.7% 37.8% 7.5% 
9. Trade union membership 54.7% 33.8% 11.4% 
10. Political opinions 50.2% 43.3% 7% 
11. Racial or ethnic origin 34.3% 60.2% 5.5% 
 
 
US data protection regulations do not include a specific ‘sensitive’ data 
provision as per EU data protection provisions. However, it is worth noting that 
out of the top five ‘sensitive’ data categories from this US base survey, only 
‘Health or medical data’ would be categorised as ‘sensitive’ data in an EU 
jurisdiction.  
 
The following sections will compare the EU and US based survey findings.  
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4.2.4 RO2 EU v US Survey:  Analysis & Discussion 
 
As discussed in the literature review, EU and US data protection regulation 
regimes emerged from very different founding principles. The centralized, 
standard setting EU approach contrasts with the narrow and fragmented US 
regulatory environment considered the right to privacy as an individual right 
(Shaffer 2000).  
 
However, when we compare the results of the survey responses we find that 
both EU and US respondents identified the same ‘top’ three categories of data 
with the highest percentages indicating they believe these should be 
categorised as ‘sensitive personal data’. These are: 1) Health or medical data, 
2) Physical location or movement and 3) Personal income details. These results 
give us some interesting insights.  
 
 
Table 4-4 Differences between US and EU Survey Responses  
Data type EU 
Sensitive 
US 
Sensitive 
Difference 
(EU – US) 
Health or medical data 93.4% 97% 3.6% 
Physical location or movement 91% 91.5% 0.5% 
Personal income details 87.3% 85.1% 2.2% 
Home address or postcode 75.6% 76.1% 0.5% 
Current/past employment details 63.8% 74.2% 10.4% 
Sexual orientation 84% 71.6% 12.4% 
Date of birth 44.9% 66.2% 21.3 
Religious and/or philosophical belief(s) 62.4% 54.7% 7.7% 
Trade union membership 50% 54.7% 4.7% 
Political opinions 67.1% 50.2% 16.9 
Racial or ethnic origin 41.8% 34.3% 7.5% 
 
 
The findings suggest that the categories sensitive data as defined in the GDPR 
while clearly relevant, can also be considered somewhere limited out of sync 
with our respondents’ views. This suggests that regulators have failed to keep 
regulations up to date with what data subjects believe should be categorised as 
‘sensitive’ personal data. This is evidenced by the fact that over 90% of EU and 
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US respondents indicated that data revealing ‘physical location or movement’ 
(i.e. location/GPS data) should be categorised as ‘sensitive personal 
information’. Similarly, over 85% of EU and US respondents believe data 
revealing ‘personal income details’ should be classified as sensitive data under 
data protection laws. Neither of these categories is classified as such in the 
GDPR.  
 
The findings also show that the list of categories defined as ‘sensitive personal 
data’ in the GDPR tend to be ‘lower’ down the rankings in terms of the 
percentages of respondents who think they should be categorised as ‘sensitive 
personal data’. Examples of this include respondents views in terms of the 
political opinions and race / ethnic origin categories etc. However, it is important 
to note that the only category of where more than 50% of respondents selected 
the ‘not sensitive data’ response was ‘racial or ethnic origin’ (EU: 54%, US: 
60.2%). These findings are consistent with research from Evens and Van 
Damme (2016) where consumers are happy to disclose basic demographic 
personal data but are more concerned with regards to sharing data on income 
and related financial details. 
 
The category with the largest percentage difference between EU and US 
respondents was ‘Political opinions’ where EU respondents it ranked 6th highest 
percentage of ‘sensitive personal data’ responses at 67.1%. This contrasts with 
the US findings where ‘political opinions’ was ranked 10th with 50.2% of 
respondents believing this should be classified as sensitive personal data. 
Given the recent media coverage in relation to how personal data from 
Facebook and other social media platforms may have been used to influence 
EU and US elections, it will be interesting to see if these survey findings are 
consistent over time.  
 
 
4.2.5 RO2: Summary  
 
The findings from the surveys conducted in relation to RO2 reveal some 
interesting views on what categories of personal data EU and US based 
respondents consider ‘sensitive’ personal data. The findings show that there are 
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clearly some categories of personal data where there is a difference of over 
10% in terms of EU and US respondent’s views on what should be classified as 
‘sensitive’ personal data. These categories include ’Current/past employment 
details’, ‘Sexual orientation’ ‘Date of birth’ and ‘Political opinions’.  
 
The findings also show that there are 7 categories of personal data where there 
was a less than 10% difference between EU and US respondents’ views. 
However, the most striking is how both survey findings reveal the same top four 
categories of personal data with the highest percentages of respondents 
indicating that the category should be classified as ‘sensitive’ personal data. 
The difference beween EU and US findings are less that 4% for each of these 
four highest ranked ‘sensitive’ data categories. They are, ‘Heath or medical 
data’ (3.6%), ‘Physical location or movement’ (0.5%), ‘Personal income details’ 
(2.2%) and ‘Home address or postcode’ (0.5%).    
 
The consistency we see in these highest ranking ‘sensitive’ data categories is 
useful as we move onto RO3 where we conduct randomised experiments and 
test what impact a privacy seal has on personal information disclosure. 
Specifically we will examine what impact, if any, the presence of a privacy seal 
has on categories of personal data that we know from RO2 findings that both 
EU and US respondents believe are ‘sensitive’ personal data. The findings in 
relation to RO2 help to inform how we set up the RO3 experiments. 
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4.3 Research Objective 3 
 
Conduct experiments to test if use of ‘privacy seals’ effect data subjects 
personal information disclosure.  
 
The sections below briefly summarise the key literature relevant to RO3 stated.  
 
To recap, the GDPR set out provisions for,  
 
"the establishment of certification mechanisms and data protection seals and 
marks should be encouraged, allowing data subjects to quickly assess the level 
of data protection of relevant products and services" (Regulation 2016, p.19).  
 
Certification mechanisms, seals and marks also have the potential to meet US 
regulators stated aims to have,  
 
“easily understandable and accessible information about privacy and security 
practices. At times and in places that are most useful to enabling consumers to 
gain an meaningful understanding of privacy risks and the ability to exercise 
Individual Control” (White House 2012, p.108).  
 
Existing empirical literature specifically examining the use of privacy seals is 
limited. The following sections summarise the research that does exist in 
relation to privacy seals as well as relevant related research in this area is.  
 
All relevant empirical findings from the experiments conducted in this research 
are considered in the context of potential implications for the key stakeholders 
i.e. data collectors, data subjects and regulators.   
  
4.3.1 Addressing Information Asymmetry 
 
Information asymmetry is a key area of concern in the relationship between 
those who used new media service users (i.e. data subjects) and new media 
service providers (i.e. data controllers). Traditionally data controllers have used 
privacy policies to state how, why and to whom etc they share personal 
219 
 
information they collect from data subjects. However, a number of research 
studies show that the length and complexity of these policies mean data 
subjects rarely read them (Vila et al 2004; Jensen et al 2005; Reidenberg, 
2015). Information sharing has the potential to be used to discriminate against 
the individual, or may even result in identity theft. Research findings form 
Miyazaki and Krishnamurthy (2003) suggests that data subjects can mistakenly 
interpret the presence of a privacy policy (or link to it) as an assurance that their 
data is protected.  
 
4.3.2 Iconography & New Media 
 
The use of privacy seals (or similar) can be considered to fall under the broad 
category of ‘iconography’ in academic literature. As examined in the literature 
review, iconography has been used in a range of online and offline settings in 
an attempt to reduce information asymmetry i.e. a position where one party in a 
trade is in possession of information that another party(s) in the same trade is 
not (Edwards and Able, 2014; Bertoldi and Atanasiu, 2007; Grunert and Wills, 
2007). 
 
The standardized energy labels for domestic white goods provides a useful 
example of how relatively complex information (i.e. relating to energy efficiency, 
and consumption an other key product information) can be visually conveyed to 
purchasers. The success of the use of standardized energy labels in reducing 
information asymmetry in the domestic appliance market appears may have 
influenced the decision to include provision for a privacy seal accreditation 
system in the GDPR although regulator do not explicitly state this. At a macro 
level the scheme achieved its goal of reducing energy consumption while also 
enjoying the micro success of changing user behaviour, with purchasers clearly 
preferring to purchase products with lower energy consumption ratings. 
 
 
 
  
220 
 
4.3.3 Privacy Seals: RO3 Research Findings 
 
There is relatively little literature that specifically examines the impact privacy 
seals have in terms of how they impact on personal information disclosure. The 
studies that do exist (Rifon et al 2005; John et al 2010; Brandimarte et al 2013; 
Carolan & Castillo-Mayen 2015; Tsai et al 2011) have produced inconclusive 
and at times counter-intuitive findings that are relevant to the experiments 
condiucted in relation to RO3. Key research outputs are summarised in the 
following sections. 
 
4.3.3.1 Issues with miss-interpretation 
Specifically examining the effect of privacy seals in online environments, 
experimental research from Rifon (2005) suggests that participants recognise 
the assurances promised by the presence of a privacy seal. However, the 
findings show that participants miss-interpreted the presence of a privacy seals.  
Privacy seals were also found to have also increased participants belief that the 
website displaying the seal would inform them of its data collection and sharing 
practices. The study suggests that,  
“An evaluation of actual disclosure response to privacy seals is a challenge to 
academic researchers but appears to be a next step in evaluating the 
effectiveness of seals” (Rifon 2005, p.359).  
This thesis examines the very subject of actual disclosure when a privacy seal 
is displayed. 
 
4.3.3.2 Contextual Clues 
 
The presence of a privacy seal may provide act as a ‘contextual clue’ to data 
subjects. Research by John et al (2010) confirms that contextual clues have an 
impact on information disclosure. Their experimental research findings 
demonstrated the somewhat counter-intuitive impact of such ‘clues’. The 
research output shows that respondents are more willing to disclose personal 
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information in the condition where the information is requested on an 
unprofessionally designed web page. In contrast to this, experiment participants 
were less willing to disclose personal information in a condition where the same 
information was requested from a more professionally designed web page. 
 
In the cases examined, contextual clues in the form of a more professionally 
designed interface and/or a warning about potential privacy concerning 
practices (i.e. phishing) appears to have alerted privacy concerns for data 
subjects resulting in less personal information disclosure. As a privacy seal has 
the potential to act as a contextual clue, these findings are important.  
 
 
4.3.3.3 The Peltzman effect  
 
The ‘Peltzman effect’ is an observed condition where the wearing a car seat belt 
makes the driver ‘feel’ safer. This can result in them driving more recklessly and 
therefore increase their likelihood of being in an accident. Experimental 
research from Brandimarte et al (2012) sees findings analogous to the 
Peltzman effect. Their research findings demonstrate that individuals fail to 
distinguish between control over the release of personal information and control 
over access and usage of personal information. The findings suggest that 
technological features designed to make individuals feel more in control over 
the release of their personal information, my have the unintended result of 
inducing riskier information disclosure behaviour from data subjects. These 
findings potentially have important implications for this research.  
 
4.3.3.4 Unintended Consequences 
 
Research findings from Carolan & Castillo-Mayen (2015) looked at the use of 
cookies and consent regulations as set out by EU regulators under the 2002 e-
Privacy Directive. Although this research did not specifically look at the use of 
privacy seals, their findings demonstrate how mechanisms designed to 
empower data subjects with greater control may in fact result in information 
disclosure counter to their intentions. The authors believe their findings cast 
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doubts on the efficacy of legal strategies that assume the provision of clear 
information (i.e. in this case about cookies) will influence user behaviour in any 
sort of predictable manner.   
 
4.3.3.5 Privacy Ratings 
 
Research from Tsai et al (2011) looked at the impact privacy ratings had on 
user purchased behavior. In their experiments, they modified search engine 
results to display an icon indicating a fictitious privacy rating for merchants listed 
in search results. Their findings showed that participants were more likely to 
purchase from websites with high or medium privacy rating icon was displayed. 
They were also prepared to pay a premium for products where the merchant 
had a higher privacy rating. These results potentially have significant 
implications for data collects, data subjects and regulators.  
 
 
4.3.4 Summary  
 
The GDPR includes a provision for the establishment of a privacy seal 
accreditation system. Such schemes are a clear attempt by regulators to 
address issues relating to information asymmetry. In the domestic appliance 
market, EU regulators successfully introduction standardized labels/icons to 
reduce similar information asymmetry issues that existed in this market. 
Regulators clearly see the potential for a privacy seals to help in relation to data 
protection.    
 
There is a relatively limited body of empirical data that looks at the effects of 
privacy seals on information disclosure in online environments. We also looked 
at other relevant research areas where the use of privacy seals has the 
potential to as a contextual clue, a de facto legal notice, a privacy rating metric 
as well it potentially inducing a Peltzman type effect.  
 
The following sections will examine the findings of the experiments carried out 
in this research study. Specifically, we will examine the impact the presence of 
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a privacy seal has on personal information disclosure. Where relevant, we will 
discuss how these findings impact these findings have on existing privacy seal 
(and related) empirical studies.  
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4.3.5 RO3: Findings, Analysis & Discussion 
 
The tables and sections below present the key findings from the experiments 
conducted in relation to RO3. The findings are discussed in the context of how it 
extends (or otherwise) existing research findings as well as discussing the 
potential implications for data subjects, data controllers and regulators. 
 
Participants in each of the experiments were randomly assigned to a control or 
treatment group by the Qualtrics software application. Those assigned to the 
Control group were asked to complete they survey questions (as detailed in the 
methodology chapter). Participants assigned to the Treatment group asked to 
answer exactly the same survey questions. The only difference between the 
Control and Treatment groups was the presence of a Privacy Seal in the header 
and footer of each page that those in the Treatment group. A section in the 
survey asks participants to ‘Please tell us a little bit about yourself’ and here 7 x 
categories of personal data are requested.  
 
Using the findings from RO2 (presented earlier), we include the 5 categories 
that the highest percentage of respondents indicated was ‘sensitive’ personal 
data. For all questions in this section, a ‘would rather not say’ option is available 
from the drop-down list of available answers. To test for statistically significant 
differences between the groups we use the Fisher Exact test and the 
accompanying p-value is reported. As is common with most statistical methods, 
we would expect to see a p-value lower that 0.05% if we are to accept the 
differences in responses between the two groups are statistically significant.  
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4.3.5.1 RO3: EU Experiment – Text only v Privacy Seal 
 
The table below shows the findings from the EU based experiment.  
 
Figure 4-42 RO3 – EU Data: Fisher Exact Test Results 
EU Experiment Summary Data: Text v Privacy Seal 
Category P-values  
Gender p-value 1.0 
Age  p-value 1.0 
Education p-value 1.0 
Personal income p-value 0.6201 
Sexual Orientation p-value 1.0 
Personal Health p-value 0.6854 
Location p-value 1.0 
Note: Control Group = Text only and Treatment Group = Privacy Seal  
Total number of participants: n = 152 [Control Group: 71 | Treatment: 81] 
 
Figure 4-43 Privacy Seal Image Used In EU Experiment  
 
 
As shown above, none of the p-values are below the 0.05 value that we would 
expect to see if there was a statistically significant difference in terms of 
respondent’s decisions to disclose personal information between control and 
treatment groups.  
 
Although the experiments did reveal differences in disclosure for the ‘Personal 
Income’ and ‘Personal Health’ categories, these differences were not 
considered statistically significant. The findings show that presence of the 
privacy seal did not have a statistically significant impact on the experiment 
participant’s information disclosure in any of the 5 sensitive data categories.  
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4.3.5.2 RO3: US Experiment – Text only v Privacy Seal 
 
The table below shows the findings from the US based experiment. The survey 
questions were the same but the privacy seal image used was different i.e. 
sued the ePrivacy icon as this did not have the word ‘Euro’ in it and would 
therefore be more relevant to a US audience. 
 
Figure 4-44 RO3 – US Data: Fisher Exact Test Results 
US Experiment Summary Data: Text v Privacy Seal 
Category P-values  
Gender p-value 1.0 
Age  p-value 1.0 
Education p-value 1.0 
Personal income p-value 0.6201 
Sexual Orientation p-value 1.0 
Personal Health p-value 0.2452 
Location p-value 0.4968 
Note: Control Group = Text only and Treatment Group = Privacy Seal  
Total number of participants: n= 152 [Control Group: 77 | Treatment: 75] 
 
Figure 4-45 Privacy Seal Image Used In Us Experiment 
 
 
The US experiment findings were similar to what we found in the EU. None of 
the Fisher Exact Test p-values can be considered statistically significant (i.e. > 
0.05%). The ‘Personal Income’, ‘Personal Health’ and ‘Location’ categories did 
show differences between control and treatment groups albeit the differences 
were not significant to say the presence of a Privacy Seal caused differences in 
personal information disclosure.   
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4.3.6 RO3 - Key Findings: Analysis & Discussion 
 
The results of the EU and US based experiments extend existing research 
findings in this area in a number of ways.  
 
Consistent with the findings from Rifon (2005) the presence of a privacy seal in 
our experiments did not influence personal information disclosure either 
positively or negatively. However, it important to note that the research 
conducted in this thesis did not explicitly measure ‘trust’ so we cannot evaluate 
whether the presence of the seal engendered more trust as it did with La Rose. 
It is also important to note that there are differences between how the La Rose 
experiments and the experiments conducted in this research. For example, their 
privacy seal indicated compliance with their stated privacy policy whereas the 
privacy seals used in the experiments conducted here indicate compliance with 
data protection regulations. However, on the core issue of privacy seals not 
impacting the amount of personal information disclosed the findings are indeed 
consistent.  
 
Existing research has also examined the role contextual clues play in personal 
information disclosure. Findings from John et al (2010) showed that the display 
of text warnings about potential privacy violations triggered privacy concerns 
and reduced information disclosure. In the experiments conducted for this 
thesis, the presence of a contextual clue in the form of a privacy seal did not 
lead to any statistically significant difference in personal information disclosure. 
This was consistent in both amongst EU or US respondents. One might expect, 
and indeed we observed some respondents in both the control and treatment 
groups would choose not to disclose this type of personal information. However, 
the differences between the control and treatment groups were shown by the 
Fisher Exact test not to be statistically significant. Therefore, we can say that 
the presence of the privacy seal did not have any positive or negative 
‘contextual clue’ causal impact on personal information disclosure. 
 
This has potentially very important implications for data controllers. The findings 
here offer no evidence that the display of privacy seals ‘trigger privacy 
concerns’ that in turn lead to reduction in personal information disclosure. This 
is an important finding for new media firms. Displaying a privacy seal that 
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reduces personal information disclosure would act as a disincentive for firms to 
participate in such an accreditation scheme and these findings have positive 
impacts for data subjects, data controllers and regulators alike.  
 
As discussed earlier, the so-called ‘Peltzman effect’ observed that seat belts 
make drivers feel safer, and the in turn drive faster and are therefore more likely 
to be involved in an accident (Brandimarte et al 2013). As applied to personal 
information disclosure, the display of a privacy seal (or other privacy enhancing 
technologies) may result in more ‘reckless’ personal information disclosure 
exposing individuals to greater risk of identity theft, fraud etc.  The results of the 
experiments conducted do not show any evidence of the presence of any such 
‘Peltzman effect’. However, with at times very high levels of personal 
information disclosure in the control groups, it was not possible to estimate 
significantly greater disclosure in treatment groups so this finding should 
perhaps be observed with this limitation in mind.    
 
Similarly, there is no evidence of the ‘unintended consequences’ observed by 
Carolan & Castillo-Mayen (2015) where mechanisms designed to empower 
data subjects with more control is not observable in any sort of predictable 
manner. The evidence from the experiments conducted here suggests a privacy 
policy that independently verifies compliance with data protection regulations 
has no statistically significant (i.e. higher or lower level of disclosure) impact on 
personal information disclosure.  
 
When taken in conjunction with the findings in relation to RO2, these 
experiment findings also add further evidence to the existence of a ‘privacy 
paradox’. Although both US and EU respondents identified categories of data 
that they identified as ‘sensitive personal data’, the experiments showed that 
many were willing to disclose this personal information for a relatively small 
financial reward i.e. $0.80. This can be seen as an example of where stated 
privacy concerns do not match actual behaviours (Taddicken 2014). 
 
The findings make it difficult to draw any conclusions in relation to regulatory 
key concern in addressing information asymmetry.  
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5 Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
This chapter presents the conclusions of the key findings in this thesis. These 
conclusions are considered in the context of implications for new media firms as 
well as for policy makers and regulators.  
 
Lucy Küng (2008) reminds us of the important wider role new media firms play 
in society and that they must behave in the public interest and not focus solely 
on profits and shareholder value,  
 
“media is a cultural force: it shapes society and its messages are fundamental 
to democracy” (Küng 2008, p.11).   
 
Leading media management academic Professor Robert Picard (2002) is clear 
on the role of policy makers and regulator. 
 
“Regulations exist to facilitate communications as well as to promote or 
constrain certain types of communications activities” (Picard 2002, p70). 
 
Data protection regulators play an important role balancing the needs of the 
individual with the wider information needs of the society (Cate 1999). EU and 
US regulators have highlighted issues with how technology progress is 
impacting on personal privacy. In the EU, the GDPR seeks to ensure that 
technological advances and related services, pioneered by the new media 
sector, operate in the public interest.  Regulators have highlighted the unequal 
relationship that exists between new media service providers (data collectors) 
and users of these media services (data subjects). This information asymmetry 
means that media consumers are not always clear what personal data media 
firms are collecting from them and how it is used/shared etc. Regulators identify 
control and transparency as a key to reducing the effects of information 
transparency, thus ensuring public interest is protected. To that extent, many 
aspects of the GDPR can be thought of as a form of behavioural regulation that 
media firms have contended with for decades. This type of behavioural 
regulation,   
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“prohibits media firms from engaging in certain practices or requires them to 
engage in specific practices” (Picard 2002, p.71).  
 
EU regulators, through the GDPR, set out to strengthen protections for personal 
data in light of advances in technology. While the GDPR is a comprehensive 
and wide-ranging regulation, this thesis focusses on the regulations provision 
for the establishment of a privacy seal accreditation scheme. While participation 
in privacy seal accreditation schemes is not a legal requirement for data 
controllers, regulators do see it as a tool to give data subjects (i.e. new media 
users/consumers) enhanced control and transparency over their personal data. 
 
There is no empirical evidence in relation to the impact the specific type of 
privacy seal envisaged by the GDPR would have on new media consumers or 
service providers. This thesis addresses this research gap within media 
management academic research. This is done in light of the lack of consensus 
on common standards to protect personal information (Jayakar 2018). 
 
This discussion will also identify some of the limitations of this research as well 
as identifying avenues for future media management research.  
 
The overarching aim of this thesis examines how ‘new’ provisions in the GDPR 
impact personal information disclosure in online environments. In order to 
achieve this, online surveys and experiments were conducted to answer three 
set research objectives. The following sections we present the conclusions that 
can be drawn in relation to each research objective.  
 
 
5.1 Research Objective 1: Conclusion 
 
The conclusion drawn from the survey findings in relation to RO1 is that high 
percentages of the EU based survey respondents are successfully able to 
identify the categories of personal data that are categorised as ‘sensitive data’ 
under EU data protection regulations. The findings are also important from an 
internal validity perspective. Given the methodological approach adopted in this 
thesis, it was important to establish that ‘sensitive personal data’ was a concept 
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that was broadly understood by survey participants before moving on to the 
other research objectives. The findings clearly show that large numbers of 
survey respondents are able to identify categories of personal data identified as 
‘sensitive data’ under EU data protection regulations.  
 
The findings here provide important insights for new media firms. The EU 
respondents surveyed do understand that some categories of data are 
classified as ‘sensitive’ data. As public awareness continues to grow around 
how advertisers use personal information to target for advertising, including 
political advertising, media firms need to be aware that new media consumers 
can differentiate between sensitive and non-sensitive data (as per the relevant 
regulations). In the context of this thesis, the results represent an important 
building block for issues addressed in RO2 and RO3 i.e. that sensitive personal 
data categories is a concept understood by respondents.  
 
 
5.2 Research Objective 2: Conclusion 
 
RO2 set out to establish what categories of personal data respondents believe 
should be classified as sensitive data under data protection rules. As the survey 
questions are not specific to one regulatory jurisdiction, both EU and US 
respondents participated in the survey. The surveys were distributed to these 
two separate groups.  
 
Despite the differing data protection regulatory provisions in the two 
jurisdictions, the survey results showed very similar results. Among both EU 
and US respondents’, the same three categories of personal data attracted the 
highest percentages of respondents selecting as ‘sensitive personal data’ i.e. 1) 
Health or medical data, 2) Physical location or movement and 3) Personal 
income details. 
 
The EU survey results show that out of the top five categories of personal data 
that respondents consider sensitive personal data, only two of these are 
actually categorised as ‘sensitive data’ under existing data protection 
regulations. These are ‘Health or Medical’ data and data relating to ‘Sexual 
232 
 
orientation’. For EU data subjects, data protection regulations in relation to 
sensitive data categories clearly do not match their expectations. This is 
evidenced by the fact that 91% of EU respondents believe data revealing 
‘Physical location or movement’ and 87.3% believe that ‘Personal income 
details’ should be classified as sensitive personal data. The figures for US 
respondents were similarly high at 91.5% for ‘Physical location or movement’ 
and 85.1% for Personal Income details.   
 
A key conclusion drawn from the findings in relation to RO2 is that EU 
regulators have failed to update the sensitive data categories in the GDPR in 
line with data subjects’ expectations. This is despite a number of discussion 
documents and white papers in both the EU and US did consider/propose 
expanding the list of categories of ‘sensitive’ data, only very minor amendments 
were made to the 95/46 directive. Barring the inclusion of biometric and genetic 
data, the list of categories of ‘sensitive’ data in the GDPR remain the same as 
those defined in the 1953 convention on human rights. This seems remarkable 
given the rate at which technology has developed over the last 65 years, the list 
of sensitive data categories barely expanded.  
 
From a regulator perspective, the GDPR represents the first major overhaul of 
data protection in the EU for over 20 years. These survey findings can be 
viewed as a missed opportunity for regulators to meet the expectations of data 
subjects with regards to sensitive personal data protections. The survey findings 
clearly show that the limited set of categories of data that regulators afford 
‘sensitive personal data’ status to, are not in line with data subjects’ 
expectations. As such, regulators need to expand the categories of sensitive 
data. 
 
For data controllers like new media firms, these findings have a number of 
potential implications. Obtaining data subjects GPS location and/or IP address 
allows advertisers to target data subjects based on their locations in order to 
offer more personalized features/content/advertising. Many applications and 
services offered by new media firms request information like GPS location from 
users devices to be switched ‘on’ in order for users to have access to all of the 
applications functionality. Similarly, many applications routinely collect the IP 
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address of the user, which in turn allows for location identification. It is clear 
from this survey that the vast majority of respondents think this type of data 
should be considered sensitive data.    
 
However, the findings can also be viewed and an opportunity for new media 
service providers to listen to their audiences and meet their expectations in 
relation to how their personal data is managed, rather than purely adhering to 
regulations.  
 
Almost all neoliberal macroeconomic growth models identify ‘technological 
growth’ as the key determinant in delivering long term increases in standards of 
living. The GDPR can be viewed as an example of where regulators having had 
to consider the conflicting requirement of the individuals fundamental right to 
privacy versus the prevention of obstacles to economic growth (Maxeiner 1995) 
and the lobbying and arguments of the new media firms and the sectors role in 
delivering economic growth won out.  
 
These findings also demonstrate that media audiences’ beliefs about sensitive 
data are not distinguished by jurisdiction and this suggests that media firms may 
benefit from meeting audience preferences rather than merely adhering to the 
regulatory rules for specific environments.  
 
Furthermore, these findings highlight a potential opportunity to capitalise/exploit 
the ‘gap’ that exists between data protection regulations and data subjects’ 
expectations. Media firms could choose to differentiate themselves in the 
market and compete with rivals by explicitly stating that they will give additional 
assurances/protections to specific data categories, beyond what is required by 
GDPR (or other relevant regulation).  
 
In 2018 it emerged that a ‘personality quiz’ distributed on Facebook was used to 
harvest the personal details of 87 million users. The harvested data was then 
used to target users with customised political messages (O’Kane 2018). While 
there is no suggestion that anyone broke the law, the subsequent ‘Delete 
Facbook’ campaign highlights that for new media firms, even the perceived 
misuse of users personal data can impact negatively on the firm. Facebook 
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founder and chief executive Mark Zuckerberg sees it as a breakdown of trust. In 
an interview with Time magazine he said,  
 
“I think it’s a clear signal that this is a major trust issue for people, and I 
understand that. And whether people delete their app over it or just don’t feel 
good about using Facebook, that’s a big issue that I think we have a 
responsibility to rectify.” (Lang 2018) 
 
Numerous high profile personal data breaches at major new media providers 
further highlights the risks to data subjects. In September 2018, Facebook 
announced that a ‘targeted attack’ had successfully accessed data from approx. 
30 million user accounts. Personal data including name, email address, phone 
number, date of birth and recent locations were taken from users (including 
Facebook founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg as well as COO Sheryl Sandberg 
accounts’). Interestingly, Facebook sought to reassure its users that more 
sensitive data like sexual orientation were not accessed in the hack as this data 
was kept more security. However, data was stolen on the most recent searches 
entered in users Facebook search bar. This has led to concerns that Facebook 
users were put at risk,  
 
“hackers could potentially target victims with blackmail scams threatening to 
reveal this info to the world, especially since the hack included user contact 
info, including phone numbers and email addresses” (Constine 2018).  
 
If, as per our survey findings, more categories of personal data were 
categorised as ‘sensitive’, then new media firms would be forced to keep them 
more secure and successful personal data hacks as described would expose 
data subjects to less risk. There may be an opportunity for new media firms to 
go beyond purely what regulators require and offer additional assurances to 
keep categories of personal data like location data, home address details etc 
(i.e. the categories of data they think should be sensitive). This type of policy 
could be used to rebuild trust between data controller and data subjects. 
 
Continued and sustainable growth in the new media sector is reliant on the 
confidence of data subjects and failure to address data subjects concerns may 
235 
 
inhibit this growth in the medium to long term. As more major personal data 
theft/breaches come to light, combined with how personal data can be used to 
influence national elections etc, there is an opportunity for media firms to offer 
enhanced privacy protection to compete for users.  
 
We know that data subjects can differentiate between different categories of 
data and across US and EU survey respondents there is a high degree of 
consistency in terms of what categories the majority of them consider most/least 
sensitive. There is an opportunity for firms to compete for consumers by offering 
greater privacy assurances.   
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5.3 Research Objective 3: Conclusions 
 
The GDPR includes a specific provision for the establishing a privacy seal 
accreditation scheme. This is a new provision that did not exist in the 95/46 
directive. RO3 set out to examine what impact the presence of a privacy seal 
has on personal information disclosure. 
 
The conclusion from the experiments conducted is that respondents in the 
treatment condition where a privacy seal is displayed do not disclose 
statistically significantly different levels of personal information than those who 
do not see the privacy seal. These findings are in contrast with existing 
empirical research in this area which showed that privacy seals (and/or related 
icons etc) can trigger privacy concerns in data subjects, resulting in lower 
personal information disclosure. For many new media firms, any mechanism 
that lowers personal information disclosure has the potential to reduce the 
opportunities for personalisation and related the associated significant 
advertising income. Any measure that negatively impacted on revenues would 
represent a significant disincentive for firms to engage with such schemes. Why 
would any firm incur the costs associated with participating in an independently 
accredited privacy seal scheme if it effectively put you at the competitive 
disadvantage? 
 
The findings clearly show that the presence of a privacy seal does not result (in 
statistically significantly way) in lower levels of personal information disclosure 
compare to those who do not see a privacy seal. An obvious question here is to 
ask why this might be the case when existing research showed it resulting in a 
lower personal information disclosure effect? It could perhaps be because users 
awareness of online privacy issues, as highlighted by significant data breaches 
in recent years, has led to more familiarity with privacy enhancing technologies. 
Another potential explanation could be that experiment participants simply did 
not see/notice the presence of the privacy seal.  
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5.3.1 Implications for Media Firms 
 
The findings do offer a potential opportunity for new media firms to use display 
privacy seals and differentiate themselves in their market. In recent years we 
have seen a number of major global new media firms attract negative headlines 
when significant numbers of their personal detail harvested, in some cases 
without their knowledge. Facebook found its platform was used by a Cambridge 
University academic who distributed a ‘personality test’ app on the social media 
platform. Extensive personal data/details of over 87 million users was collected 
by the app. The academic who distributed the original ‘personality test’ 
application then passed the personal data collected to a firm called Cambridge 
Analytica. The data was then used in online election advertising in the 2016 US 
presidential election.  
 
The Facebook and Google+ data breaches represent significant and high profile 
personal data breaches by major new media players. EU regulators are still 
investigating these cases and we await the findings from the relevant enquiries. 
What these and other similar cases demonstrate is how data breaches can 
occur and the data harvested potentially used to influence general elections. It 
is likely that some data subjects have become more sensitive to potential 
personal data breaches when choosing the new media services they interact 
with in future. As such, privacy seals have potential significant role to play in 
differentiating between competing application/service providers. For example, 
as an EU member state data subject you have a choice of three similar online 
service providers to choose from. All three-service providers must under EU 
data protection rules adhere to the GDPR. However, only one of the three 
online service providers displays an independently verified privacy seal. Privacy 
sensitive data subjects may choose to select the service provider who displays 
the seal. It is important that the new media industry adopts initiatives to 
reassure consumers that their data is safe. As Akerlof (1978) warns, the inability 
of consumers to differentiate between scrupulous and unscrupulous sellers risk 
undermining the whole industry and this can lead to market failure.   
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5.3.2 Implications for Media Regulators 
 
Data protection regulators may well view these results positively i.e. the 
presence of the privacy seal does not negatively impact on data processors. 
Furthermore, it is possible that over time, as the use of GPDR compliance seals 
become more widely used, data subjects may only engage with new media 
firms (i.e. data controllers) who display privacy seals (and/or similar ‘privacy’ 
kite marks). We may see a situation where data subjects seek out firms who 
display privacy seals much in the same way as people seek out efficient energy 
labels when purchasing domestic while goods. We do already see some 
evidence to support this. For example, Microsoft ran a global campaign 
promoting their ‘cloud’ based services as already being GPDR compliant in 
advance of the GDPR effective data. Apple have done something similar, as 
they are primarily a hardware seller, they are differentiating themselves from 
those media firms who are reliant on making data subjects personal details 
available to maximise advertising revenues.  
 
Another conclusion of these experiments is that the so-called ‘privacy paradox’ 
is still alive and well. The findings here again show while respondents state that 
specific categories of data should be treated as ‘sensitive’ personal data yet 
they are willing to disclose this information in return for a relatively small amount 
of money. Perhaps as data subjects become more aware of how their personal 
data is collected and used my new media firms, they will adjust their behaviour 
and we may see the privacy paradox type behaviour reduced or disappear. 
 
From a privacy seal perspective, media regulators should look to the success of 
energy labels and adopt a similar approach. Energy labels took a complex 
technical area and produced a standardized and visually easy to interpret 
approach to its labels. As well as helping consumers to understand complex 
technical information, the approach also encouraged manufacturers to produce 
more energy efficient goods. We could see privacy seals enjoy a similar 
success. The presence of a standardized seal would allow media consumers to 
easily see how media firms manage consumers personal data. It would also 
consumers to choose between scrupulous media firms who have had their data 
practices independently verified, from those who perhaps do not comply with 
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data protection rules. As Akerlof (1978) warns, without this ability to 
differentiate, market may fail. A markets failure has the potential to be bad for 
consumers and media firms as well as wider negative impact on economic 
growth. 
 
Regulators need to expand the list of sensitive data categories to reflect the 
modern era. The survey findings here in relation to RO2 clearly demonstrate 
that the actual list of sensitive data categories in the GDPR does not meet with 
consumers expectations of what should be classed as sensitive.    
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5.4 Original Contribution to Knowledge  
 
This thesis makes a number of original contributions to knowledge. Phillips and 
Pugh (2010) identify 15 different definitions of originality and this thesis makes 
contributions in the following ways: 
 
Carrying out empirical work that hasn’t been done before: 
The surveys carried out in relation to RO2 represent original empirical research 
that specifically addresses respondents’ views on what they believe should be 
considered ‘sensitive’ as data categories.  
 
Additionally, there is no existing research (empirical or otherwise) that 
compares EU and US respondents’ views in relation to sensitive personal data 
categories.  
 
Making a synthesis that has not been made before: 
Existing research in relation to privacy seals has been conducted exclusively on 
US based respondents. In this thesis a survey was used to identify what 
categories of personal data EU and US respondents considered most sensitive. 
These results were then used to conducted experiments on both EU member 
and US state residents to examine what impact the presence of privacy seals 
have on personal information disclosure. The results also allowed for a 
comparison of the results from the respondents based in different jurisdictions.   
 
New evidence on an old issue:  
Existing research on privacy seals and related privacy iconography has relied 
on icons created by the authors. This brings obvious methodological issues in 
relation to their design etc. In the research conducted here actual ‘real world’ 
operation privacy seals run by private companies have been used in the 
experiments and this is an original approach. This extends our knowledge on 
how contextual clues impact on personal information discloser. The findings 
also make a contribution to confirm existing theoretical literature on the 
presence of the so called ‘privacy paradox’. In the surveys conducted for this 
tesis, participants confirmed the categories of data that they thought should 
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have added ‘sensitive data’ protection in law. However, in the experiments the 
vast majority disclosed many of these personal data categories for less than $1.   
 
 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
Technological developments have facilitated the rapid growth of a global new 
media industry. For some firms like Facebook, Apple and Google, first mover 
advantage has resulted in them capturing very significant percentages of global 
market share. Technology now allows sophisticated advertising to media 
consumers based on their personal data disclosures has seen a small number 
of new medial firms dominate this sector, with some commentators referring to it 
as an example of monopoly capitalism.    
 
In May 2017, the editorial in the Economist declared the world most valuable 
recourse was no longer oil, but data. It went on to call for this new media sector 
to have more regulation. Apple’s chief executive Tim Cook echoed this by 
declared privacy to be one of the most important issues of the 21st century and 
called for greater regulation of the industry to protect the wider interests of 
society (Thornhill 2018). Cook has even described the collection of personal 
data as surveillance (Lomas 2018).  
 
Perhaps we should not be overly surprized with the warning from Tim Cook. In 
the 1970’s we heard Irwin Altman warn that individual privacy was required for 
cultural survival.   
 
Additionally, in light of the Cambridge Analytica scandal in March 2018, 
Facebook has announced measures to increase the transparency around who 
places political advertisements on Facebook (Hern and Waterson, 2018). It 
remains to be seen now effective this increased transparency is going to be. 
 
The 2018 GDPR represents an attempt by EU regulators to address the 
concerns about how technology can gown in a way that helps wider society and 
thus avoid the somewhat dystopian cultural and democratic harms that Cook 
and Altman warn us about. Although its existence emanates from an EU 
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regulation, the ‘Privacy Shield’ arrangement for international data transfers 
means that the GDPR has effectively become the global standard for data 
protection.  
 
The effective enforcement of meaningful penalties for breaches of regulatory 
rules, has an important role to play in protecting data subjects personal data. 
However, in the case of large new media firms, regulation and deterrents might 
not be enough. Some commentators suggest that for a firm like Facebook,  
 
“the nature and scale of its operations make it nearly impossible to avoid major 
data breaches that expose highly personal data” (Coldewey 2018).  
 
If we accept that new media firms (as data controllers) cannot guarantee to 
keep our personal data safe, then it is important that consumers of new media 
(i.e. data subjects) take responsibility for who they decide to share their 
personal data with. While privacy seals are not the only weapons that can be 
deployed to protect against the ‘data industrial complex’, an effective privacy 
seal accreditation scheme can be an important tool for both data subjects and 
data controllers to engender trust in each other.  
 
Mai et al (2010) conducted research into how the use of privacy seals by online 
vendors impacting on consumers purchasing behaviour. The authors usefully 
differentiate between what they call ‘scrupulous’ and ‘unscrupulous’ vendors. 
Scrupulous vendors are those implement and monitor stringent privacy policies 
and incur additional costs because of this. Unscrupulous vendors do not incur 
these costs. The research adopts the premise that when making purchases 
online, consumers face a choice between buying from privacy seal bearing 
vendors or from non-privacy seal bearing vendors. The latter is associated with 
an enhanced risk of privacy violation for the purchaser (data subject). There is 
almost no way for potential consumers to distinguish between the ‘scrupulous’ 
and ‘unscrupulous’ vendors and therefore privacy seals potentially have a role 
here.  
 
It is my belief that it is data subjects themselves who need to take greater 
responsibility for what personal data we choose to share with specific new 
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media service providers. Third party verified privacy seals can have a role in 
helping data subject select new media services who adhere to the relevant 
regulatory requirements. In the UK we have an OFSTEAD system for 
independently evaluating schools performance against a set of national criteria. 
This does not make all schools excellent but it does help with decision making 
for parents. A similar independent third-party evaluation of the data collection 
and sharing of media and large tech firms is needed to help us as consumers 
(i.e. data subjects) decide who we interact with.   
 
In the 1980’s, HIV was considered an issue of national health and in the UK a 
national public information campaign to inform the public about the potential 
risks and how to take steps to avoid those risks. For me, the data industrial 
complex and new media and tech firms ability to weaponize our data against us 
for either commercial or political reasons, represents a serious threat that 
requires a national/international campaign to inform and mitigate against the 
most serious consequences. Third party accredited privacy seals have a role to 
play in protecting data subjects. It is not the sole solution, but it has a role to 
play. 
 
Some commentators have warned that data protection regulators have been, 
“corrupted and compromised through timidity and neglect” (Davies 2001, pg289). 
Davies does acknowledge that some may interpret his views as ‘extreme’ 
and/or alarmist. However, he defends his position pointing out that once a 
fundamental right has been established, the rigorous protection of these rights 
is in fact a conservative notion and this it is the transgressor who becomes 
radical. He believes both the government and the private sector conveniently 
invert this notion and it is those who call for greater privacy as radical rather 
than a conservative notion.  
 
As Lucy Kung notes, the new media industry has faced many new innovations 
over the past 100 years. There is one persistent pattern that all CEO’s should 
be aware of, “technology gives, and technology takes away” (Küng 2008, p.125).  
 
“Under such circumstances, dialogue between media management scholars 
and policy makers, as mentioned, is critical” (Rohn 2018, p.436).  
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Media management scholars can be used to identify emerging trends in the 
sector that may give firms a strategic advantage over competitors, rather than 
just waiting on regulators to publish compliance rules.  
 
Google (Alphabet), Facebook and Microsoft have all established dominant 
positions in the new media sector. This has mainly been driven through their 
ability to innovate and capitalize on technological advances (Doyle 2013). 
However, their ability to retain these dominant positions may depend on their 
ability to react to their users desire not just for innovations in terms of 
functionality and features, but also in their ability to react to concerns. As new 
media consumers become more aware of how their personal data is 
shared/traded etc, there may well be a role for third-party verified/accredited 
Privacy Seals in giving consumers the reassurances they need that data 
controllers are trustworthy. As the new media sector further evolves, retaining 
dominant positions within the sector may depend on such 
assurances/innovations. 
 
 
5.6 Limitations:  
 
The methodological limitations associated with surveys and experimental 
methods as well as recruitment of participants using MTurk are set out with in 
Chapter 3. A key limitation in relation to RO3 experimental findings is that 
participants did not see or understand what the privacy seals displayed in some 
of the treatments. There are methodological reasons as to why experiment 
participants are not explicitly alerted to the presence of the privacy seal.   
 
5.7 Future Research:  
 
The experiment and surveys in this thesis were conducted in 2016 and 2017. In 
2018 we have seen controversies in terms of how personal information was 
harvested from Facebook and used in political advertising during the US 
presidential and Brexit referendum in the UK. It would be interesting to see if 
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these controversies have made people more privacy aware in terms of personal 
information disclosure.  
 
“The tremendous speed of change in the media industries and practices calls 
for conducting more longitudinal and time series studies to avoid only seeing 
screenshots of reality that do not capture all the trends and full complexity” 
(Rohn 2018, p.437).  
 
It will be interesting to see the results of the experiments conducted for this 
research change over time as public becomes more aware of how their 
personal information is used in behavioural advertising and online political 
campaigns etc.  
 
The findings here could be used as a longitudinal study to establish how 
attitudes to privacy, and specifically privacy seal’s impact on personal 
information disclosure, develops over time.  
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6 Appendices 
 
6.1 Appendix 1: RO1 Survey  
 
This is a link to the survey in relation to Research Objective 1. 
 
https://bournemouthbusiness.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_2hnf0fmj42i6fkx 
 
The figure below is an example screenshot of the survey. 
 
Figure 6-1 RO1 – Example Survey Screenshot 
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6.2 Appendix 2: RO2 Survey 
 
This is a link to the full survey in relation to Research Objective 2: 
 
https://bournemouthbusiness.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_9nv8LNMTIxeQAtL 
 
The figure below is an example screenshot of the survey. 
 
 
Figure 6-2 RO2 – Example Survey Screenshot 
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6.3 Appendix 3: RO3 – EU Experiment 
 
 
This is a link to the full survey in relation to Research Objective 3 EU 
Experiment: 
 
https://bournemouthbusiness.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_6tHSzDIZkIUr8QB 
 
 
The figure below is an example screenshot of the survey. 
 
 
Figure 6-3 RO3 – EU Experiment Example Screenshot 
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6.4 Appendix 4: RO3 – US Experiment 
 
This is a link to the full survey in relation to Research Objective 3 US 
Experiment: 
 
https://bournemouthbusiness.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_3BOl2xrvxG4ieS9 
 
The figure below is an example screenshot of the survey. 
 
 
Figure 6-4 RO3 – US Experiment Example Screenshot 
 
 
